LONDON CONFERENCE IN CRITICAL THOUGHT

Birkbeck College
University of London

29th & 30th June, 2012

http://londonconferenceincriticalthought.wordpress.com/
Twitter: @londoncritical/#londoncritical
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- **Parallel Sessions (4)** Friday 15.30 – 17.00
- **Book Launch and Reception, Friday** 18.00 – 21.00
- **Parallel Sessions (5)** Saturday 10.00 – 11.30
- **Parallel Sessions (6)** Saturday 12.00 – 13.00
- **Parallel Sessions (7)** Saturday 14.30 – 16.00
- **Book Launch and Reception, Saturday** 18.00 – 21.00

## Streams

- **Common Life: Critical Perspectives on Authority, Experience and Community**
- **Cosmopolitanism and the City**
- **Critical Art**
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- **Critical Education and Radical Pedagogy**
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- **Mapping the Concept: Developments in the Productive Power of Critical Theory**
- **Marx and Marxism Today**
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- **The Object: Between Time and Temporality**
- **Post-structuralism and the Political Subject**
- **The Question of the Animal, the City and the World**
- **Radical Political Rhetoric**
- **Sovereignty at the Margins: Critical Encounters with Early Modern Theories of the State**
- **Textual Space/Spatial Text**
- **Thinking Egalitarian Emancipation**
- **Transdiciplinary Approach to Law and Culture:**
- **Žižek and the Political**

## Single Page Timetable

## Map and Information
The London Conference in Critical Thought (LCCT) began as many ideas do – in conversation with friends. In this case it was with new friends made at another conference where we all felt that the most interesting panels and papers always seemed to appear at the margins of the event and the margins of disciplinary boundaries more generally. From this we were inspired to find a means of developing and sustaining the sense of community we found on these margins. Central to this vision was an interdisciplinary, non-hierarchical, and accessible event which made a particular effort to embrace emergent thought and the participation of emergent academics. While the original call for papers was developed by a small group of committed volunteers, the organising collective soon grew with an enthusiastic response from those who proposed thematic streams and panels. In this way, both the organising collective and the subjects discussed at the conference emerged in a very organic process as academics identified with an event oriented toward a broad interpretation of critical thought.

In the spirit of accessibility and the facilitation of an emergent community of academics, we have kept the conference free and decided against the common practice of plenaries and invited speakers. Although the LCCT is not directly affiliated with any specific institution, it would not have been possible in its current form without the generous support of: the Birkbeck Institution for the Humanities, who have provided both financial and administrative support; the Birkbeck School of Law, who have provided financial support as well as the use of School facilities during the organisational process; Edinburgh University Press, who are launching the books of two of our organising collective on Friday evening; and Routledge, who, on the Saturday night will also be launching a book co-edited by one of our stream organisers. But most importantly, the conference has been possible due to the commitment of the organising collective itself – from writing the call for papers, to designing the program and coordinating volunteers. The LCCT is very much a reflection of the efforts and vision of the collective and conference participants.

Next year’s LCCT has been agreed in principle to be hosted by the London Consortium – and we look forward to the conversations and friendships that will continue to develop in 2013.

Victoria Ridler and the LCCT Collective
Friday, June 29th

9.00 – onwards    Registration/Information
(Malet Street 152/153 - this room will be open for registration and information all day.)

9.30 – 11.00 Parallel Sessions 1

Textual Space/Spatial Text I
Text and space (MS 416)

Fire Escape / Washing Line
Edwina Attlee

The Language of Real Estate Boards
Peter Safronov

Towards a Spatial Ontology of the Maritime Subject of Modernity
Jonathan Stafford

Critical Art I (MS 417)

Rancière Against the Cuts! Activism as Aesthetic Force
Steve Klee

Art, Professional Ethics and the Great Book of Accounts
Theo Reeves-Evison

Notes Towards a Secret Service: Critical Art and Employment Contracts
Sophie Hope

Critical Human Rights I
Human Rights Beyond Marx (MS G16)

The Proletariat and the right for ‘the common’
Andreja Zevnik

The Modern Foundations of Critical Human Rights
Bob Cannon

On the Human Rights Question
Paul O’Connell

Common Life I
Questioning Community: new articulations of a ‘common’ politics (MS 151)

The idea of the common
Leila Dawney

Community as a ‘body without organs’, Post-sovereign reformulations of democracy
Gundula Ludwig

From commons to commoning
Patrick Bresnihan

The Question of the Animal I
Consumption and the Question of the Animal (MS 538)

Cannibals and Apes: Revolution in the Republic
Dr. Richard Iveson

Wolf-biters and Over-Groomers: (Self-)Consumption as Ethical Reciprocity
Kamillea Aghtan

Molar Ethics and Aesthetics
Karin Sellberg

Post-Structuralism and the Political Subject (MS 151)

Social Integration Through Recognition: Between Normative Consent and Subjection
Kristina Lepold

Cultivating Sexuate Difference with Luce Irigaray’s Between East and West
Laura Roberts

‘We will destroy all logical revolt!’ Revolutionary Failure and the Event: Rethinking Kathy Acker’s Politics
Emilia Borowska

11.00 – 11.30 Coffee Break
(Coffee and tea will be provided in the registration/information room, MS 152/153)
FRIDAY JUNE 29th – cont.

11.30 – 13.00 Parallel Sessions 2

SPATIAL TEXT/TEXTUAL SPACE II
TEXT AND SPACE (MS 416)

Baudelaire and the Rhizomatic City
Octavia Bright

Rewriting the City, Reading Harry Beck’s Tube Map as a Form of Writing
Andrea Vesentini

NEW FOUCAULTIAN APPROACHES (MS 417)

Michel Foucault’s theory of sovereignty in modern political society
Attasit Sittidumrong

Healthcare as a Common Right: Biopolitics and the privatisation of the NHS
Graham Matthews

Who is the subject of human rights practice? Witnessing and its discontents
Michal Givoni

CRITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS II
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW (MS G16)

What is radical in ‘radical international law?’
Bill Bowring

The World Turned Upside Down? Socioeconomic Rights and Counter-hegemony
Joe Wills

Critical human rights and liberal legality
Roger Merino Acuña

13.00 – 14.00 Lunch Break

MAPPING THE CONCEPT (MS 541)

Formulating Systems of Affect: Developing a methodology for interrogating and responding to the dominant aesthetic
Tina Richardson

Capturing The Social Sciences: An Experiment on Political Epistemology
Martin Savransky

Facing transpolitics – from image to operational formula
Dan Öberg

Decolonizing Critical Theory
Julia Roth

THE OBJECT: BETWEEN TIME AND TEMPORALITY I
ATTENTION TO THE OBJECT (MS 538)

Happening Art: Anthropological approaches to the art object
Sam Barton

Alarm Clocks, Awakening, and the Outsourcing of Capitalist Time
Jacob Bard-Rosenberg

The Object(s) of Musical Experience: Potentials for Cross-Disciplinary Dialogues
Sam Wilson

Fashion, Consumption, History
Calvin Hui

MARX AND MARXISM TODAY I
POLITICS (MS 151)

Marxism and Democracy Today
Marco Vanzulli

Inter-State Relations: Furthering National Interests
Ozgur Yalcin

From Negative Freedom to Recognition: A Change in the Concept of Reification,
Jonathan Lewis
14.00 – 15.00 Parallel Sessions 3

THE OBJECT: BETWEEN TIME AND TEMPORALITY II
ROUNDTABLE: “SPECULATIVE REALISM/ OBJECT-ORIENTED
PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRITICALITY OF CRITICAL THOUGHT” (MS 416)

Joseph Noonan-Ganley
Chris Wong
Stanimir Panayotov (via video)

CRITICAL ART II (MS 541)

In Europe, Nobody Knows How to Scream Anymore
Paul Pieroni

Noise Repetition – The Political Potential in Contemporary Music
Mads Led Behrend

MARK AND MARXISM TODAY II
VISUALIZING CAPITAL (MS 538)

Allegory, Commodity, and Death. Reading Capital with
Benjamin
Sami Khatib

On the Visual Dimension of Alienation: The Berlin School (Hirdina, Heise, Trebess)
Leena Petersen

THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL II
ANIMAL LIFE: BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (MS 417)

A Marxist Response to ‘The Animal Question’?
Daniel van Strien

Deleuze and an Ethics of Suffering: Toward the Zone of Indiscernibility of Human and Animal
Hyun Sook Oh

A Poetics of the Naughty
Tom Lee

THINKING Egalitarian EMANCIPATION I (MS G16)

Participation, Cooperation, and Common Property:
Outlines of a Post-capitalist and Communitarian Idea of (Global) Democracy
Stefano Salvia

Egalitarian Emancipation via Structural Non-dominating (or how to recover the structural critique of domination)
Ana Azmanova

15.00 – 15.30 Break

CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL THEORY I (MS 151)

The Eurocentrism of Critical Theory and Modernity as Crisis
Jose-Manuel Barreto

The blackness of black studies
Dhanveer Singh Brar

15.00 – 15.30 Break
FRIDAY, JUNE 29th – CONT.

15.30 – 17.00 Parallel Sessions (4)

CRITICAL EDUCATION AND RADICAL PEDAGOGY I
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EDUCATION (MS 416)

Evolution of welfare states 1960-1970: Birth of Education Society in Finland and West Germany
Matias Gardin

The Politics and Pedagogy of Debt: The New Poverty of Student Life
Gurnam Singh

The Tyranny of Structured-ness: Is the struggle for education restricted to institutional battlegrounds?
Soo Tian Lee

ŽIŽEK AND THE POLITICAL I
ŽIŽEK AND VIOLENCE (MS 417)

Anonymous Democracy – The Legacy of the French Revolution
Petr Agha

The Mapuche Hunger Strike and The Terrorism Act in Chile: Symptoms of a State and their anti-ethical dimensions
Dasten Julián Vejar

DELEUZIAN THEORY IN PRACTICE I
PRACTICES (MS G16)

Deleuze, Philosophy and the Missing Architecture,
Marko Jobst

What is Deleuze and Guattari’s political theory, if there is any?
Charles Barthold

Who are our nomads today? Deleuze’s Political Ontology and the Revolutionary Problematic
Craig Lundy

CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL THEORY II (MS 541)

Towards a theoretical foundation of human rights: An analysis from Decolonial thinking
Fernanda Frizzo Bragato

Critique of critique: On critical interventions
Elise Derroitte and Alain Loute

CRITICAL ART III (MS 538)

Killing Time Without Inuring Eternity
Amelia Groom

Ambiguous Materialities – objects and affects of resistance
Ida Marie Hede Bertelsen

Constructing Surrealism
Oisín Wall

RADICAL POLITICAL RHETORIC I
THEORIZING RADICAL RHETORIC (MS 151)

Discourse or Dialogue? Habermas, the Bakhtin Circle and the Question of Concrete Utterances
John Roberts

The tactical polyvalence of leftism
Mark Kelly

Being Radical: The modernist grounds of radical political rhetoric
Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis

The Politics of Redescription and Democracy: Going beyond Rorty
Giuseppe Ballacci

COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE CITY (MS 540)

Reorient[ing] the politics of the state’: Cosmopolitanism and Multidirectionality in Teju Cole’s Open City
Daniel O’Gorman

Paris, Paramount: Ernst Lubitsch and the Imaginary Open City
Rachel Kapelke-Dale

Cosmopolitanism and the Metropolis
Esra Mirze Santesso

Olympics: Cosmopolitan dialectics of the city and the state
Erdem Ertürk

18.00 – 21.00 BOOK LAUNCH AND RECEPTION (FOYER OF B01, CORE)
EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS BOOK LAUNCH AND RECEPTION
FRIDAY JUNE 29th EVENING
18.00 – 21.00 (FOYER OF BO1 CLORE)

HISTORY AND BECOMING,
with author Craig Lundy

&

ŽIŽEK AND COMMUNIST STRATEGY,
with author Chris McMillan
SATURDAY, JUNE 30TH

10.00 – 11.30 Parallel Session (5); 10.00 – 14.00 Registration/Information  (Clore G01)

**TRANS Disciplinary Approach to Law and Culture (MS G15)**

Colonial Law and the Destruction of Tradition
Siraj Ahmed

Fanon, Violence and the Post-colonials
Saroj Giri

Oury Jalloh and the Colonial Scene: Law as Reminder
Eddie Bruce-Jones

**THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL III**

**Animals in Domestic and Urban Space (MS 451)**

The Panoramic Animal: Authenticity and Living Exhibitions
Aaron Santesso

Art from the Dead: the Moral and Ethical Transformation of the Animal Pet into Cultural Artifact
Angela Bartram

Animal-Life in the London Zoo: Architecture, Consumption and Display
Lucia Vodanovic

**THINKING EGALITARIAN EMANCIPATION II**

**EMANCIPATORY PRACTICES (Clore 101)**

Taking Power or Re-Making Power?: New political cultures and strategies of opposition in the Americas and Beyond
John Foran

The failure of the post-1968 consensus
Kevin Gray

Abstract of Catalyzing Dissent: Irreversible Noise and Computational Immanence
Inigo Wilkens & Andrew Osborne

**DELEUZIAN THEORY IN PRACTICE II**

**CORPOREALITY (MS 415)**

Humoural Assemblages and the Praxis of Corporeal Confluence - Anna Chromik

Deleuze and Alcoholism - Aidan Tynan

Refractions of Crystallinity - Dennis Rothermel

**SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MARGINS I (MS 417)**

The Schmittian Deconstruction of Hobbes’ Leviathan
Georgios Kolias

Walter Benjamin’s Monadology and the Fragmentation of Sovereignty: A Response to Carl Schmitt
Paula Schwebel

Hobbes, Foucault and the Shadow of Sovereignty
Osman Nemli

**MARX AND MARXISM TODAY III**

**DIALECTICS (Clore 102)**

Max Horkheimer’s Open Marxism Retrieved. A Defence of His Dialectics
Vasilis Grollios

Marx, Hegel and the ‘Realisation of Philosophy’ in the Work of Guy Debord and the Situationist International
Tom Bunyard,

Communism and Consumerism: A New Perspective
Ishay Landa

**CRITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS III**

**THINKING BEYOND THE HUMAN OF RIGHTS (Clore 103)**

Liberal Pragmatism, the Marxian Critique of Human Rights and the Political Paradox
Andrew Schaap

Paintballs Against Lynchers – The Israeli media’s coverage of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla
Itay Eisinger

A Trojan Horse? The Pirate and the constitution of the in/human at the limits of the international
Roberto Vilchez Yamato

11.30 – 12.00 Coffee Break – Coffee and Tea provided in room G01 Clore
SATURDAY, JUNE 30TH – CONT.  12.00 – 13.30  Parallel Session (6)

CRITICAL EDUCATION AND RADICAL PEDAGOGY II

Critical Education and the Creation of Situations: From Adorno’s Critique of Halbbildung towards a Situationist Pedagogical Praxis
David Christopher Stoop

Understanding Post-Situationist Struggles in Education: A Comparative Analysis of the Production of Bio-Political Utopias and Revolutionary Subjectivities Then and Now
Kasper Opstrup

Walter Benjamin and Critical Pedagogy: the Limits of Liberalism and the Refunctioning of Pedagogy
Matthew Charles

COMMON LIFE II

ON THE PRACTICAL AND EMBODIED; RADICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRODUCTION AND EXPERIENCE OF COMMUNITY.

We bow our heads in deep mourning: Genocide remembrance amongst global political communities
Tracey Skillington

Social Media, Organisational Cybernetics and Non-hierarchical Community Organisation
Thomas Swann

On Martin Luther King day...
Adam Gearey

SPATIAL TEXT III

SPATIAL TEXT (TEXT) (CLORE 101)

‘To’ in Contemporary Poetry
Johanna Hately

Textual Entrances and Crossed Thresholds
Hannah Gregory

CRITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS IV

UNWORKING DISEMBODIED HUMAN RIGHTS (CLORE 103)

Right of resistance and human rights intactivism: The mutilated body of female genital cutting
Elisabetta Bertolino

Narratives of Blood and the Killjoy Sister: Queering Human Rights’ Politics in Contemporary Argentina
Cecilia Sosa

13.30 – 14.30 Lunch Break

MARX AND MARXISM TODAY IV

ABSTRACTION AND VALUE (MS 415)

Real Abstraction and the Marxism of Alfred Sohn-Rethel
Simon Choat

Failed Abstraction – A Critique of Uno Közö’s reading of Marx’s theory of the value form
Elena Louisa Lange

SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MARGINS II (MS 417)

On the Unconditional Heteronomy of the Sovereign
Mauro Senatore

Securitization through Sovereignty: Anti-Roma Violence in the Nation and Supranation
Erin McElroy

Waning Sovereignty’s New Walls: Contested Mexican American Identity Politics in Ethnic Studies in Arizona
Perveen Ali and Nicolas Blanc

RADICAL POLITICAL RHETORIC II

CASE STUDIES AND ENGAGEMENTS (CLORE 102)

The not reactive rhetoric of emergent social movements
Alicia Dominguez Garnelo and Rommy Morales Olivares

Not Another Twitter Revolution: Social Media and the Radical Politics of Refusal
Zinaida Feldman

The role of ethics for radical political discourse
Anat Matar

This Silence that Is Not One: Silence as a Tactic in Politics
Sofia H. Hadjisavvidou
SATURDAY JUNE 30TH – CONT.

14.30 – 16.00 Parallel Sessions (7)

CRITICAL EDUCATION AND RADICAL PEDAGOGY III
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY NOW (MS G15)

Paulo Freire’s Educational Progressivism and Its Contemporary Significance
Jones Irwin

Critical pedagogy, Public Sociology and Student Activism
Joyce Canaan

COMMON LIFE III
DREAMS OF THE COMMON; OPENINGS, POSSIBILITIES AND CONCERNS (MS 451)

A communality-to-come: Deconstructive politics and community
Daniel Matthews

Pirates and politics: A digital commons or Bill Gates’s wet dream?
Tara Atluri

An uncommon commons: Radicalising the radical imagination as a response to new enclosures
Naomi Millner

Reclaim the commons: Occupy everything
Sophie Ball

SPATIAL TEXT/TEXTUAL SPACE IV
SPATIAL TEXT (CLORE 101)

Passions and Agonies of Critical Distance; the All too Exemplary Case of Maurice Blanchot
Ivan Callus

Photography, Violence and Sovereign Indifference in Benjamin, Agamben and Barthes
Saul Anton

Critical Distance in the Aesthetics and Politics of Simon Critchley
James Corby

DELEUZIAN THEORY IN PRACTICE III
INCORPORALITY (MS 415)

The Theory of Ideas: Kant and Deleuze
Daniela Voss

Tradition as Repetition: A Deleuzian Perspective on Christian Tradition and Practice
Kristien Justaert

Deleuze and Guattari: Creative versus Utopian Thinking
Lee Watkins

THE OBJECT: BETWEEN TIME AND TEMPORALITY III
TEMPORALITIES AS STRATEGY (CLORE 102)

Preservation, Restoration and the Politics of the English Constitution in the 19th Century.Reuben Bard-Rosenberg

Notes for an argument about Deleuze: postcolonial thought, temporality, transdisciplinarity
Matt Mahon

The Experiential Time of Pre- legality
William E Conklin

ŽIŽEK AND THE POLITICAL II
THEORETICAL INTERVENTIONS (CLORE 103)

The toilet as the Žižekian vase: On the implications of the Lacanian concept of cause to the critique of political economy
Gabriel Tupinambá

Rethinking the political: A genealogy of the “antagonism” in Carl Schmitt through the lens of Laclau-Mouffe-Žižek
Ricardo Camargo

Still Class Struggle and New Forms of Apartheid: What does sexual difference tell us about urban slums?
Chris McMillan

18.00 – 21.00 BOOK LAUNCH AND RECEPTION (FOYER OF B01, CLORE)
Routledge Book Launch and Reception

18.00 – 21.00 Foyer of B01 Clore
Saturday June 30th

New Critical Legal Thinking

with,

Matthew Stone, Illan R. Wall, and Costas Douzinas (eds.)
COMMON LIFE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AUTHORITY, 
EXPERIENCE AND COMMUNITY

Leila Dawney and Samuel Kirwan

I  Questioning community: new articulations of a ‘common’ politics. 
   (Friday 9.30 – 11.00 MS 541)

The idea of the common
Leila Dawney

Community as a ‘body without organs’. Post-sovereign reformulations of democracy
Gundula Ludwig

From commons to commoning
Patrick Bresnihan

II  On the practical and embodied; radical perspectives on the production and 
    experience of community. 
    (Saturday 12.00 – 13.30 MS 451)

We bow our heads in deep mourning’: Genocide remembrance amongst global political 
communities
Tracey Skillington

Social Media, Organisational Cybernetics and Non-hierarchical Community Organisation
Thomas Swann

On Martin Luther King day...
Adam Gearey

II  Dreams of the common; openings, possibilities and concerns. 
    (Saturday 14.30 – 16.00 MS 451)

A communality-to-come: Deconstructive politics and community
Daniel Matthews

Pirates and politics: A digital commons or Bill Gates’s wet dream?
Tara Atluri

An uncommon commons: Radicalising the radical imagination as a response to new 
enclosures
Naomi Millner

Reclaim the commons: Occupy everything
Sophie Ball
The idea of the common
Leila Dawney

This paper explores the political possibilities of this concept through a discussion of the production of new political subjectivities that it could generate, as well as a consideration of its role as an ethical and political tactic. With this in mind I refer to recent movements that have stressed solidarity politics, and have asked whether these have the potential to produce such new subjectivities, or whether they “get it wrong” because of the perceived rift between their practitioners and a collective (hegemonic) understanding of the “hardworking public”.

Drawing on recent work on new materialisms and affect (Protevi, Barad, Connolly), I argue that following the movements of materials and bodies can elucidate the ongoing formation of a sense of the common through an analysis of the affective, embodied moments of its production (Dawney, 2011). Embodied practices enable imaginary identifications with others and with places. A consideration of the sensate, material and affective dimensions of certain practices, I argue, also draws attention to our shared embodiment and vulnerabilities that have been considered as central to the formation of the common (Nancy).

Through these theoretical engagements, I consider the critical potential of developing collective subjectivities and the extent to which they are countered by politically dominant modes of subject production.

Community as a ‘body without organs’. Post-sovereign reformulations of democracy
Gundula Ludwig

My paper is divided into two parts: The first one is dedicated to the critique of the modern, ‘Western’ understandings of democracy as political order that needs to be grounded in a community which is depicted as entity. In the second part I propose a post-structural understanding of community.

In the first part, I argue that a specific understanding of ‘the body’ serves as crucial metaphor in constructing the demos as a self-contained community. With the emergence of modern sciences, the body became a source of objective truth and a naturally given entity. The strong use of bodily metaphors for depicting the political community that can be found in political treatises in the 18th and 19th century can be interpreted as attempt to construct the demos of the new, modern democracies as self-contained entity. In my paper I will focus on Germany in the 18th and 19th century and will lay out how an understanding of democracy that is based on the phantasm of a community as entity necessarily is limited. Furthermore, I will argue that such an understanding of the demos as entity still has its legacy in concepts of deliberative democracies in our present times.

Against this background, in the second part of my paper, I will focus on the question how democracy could be conceptualized differently if the phantasm of the body as source of certainty for any political community is unsettled. Rejecting an understanding of the body as a being, but rather deploying an understanding of the body as becoming, as a Body without Organs (BwO) (Deleuze/Guattari), as an intercorporeal, relational, fluid embodiment, I will discuss how such an understanding also leads to a reformulation of the political community. I will argue that if the body as source of certainty is suspended, also the demos is ripped off of its certainty. Political community then would be an infinite, disruptive, disorderly, hybrid, fragmented, ambiguous assemblage. Rejecting any transcendent principles that could be grounded in any ‘given entity’, the community as a BwO would take the impossibility of a grounding of the demos as starting point for rethinking the common, for rethinking demo-cracy in terms of demo-archy whereas the archy (principle) of democracy could only be the absence of any principle.
From commons to communing
Patrick Bresnihan.

In the 1990s the 'commons' became an increasingly popular way of thinking about alternatives to the privatization or state management of common resources (Acheson and McCay 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999). Despite appearing to offer a more sustainable mode of community resource management it has become a means of ensuring more effective governance within a recycled narrative of (ecological) modernisation. The consequence is the apparently neutral (non-ideological) and unavoidable extension of techno-scientific control over socio-ecological relations.

In this paper I describe and develop the idea of 'commoning' (Linebaugh 2011) as a critical response to the persistence of modern dualism. 'Commoning' describes an ongoing set of relations embedded in everyday exchanges with the material world. These horizontal exchanges provide the inter-subjective relations through which common worlds are constituted: commons materialise through bodies, animals and things, and are thus outside existing modes of representation (Bennett 2010; Ingold 2000; Papadopoulos and Stephenson 2006). In this way 'commoning', as immediate and immanent, escapes any normative, a priori framing of the 'common' such as those employed within existing narratives of sustainability. This suggests a non-dualistic, ecological subjectivity that is not external to a world (Nature) in need of regulation, but rather a multiplicity of enmeshed natures (human and non-human) that emerge through the immediate sociality and materiality of everyday experience.

In this paper I will articulate the idea of 'commoning' through my fieldwork on commercial fishing boats and the poetry of John Clare, who wrote at a time of enclosure at the turn of the nineteenth century. In conveying the unpredictable unfolding of a common non-proprietary world these voices, separated by two centuries, offer an alternative mattering of the 'commons' to the instrumental, humanist imperative of enclosure.

We bow our heads in deep mourning': Genocide remembrance amongst global political communities
Tracey Skillington

This paper explores some of the main symbolic practices used by the United Nations to transform the details of genocidal histories into objects of moral instruction for global communities. In particular, it will assess the binding potential and community-building capacities of annual UN commemorations of Rwandan and Holocaust atrocities. As high profile, public performances of collective remembrance, mourning, loss, allegiance and solidarity, these commemorations provide a rich context today for the articulation of shared but also sometimes competing meanings and identities across transnational communities of interpretation.

One dominant mechanism used to represent our collective relationship to these past tragedies is to present scenes of commemoration as scenes of mourning. Ancient rites of mourning and self-humiliation thus feature heavily in these commemorative performances. Their stated purpose is to 'honor' and 'mourn' that part of the global 'human family' that is formally recognized as 'missing' and to 'unearth the lessons we can draw from their lives and their fate'. However, as genocide atrocities keep re-emerging (e.g.,
the Great Lakes Region of Africa, phases of grieving and remembrance
can never be complete. Having set out from Auschwitz and Warsaw, the
funeral processions are still winding their way to the Genocide Memorial
in Kigali. As one moment amongst many episodes of collective mourning,
UN commemorations communicate ‘a duty of love’ to the dead but also,
a conciliation gesture or a show of solidarity with the living. The desire
is to reconnect a disenchanted post-Holocaust humanity with a human
rights-based project of agency, hope and redemption. Assertions like that
proclaiming ‘we can and must do better in the 21st century’ (Edward Luck,
Special Advisor to the UN’s Secretary General, 7 April, 2010) point straight
at the future but in a way that cannot ignore such failures in the past. Rather
than offering ‘prophetic visions’ (Benjamin, 1996) of a world now largely free
of barbarism, the act of commemoration is presented as a compulsory one for
a global humanity still in danger of forgetting its own potential for evil.

Social Media, Organisation Cybernetics and Non-hierarchical Community Organisation
Thomas Swann

The UK riots of 2011 saw social media coming to the fore in a seemingly horizontal form
of organisation. The availability of real-time information allowed unconnected groups to
coordinate action in efficient and successful ways. Rather than viewing the riots as a sign
of a lack of community, this presentation aims to discuss the notion that the organisational
structure of the riots actually signals the importance of a temporary or mediated community
(Baker 2011) brought together for a definite goal. It looks at the use of social media during
these uprisings within the framework of organisational cybernetics.

Organisational cybernetics, an approach developed by Stafford Beer (1979; 1981), proposes
that the most efficient form of organisation is that which allows individual operating units to
work autonomously within their own niche. These autonomous units are able to self-regulate their
activities in coordination with one another and in line with the goals of the organisation.

This is achieved by information sharing between operating units and higher level, more
centralised units which redistribute information as opposed to distributing orders.

Hierarchy and centralisation are not, however, essential to this organisational model
(Espinosa, Harnden and Walker 2007; Walker 1991). In this presentation, I want to highlight
how the use of social media allows this information sharing to occur without the need for
centralised information hubs. While the hierarchy of the organisational cybernetic model
remains, it does so only as a metaphor as different levels of the hierarchy become functional
roles played by different people at different times according to how the information is being
transmitted. This, I will argue, is how temporary, mediated communities, or networks, can
thus organise in ways that eschew the centralisation, hierarchy and, crucially, established
structures of community central to past social uprisings.

On Martin Luther King Day
Adam Geary

On Martin Luther King Day in 2006, the American radical movement Students for a Democratic
Society [SDS] was reformed. Defunct since 1969, the peculiar ‘afterlife’ of the SDS is indicated by the
re-foundation of ‘the movement’ for new times: a political conjuncture defined by the radicalism of
the 1970s and 80s, but perhaps most importantly, the alter-globalization radicalism of the last two
decades. Boldly proclaiming that "[o]ur common life will...be reclaimed"- the new SDS appears to be symptomatic of a striking moment in contemporary radical politics: the possible beginnings of a broad based movement beyond single issue protests. In order to focus our analysis, we will use the notion of 'the part of no part' to try to determine whether or not present SDS politics has a consistent ideology, and how this might relate to the legacies of the new left as mediated by the intervening decades of radical protest and organisation.

A communality-to-come: Deconstructive politics and community
Daniel Matthews

Like his friend Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida was deeply suspicious of “community” thought of as a present, totalizing, and essentialised collective that posits a clear sense of that which is included and excluded from its borders. Unlike Nancy, however, Derrida saw no purchase in rehabilitating notions of “community” and “the commons” in a deconstructive fashion. Derrida suggested that all communities suffered from an autoimmune tendency towards self-destruction. And whilst sympathetic with much of the thinking in Nancy’s Inoperative Community and Blanchot’s Unavowable Community, Derrida rejected their terminology, inferring that their projects had little to do with “community” at all. Alongside this, however, Derrida remained committed to a belief in the emancipatory potential of democracy, with two book length studies (The Politics of Friendship and Rogues) dedicated to re-articulating a certain sense of the promise of democracy. His thinking is most famously encapsulated with his notion of the “democracy-to-come”.

A tension then exists in Derrida’s thought: how can the belief in the promise of the rule of the demos be conceived in the absence of any sense of community action and engagement? Moreover, how can a valorisation of, and commitment to, the absolute singularity of every other (implicit in Derrida’s Levinasian-inspired ethics) be reconciled with a sense of communality that underpins democracy?

Arguing against much of the existing literature (most notably Wendy Brown and Jacques Rancière) this paper seeks to retrieve a certain sense of community from Derrida’s thought. I argue that while Derrida offers a robust (and justified) attack on closed, “operative” or essentialised communities, this should not foreclose thinking of a deconstructive sense of communality. In particular, by unpacking the logics of différance and the à venir that underlie the notion of democracy-to-come, I suggest that a sense of a “communality-to-come” can be developed in light of Derrida’s work. In the same way that Derrida argue that the democracy-to-come calls for action and engagement in the “here-and-now,” this sense of a communality-to-come is structured around a desire and need for practical and immediate engagement in politics (la politique) rather than being solely of use in recovering a sense of the political (le politique). The paper argues against the notion that Derrida leaves us with nothing but a kind of post-deconstructive individualism (as recently suggested by J. Hillis Miller) and hopes to illustrate ways in which Derrida’s thought offers new avenues for thinking critically about community, communality and the commons.

Pirates and Politics: A Digital commons or Bill Gates’s wet dream?
Tara Atluri

I am interested in exploring the paradoxes and possibilities of the digital commons. This is a
Neo Marxist analysis that draws on Marxist scholarship and works pertaining to contemporary biopolitics and late capitalist economies. In relation to the Arab revolts earlier this year, Antonio Negri commented that,

"...social network tools, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter...are the modes of expression of an intelligent population capable of using the instruments at hand to organise autonomously"(Negri, the guardian, February 24 2011).

One could also make note of Blackberry technologies used in recent UK riots as evidence of how social networking tools can be employed for collective dissent. However, in “Post scripts on societies of control,” Gilles Deleuze remarks that within societies of control “...one is never finished with anything...” (Deleuze,1992). Within societies of control, the internet can be used to police and monitor people at all times. Slavoj Žižek also argues we have entered a predicament Marx could not have foreseen, in which we are landless peasants paying rents to American internet tycoon Bill Gates. Žižek argues that ‘cybercapitalists’ appear as the paradigmatic capitalists of today. He states that,

What we have here is an ideological short-circuit between the two versions of the gap between reality and virutality: the gap between real production and the virtual/spectral domain of Capital, and the gap between experiential reality and the virtual reality of cyberspace (Žižek, 2007, 228).

Cyberspace allows for monopolies of rabid capitalists while workers in the global south labour in exploitative conditions to produce the latest technological gadgets. Conversely, New Delhi based activists/artists The Raqs Media Collective imagine that,

A community of programmers dispersed across the globe sustains a growing body of software and knowledge—a digital commons that is not fenced in by property controls. A network of hackers, armed with nothing other than their phone lines, modems, Internet accounts, and personal computers inaugurate a quite global insubordination by refusing to let code, music, texts, math and images be anything other than freely available for download, transformation, and distribution... (Raqs, 2010,108-109).

This paper will deal with the paradoxes of the “digital commons.” We can use the language of biopolitics and biopower to judge the paradoxes of the internet age. As Antonio Negri makes clear in “Art and Culture in the Age of Empire,”

The only problem that concerns us today, when we consider the new cultural determinations in imperial space, is that of seizing the moment of intersection, the determination of the event, the innovations that traverse the chaotic ensemble of the multitude. It’s a matter of understanding when biopolitical expression triumphs over the expression of biopower(50, Negri, 2007).

When and how is cyberspace used to re fashion biopolitical expression over biopower? Negri discusses the possibility of,

...taking ourselves as the starting point of a creative project. It’s the possibility of transforming our bodies, not just of rendering them hybrid by an interaction with the outside world, but of constructing them and rendering them hybrid from within. It’s the possibility of engaging in politics by leading all the elements of life back to a poetic reconstruction. The very term “biopolitics” implies this constitutive project(50, Negri, 2007).
The implications of transformative biopolitics are met with bipower, as state strategy. It is perhaps useful to reference Foucault’s originary use of these concepts. Lazzarato states that, “...‘life’ and ‘living beings’ (le vivant) are at the heart of new political battles and new economic strategies....” (Lazarato, 2011). He goes on to reference Foucault who stated that, “Western man gradually learns what it means to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified...” (Lazarato, 2011). Biopower can be defined, very generally as, “...an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations.” (Lazarato, 2011).

I will discuss key moments in the world of technology that gesture to transformative biopolitical uses of the internet and regressive forms of digital biopower. Namely, I will discuss cyberbullying and queer suicide, cyberfeminism in regards to Slutwalk organizing globally, the case of the Iranian ‘blogfather’ given a life sentence for creating blogs that were said to inform the 2010 Iranian Green revolution, the problem of ‘Bill Gates’ and other cybercapitalists, and cultures of internet piracy.

Radicalising the radical imagination as a response to new enclosures
Naomi Millner

This paper revisits the idea of the ‘commons’ often associated with radical imaginations for change, developing a theoretical framework which places this commons as an always-coalescing vision of community, rather than a particular set of social goods, or unquestionable grounds for political unity. As such this ‘commons’ must be acknowledged to be as present in fundamentalist and fascist visions of political change as in Leftist calls to arms – in fact, wherever political unity and momentum exists. The challenge for a properly ‘radical’ politics, such as that laid out by political theorists like Jacques Rancière, Todd May, and others, is to continuously intervene upon and remake this imagination, from a ‘minoritarian’ vantage. I revisit the idea of the commons through this minor way, reflecting first on how this alters how we approach the enclosures of common lands and counter-movements in sixteenth century England, and draw upon their histories in our critical claims. Secondly I offer some methodological tactics for critically revisiting the new enclosures which David Harvey (2003) associates with new forms of capitalism, developing examples from recent episodes of ‘land grabbing’ in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. The paper suggests that such acts of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ cannot be countered by a simple reiteration of the need to protect the commons. Instead concerted efforts to interrupt the common imagination from a minority vantage are called for, which require courageous associations between academics, activists and practitioners.

Reclaim the commons: Occupy everything.
Sophie Ball

‘The Commons’ is a phrase with an apparently simple enough meaning yet one that we can currently see being used with rapidly accelerating frequency in an ever-broadening range of issues, and carrying, it would seem, ever more depth of meaning. This paper sets out a brief history and typology of the commons, drawing on a diverse selection of texts from Magna Carta to statements by the collective Anonymous, and highlighting also the significance of grassroots movements in the re-emergence and development of the commons discourse.

Practices of commoning are a reinvention of political relationship. In the contemporary development of a discourse around the commons we can identify a reaction against the imbalance of corporate power versus that of the individual, and a response to the failure of...
governments to acknowledge the voice of their citizens. If neoliberalism has encroached upon, privatised, destroyed or damaged commons, if it has limited or denied access to physical, economic, cultural and political spaces, then movements to reclaim spaces, to ‘reclaim the commons’, have emerged to counter these trends. Grassroots activism has tended to be overlooked by mainstream media, academics, business and political parties. By failing to recognise the significance of grassroots activist groups and their achievements, we overlook a noteworthy movement towards a new democracy that is ‘a reimagination of public governance emerging from place, culture, and people.’ (Hawken 2007)

‘Commons thinking’ is found in approaches to the management of resources which prioritise social and environmental justice, providing a reformative tendency to neo-liberal capitalist exploitation, as well as responding to emerging issues concerning the management of global environmental commons. It is also found in radical approaches which see irreconcilable contradictions between capitalism and notions of the commons and which do not accept solutions based on capitalist growth. This paper will argue that the discourse of the commons transcends the capitalist/anti-capitalist dichotomy and helps us to reconceptualise the political and economic sphere.
In his essay, ‘On Cosmopolitanism’, Jacques Derrida calls for ‘a genuine innovation in the history of the right to asylum or the duty to hospitality’. He argues that the beginnings of such an ‘innovation’ might be found in the notion of the ‘open city’, a wartime term denoting a conurbation surrendered by its government to avoid unnecessary violence to its people, but which also draws on the ancient Judean ‘cities of refuge’, in which people who committed manslaughter were granted asylum (outside the designated cities, they would normally be subject to a vigilante blood feud). ‘Whether it be the foreigner in general,’ Derrida writes, ‘[or] the immigrant, the exiled, the deported, the stateless or displaced person … we would ask these new cities of refuge to reorient the politics of the state’.

In this paper, I will analyse the way in which the literary figuration of a contemporary city can contribute to an establishment of the circumstances by which a cosmopolitan ‘reorient[ation] of the politics of the state’ can begin to take place. I will focus in particular on Teju Cole’s *Open City* (2011), a novel about a Nigerian-German psychiatrist leading a solitary and alienated immigrant existence in post-9/11 New York, who unwittingly finds out that he may have once perpetrated a thoughtless and traumatising act of violence against a childhood friend in Lagos. I will argue that, through the trope of the global city, the novel connects the personal to the political in a way that Michael Rothberg might describe as ‘multidirectional’: that is, as ‘subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not privative’. I suggest that this ‘multidirectional’ connection has the potential to disrupt the often homogenising narratives of national identity that have shaped ‘the politics of the state’, both in the US and elsewhere, since 9/11. By engendering what Kwame Anthony Appiah calls a ‘conversation[] across boundaries of identity’, I posit that it can work to replace hostility towards the other with a more cosmopolitan hospitality.
Derrida’s discussion of ‘open cities of refuge’ challenges our traditional view of war-threatened ‘open cities’ by re-situating asylum, hospitality, and the cosmopolis itself in terms of the sovereign state. One case study, of a displaced filmmaker in 1930s Hollywood, elaborates upon Derrida’s constructions, showing the possibility of reconciling these spaces through their cinematic depictions.

In the midst of the Great Depression, a noted period of American isolationism, one of the most celebrated comedic directors in Hollywood was an émigré: the German-Jewish Ernst Lubitsch. Yet despite his heritage, Lubitsch had left Germany in the early 1920s, not in flight from the Third Reich: he had come to work in Hollywood, drawn by the resources and opportunities available for a talented director. Strangely enough, of the eleven feature-length films he made in Hollywood during the 1930s, all but one were at least partially set in Paris; the only one that wasn’t was *Monte Carlo* (1930).

Through the image of Paris that Lubitsch’s films present, we as spectators can see the embodiment of Derrida’s open city as a place both representative of and separate from its Nation-State. The paper will look at Lubitsch’s films as a way of addressing the question of to what extent classic Hollywood film can productively read the Open City – and whether, indeed, it is the only ‘place’ where such a city can exist.

**Cosmopolitanism and the Metropolis**

Esra Mirze Santesso

Postcolonial studies tends to privilege the metropolis as a site of cultural diversity: as opposed to the closed, monocultural and unrefined enclaves of rural space, or the vast, estranged populace (the "imaginary community") of national space, the city offers a geographically contained but culturally open site that offers the possibility of cosmopolitan existence. London’s history (as a post-imperial, post-colonial space) seems to justify this vision, and it certainly serves as the quintessential emblem of cosmopolitanism in contemporary British literature, both an extension of the nation (as the former center of empire) and of the previous colonies due to mass migrations. It is therefore the ultimate site in which the postcolonial subject may create new forms of identity vis à vis cosmopolitanism, leading towards the possible construction of hybridity, a space of in-betweenness.

However, when it comes to religion, and specifically Islam, the promise of urban cosmopolitanism stands on shakier grounds; indeed, the very diversity of London has both inspired and sheltered the growth of a neo-fundamentalist community. In Appiah’s words, these neo-fundamentalists (whom he identifies as “counter-cosmopolitans”) “exemplify the possibility of a kind of universal ethics that inverts the picture of cosmopolitanism” by invoking “universalism without toleration.” This view of the city as a space of withdrawal and radicalization as well as openness and cosmopolitanism finds support in contemporary literature: in Hanif Kureshi’s *The Black Album*, anti-cosmopolitanism appears in the guise of a radical Muslim group who publicly burn Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*. Nadeem Aslam’s *Maps for Lost Lovers* portrays a first-generation Muslim woman, Kaukab, living in a Muslim ghetto in London, whose strong devotion to Islam causes leads to her estrangement not just from "cosmopolitan" London, but even from her secular husband and children; indeed, when her brother-in-law is the victim of an honor killing, she expresses her support for the killers. The same type of sentiment is articulated in Leila Aboulela’s *Minaret*: unable to appreciate Western freedom and individualism, Najwa expresses a desire to retreat from cosmopolitan space, and become a slave and a concubine in a harem.
This paper, then, will investigate the way the city, the ostensible locus of cosmopolitan interaction, holds also the potential to act as a site of diasporic radicalization. Recent works by British Muslim novelists move away from the optimistic vision of the metropole to a very different idea of London as a patchwork of isolated enclaves—ironically, something closer to the traditional vision of rural existence. In this way, the novelists provide a lens through which to study tribal/national/transitional subjectivity, complicating assumptions about cosmopolitan, global citizenship based on a romanticized notion of postcolonial freedom and hybridity.

**Olympics: Cosmopolitan dialectics of the city and the state**

Erdem Ertürk

In *On Cosmopolitanism*, Derrida writes about a new cosmopolitics which requires thinking about a novel status for the city. The context in which Derrida writes involves the question of refugees and the granting of the right to asylum. In light of sovereign states’ ever increasing restrictions upon the right to asylum Derrida highlights the need for an original concept of hospitality. Associated with the idea of open cities of refuge, the concept of hospitality necessitates a reorientation of the politics of the state. This, in turn, raises the question of whether the city can be equipped with new rights and greater sovereignty to offer such hospitality.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the Olympics as an international event of hospitality and question whether the games may provide the most ancient example of cosmopolitics. This necessitates probing further into the city- and state-centric aspects of the modern Olympics and examining the interrelation of these features. Since ancient times, the Olympics remain a ‘city event’ in which the host city welcomes athletes from many parts of the world. In modern times, this is reflected by calling the event by the name of the hosting city: London 2012, Beijing 2008, Athens 2004 etc. Nonetheless, the modern Olympics are also an event in which the *nation-states* compete. The athletes belong to national-teams, and the victory ceremonies involve the flag and the anthem of the nation-states. The aim of the paper is to consider whether the Olympics set a working structure of a truly cosmopolitan event by striking a dialectical balance between the city and the state.
Rancière against the Cuts! Activism as Aesthetic Force
Steve Klee

Art, Professional Ethics and the Great Book of Accounts
Theo Reeves-Evison

Notes Towards a Secret Service: Critical Art and Employment Contracts
Sophie Hope

In Europe, Nobody Knows How to Scream Anymore
Paul Pieroni

Noise Repetition – The Political Potential in Contemporary Music
Mads Led Behrend

Killing Time Without Inuring Eternity
Amelia Groom

Ambiguous Materialities – objects and affects of resistance
Ida Marie Hede Bertelsen

Constructing Surrealism
Oisín Wall

Rancière against the cuts! Activism as aesthetic force
Dr. Steve Klee

This paper seeks to describe the eruption of anti-cuts activism over last winter and spring as an instance of Rancièrean politics. My particular focus will be those activities organised under the banner of the Arts Against Cuts collective: slogan writing, marches, occupations and public interventions etc. (See http://artsagainstcuts.wordpress.com/)

To claim these activities for a Rancièrean politics is to assert they are instances of the verification of equality in contradistinction to the hierarchical logic of government cuts. The efficacy of this verification stems from the way it reveals power (police order) to be contingent. The extent to which anti-cuts activism has actually had an impact upon the Con-Dem government and broader political discourse will be a point of discussion.

My second claim is that egalitarian activism is aesthetic; the experience of equality felt in different ways by both victim and beneficiary of power during an activist episode is precisely symmetrical with
the experience of aesthetic free-play, which Rancière borrows from Kant and Schiller (2002; 2003b, pp. 197-202).

Rancière whilst stressing this consonance organises his philosophy-of-art so as to limit its potential repercussions. Specifically he does not allow that activism could be art even if it is undertaken by artists (2007a, p.264). For him art is political because it reveals, through strategies of aesthetic ambiguity, that the world might be different. But any attempt to actually change the world is the responsibility of the spectator. For the artist to do so, to mobilise people to join a march or directly confront power is to communicate in mere “messages” to stray beyond the realm of art (Rancière 2007a, p.258). In fact this very effort introduces a relation of proscriptive “mastery” between the artist and their spectator (Rancière 1991; 2004c, pp.49-50).

The final task of the paper is to argue that Rancière is wrong to impose this limitation on the agency of art and artists. I assert that there is a type of political signification, one apparent in the activities of Arts Against Cuts, which escapes the co-ordinates of mastery and fits squarely within the category of art. This signification is not a message but what I call a demand.

Art, Professional Ethics and the Great Book of Accounts.
Theo Reeves-Evison

A few years ago, Gustav Metzger suggested that museums should set up their own in-house ethical commissions in a way analogous to the systems in place in universities. For one night in January 2012 this became a reality. The event, which was open to the public, involved an internationally known artist proposing a work to a specially formed ethics committee. The ethics committee debated the proposal and came to a judgment on whether or not the artist could go ahead with the piece. The specific way in which decisions such as this are made will be the primary subject of this paper. Using the event as a springboard to talk about the unacknowledged role of politics in professional ethics, I will draw on the work of Deleuze and Lacan, and in particular their varying reflections on the issue of judgment. In both Deleuze’s essay ‘To have Done with Judgment’ and Lacan’s celebrated seventh seminar, judgment is linked to a biblical metaphor of the ‘great book of accounts’, in which debts are set off against a transcendent ideal of ‘the good’. In the second half of this paper I will amplify on this metaphor in order to explore some points of convergence between Deleuze and Lacan, and widen the discussion to draw on a number of recent books that have revealed the extent to which money lends its structural form to ethics. Coming back to the subject of art, and critical art in particular, I will conclude by asking if it is possible for artworks to imminently generate value, or whether we must always refer them to systems of judgment that are structured according to logics of equivalence. Is there a way for art to question the language and logic that gives the dominant moral discourse its appearance of legitimacy, without falling into the hopelessly appropriable discourse of transgression?

Notes towards a secret service: critical art and employment contracts
Sophie Hope

In this paper I will explore how critical art can be imagined and practiced within the confines of a contract of employment. My past research has involved trying to locate criticality within commissioned art projects in the UK. I found the most interesting territory to be where the limits of the contract are exposed and confronted as this tends to reveal (mis)understandings and (in)tolerances of what it means to be critical. Within this context, if criticality is deemed possible at all, it is when the artist holds up a mirror to reflect and critique the conditions of the commission itself. I am interested in how one’s position, in terms of employment status, in relation to a political
and economic context (such as the Olympics), affects the potential for criticality. The future of critical art will perhaps continue to invisibly bubble away, uncontracted and unsanctioned by urban developers, for example, not least because there are fewer opportunities in general of paid work for artists. I am interested, however, in the possibility of what Michel de Certeau called ‘la perruque’ – a subversion of existing forms of work to reclaim time and space for one’s own (critical) acts. Rather than fight for employment contracts or the ‘open brief’ that recognise the ‘autonomy’ and independence of the artist, I want to consider more broadly how one can operate, clandestinely, as an ‘artist in residence’ in any form of work, without framing it as such. How can one continue a critical practice below the radar of any contract of employment? What is lost and gained from this invisible, secret ‘service’? I will explore through this paper the future of critical art as a form or parasitical misbehaviour that continues to look like work but where something untoward is happening in its place.

**In Europe, Nobody Knows How to Scream Anymore**

Paul Pieroni

In certain ‘non-ordinary’ states of consciousness (e.g. a schizoid episode or a DMT trip) formal symbolic structures tend to fracture and crumble away. Language and meaning are pushed to their very limits by the psychotic or psychonaut (and sometimes well beyond...).

My proposed paper will explore the relationship between the displacement of formal symbolic certitude represented by psychotic and psychedelic states of consciousness and certain recent struggles around the hermeneutics of artistic production and interpretation.

This paper will be accompanied by a practical (or rather curatorial) anchor: documentation from a series of ‘interpretative’ symbolic (or rather anti-symbolic) experiments conducted recently with experimental musician Benedict Taylor, sound/visual poet Lawrence Upton.

**Noise, Voice and Repetition – The Political Potential in Contemporary Music**

Mads Led Behrend

_No concept comprehends the art of the past decade, but there is a condition that this art has shared, and it is a precarious one._” These are the words of the art theorist Hal Foster, who, in an attempt to sum up the art of the 00’s drawing on descriptions by Giorgio Agamben on bare life and the state of exception, Foucault’s biopolitics and Judith Butler on The Other, describes how contemporary art articulates this precarious state of our world. In short, Foster describes the precariousness of contemporary art as a new type of mimetic practice in the arts where the uncertainty, the state of exception and insecurity that characterizes our “liquid society” as Zygmunt Bauman would say, is being doubled in the art. In Hal Foster’s view, the critical potential of contemporary lies in the way it articulates and relates to the precarious state of our world. Precariousness cannot be reduced to the use of fragile materials and ephemeral works; it is an ontological state in contemporary art. The curator and art theorist Nicolas Bourriaud further develops the concept of this ontological precariousness to describe contemporary art as an altermodern nomadic art practice that changes the role of the artist from a _radical_ to a _radicant._

Through a discussion of this theory of precarious art, my presentation will attempt to describe the political potential in contemporary music. More precisely I will examine the political potential in three different musical gestures; _noise, voice and repetition_ in an analysis of selected pieces of contemporary music. The presentation will draw on different texts from aesthetic theory and art philosophy. I will refer to work by Hal Foster, Nicolas Bourriaud, Jacques Ranciére, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Attali and Michel Serres among others.
Killing Time Without Inuring Eternity
Amelia Groom

This paper looks at some of the ways in which four contemporary Japanese artists have conceptualised, visualised, employed and manipulated temporality. It considers Hiroshi Sugimoto’s crumpling and layering of historic temporalities and East Asian antiquities, the explorations of cosmic time and entropic processes in the work of Nomura Hitoshi, the temporal paradoxes of Arata Isozaki’s prospectively ruined futurism, and the accumulation of retrospective Gregorian calendar time in On Kawara’s archiving of past dates. A tendency towards cyclical reincarnative time is evident in these artists’ work, where alternate times are not juxtaposed (next to) but are superposed (on top of) each other so that temporality folds back on itself and each present includes both pasts and futures. In line with these notions of polychronicity and thickened temporality, the research weaves ideas from a broad range of thinkers from disconnected times and places, including Saint Augustine and the Zen monk Dōgen, as well as George Kubler, Michel Serres, Keiji Nishitani and King Sisyphus. I consider how time is conceptualised in classical Japanese aesthetics, through concepts including ma (framed interval in time/space), sabi (acquired patina), kire tsuzuki (‘cut continuance’) and mono no aware (‘the sadness of things passing’); and I look at the ways in which these traditions are adopted and re-imagined by artists in the present. Particular attention is paid to photography and the specific capacities and conundrums it has with regards to time. The photographic image might rescue a thing’s appearance from the ravages of time, but the notion of fixing the passing instant is problematised here, with examples of works that have drawn attention to the ways in which duration is inscribed in all photographs, making them intrinsically polychronic. Rather than treating photographs as abstracted and atemporal information, I consider here the physical support of all images and deal with photographs as material things – ones that create their own internal time and remain subject to the temporal progressions of the world.

Ambiguous Materialities – objects and affects of resistance
Ida Marie Hede

In a series of subjective journal entries Ida Marie Hede associatively investigates ideas around materiality, (art) objects and their relationships to criticality in contemporary art. Hede draws upon Canadian artist Iris Hässler’s installation ‘He named her Amber’, an ambiguous and intimate journey of traces, remnants, invisible textures and surfaces which move between categories and destabilize the expectations you would normally have in an art context. How may something not potentially experienced as art produce an affective ‘un-knowing’ which opens up the space of art, history and analysis? Is it possible – drawing upon the work of theorist and poet Fred Moten - to talk of the material objects in Hässler’s work as objects of resistance, objects, which ‘talk back’ and resists the hegemonic through their surfaces and textures? How may this be linked to the idea of an embodied critical art practice or the notion of criticality, which Irit Rogoff describes as a way of ‘living out the very conditions which we are able to see through’?

Constituting Surrealism
Oisín Wall

This paper will engage with the significance of the trial in Surrealist literature. It will begin by describing how the surrealist group constituted itself through the Dada trial of Maurice Barrès in 1922 – which negated Dada’s attempt at ‘absolute’ negation and differentiated the proto-surrealists from the rest of the Dada movement.
The rest of the paper will look at how the surrealists redeployed the concept of the trial as method of critiquing perceived reality. From the outset surrealist literature is littered with references to trials. For instance in the early 1920’s they wrote about holding assizes to establish who was guilty of betraying the avant-garde principles of Dada and Surrealism, in 1934 they tried Dali for crimes against surrealism and throughout the 1920’s and ‘30’s they simulated madness in order to try reality. They believed that through their critique, their constant trial of reality, they could overcome the common-sense perception of the world and create the conditions for a radical new form of consciousness.
I  The Institutionalization of Education
(Friday 15.30 – 17.00 MS 416)

Evolution of welfare states 1960-1970: Birth of Education Society in Finland and West Germany
Matias Gardin

The Politics and Pedagogy of Debt: The New Poverty of Student Life
Gurnam Singh

The Tyranny of Structured-ness: Is the struggle for education restricted to institutional battlefields?
Soo Tian Lee

II  Critical Theory and Radical Pedagogy
(Saturday 12.00 – 13.30 MS G15)

Critical Education and the Creation of Situations: From Adorno’s Critique of Halbbildung towards a Situationist Pedagogical Praxis
David Christopher Stoop

Understanding Post-Situationist Struggles in Education: A Comparative Analysis of the Production of Bio-Political Utopias and Revolutionary Subjectivities Then and Now
Kasper Opstrup

Walter Benjamin and Critical Pedagogy: the Limits of Liberalism and the Refunctioning of Pedagogy
Matthew Charles

III  Critical Pedagogy Now
(Saturday 14.30 – 16.00 MS G15)

Paulo Freire’s Educational Progressivism and Its Contemporary Significance
Jones Irwin

Critical pedagogy, Public Sociology and Student Activism
Joyce Canaan

Evolution of welfare states 1960-1970: Birth of Education Society in Finland and West Germany
Matias Gardin

This paper examines the impact of political ideas on the educational developments of Finland and West Germany from 1960 to 1970. It explores the issue by asking whether different ideologies of ruling parties mattered in these developments or were there other factors, such as the level of industrialisation, which are more influential in explaining cross-national variations regarding the birth of education society. Whereas mainstream analysts of comparative social policy since the early 1990s
have taken for granted that politics mattered in the post-war era reflecting the more-pronounced Left-Right, Catholic-Protestant and other historical cleavages, this research moves beyond the oversimplified traditional welfare-regime typologies and instead considers the issue of how education systems became intertwined with control-focused aspects of state development: whether and how they become instruments of discipline.

This research first analyses the ways in which disciplinary practices were theoretically presented as efficient means for societal control and then proceeds to investigate how they were later crystallised in practice. Drawing on the Foucauldian notions of power and normalisation, as well as on Althusser’s ideology, it will be suggested that in this process politics was likely to play a strategic role.

As this research indicates, welfare regimes became ever more complex societal structures which shaped the domestic evolution of nation-states after WW2. The welfare state became a centre of power in its own right. However, in today’s neoliberal dogma it is often assumed that strong economic development and egalitarian education policies are highly incompatible. This is a serious misunderstanding. As this study demonstrates, this was not the case in Finland or the Federal Republic. Quite the opposite, both countries emerged stable, prosperous and democratic into the 21st century. Therefore, a closer study on the interconnectedness between political realms, discipline and control, and economic realities regarding the subject needs to be established in the future.

The Politics and Pedagogy of Debt: The New Poverty of Student Life
Gurnam Singh

On the Poverty of Student Life was a now seminal text of the wave of political protest in Europe in the late 1960s. It was written by members of the small radical group known as the Situationist International and students at the University of Strasbourg in 1966. We revisit this key piece of radical student literature and consider it in the light of the issues facing students in the present. In particular they look at the way contemporary students have become increasingly controlled and contained through cycles of debt. We develop Marx’s analysis in Capital where he notes that increasing levels of dept are an essential part of the logic of capital, wherein Capital needs to extract surplus value in the production of commodities, which is reinvested in order to extract more surplus value and produce more commodities, and so on. The problem, which has been extensively discussed in recent Marxist work by David Harvey (2007,2010) is that in consumer capitalism workers need also to be able to buy those commodities. The logic of Keynesianism was to achieve this through guaranteeing wages at particular levels. However in a neo-liberal scenario this has been replaced by a strategy of enabling people to maintain living standards through the accumulation of debt. This is at the same time inherently unstable, as was revealed in the banking collapse of 2008.

We also explore here the inherent paradox within the current attempt to impose even greater debts on students. We are at one moment being exhorted by the government to ‘learn to live stoopithin our means’ at the very same time as students are being enticed into entering into debts of up to £40,000. We situate this policy, where a university education becomes a kind of personalised PFI, as part of a two prong strategy by the state. Firstly it seeks to reduce numbers of potential students, a policy driven by a fear of creating a large pool of unemployed graduates, with the concurrent reassertion of the value of an elitist Higher Education system and those no longer able to afford university being offered purely ‘vocational’ training (i.e. to meet the demands of the new labour globalised labour market). Secondly for those who go into HE that the burdening of these students with huge amounts of debt acts as a disciplinary hegemonic mechanism whereby the debt burden is so great that education is entirely dominated by the need to earn money to pay off those debts.

It is this situation which we characterise as the New Poverty of Student Life, in which exchange value comes to rule every aspect of the student experience. We argue, as the Situationists did several decades earlier that this is a strategy whose very contradictions will generate further resistance,
which we argue must go beyond the demand of rejecting tuition fees and argue for an egalitarian socialist project where the rationale of education, as well as other social goods and services, is purely in terms of their use value.

The Tyranny of Structured-ness: Is the struggle for education restricted to institutional battlegrounds?

Soo Tian Lee

Amidst the manic phases within the developments in education policy in the last couple of years both in the UK and beyond, the language employed in various catchphrases of resistance – from conference themes such as 'The University is Ours!' to the rhetorical cry, “Whose university?” -- suggests that we are still obsessed with (traditional) institutional sites and manifestations of education. More broadly, although theorists of critical and radical pedagogy from Freire to Giroux and McLaren rightly seek to intervene in the processes of education that are seen to reproduce oppressive conditions of thought-life, the application of such ideas seem to swirl around institutional nodes such as the school, the college and the university. Among the issues that this paper will seek to think through are the role of self-study, autodidactism and collective self-education in thinking about and enacting pedagogical ideas, as well as whether it is possible, or in fact necessary, for us to move beyond a focus on the structures of conventional institutions and into the messy morass of education in everyday life. Also, if one is to take seriously Ranciere’s critique in *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* of the traditional role of the teacher as explicator, how does the figure of the radical teacher-militant fit into an emancipator pedagogical practice that is founded upon the axiom of the equality of intelligences? It may be that an examination is necessary of the structures that enable education to happen, an examination which is not limited to the workings of educational institutions (or even the much wider, and perhaps more nebulous, concept of ‘society’) but which provokes the most basic questions in thinking about education, such as: 'who is able to learn?', 'how does learning happen?', and 'at what points are radical interventions, both in individual and collective settings, most necessary and effective?'

Critical Education and the Creation of Situations: From Adornos Critique of *Halbbildung* towards a Situationist Pedagogical Praxis

David Christopher Stoop

In his educational theory, Theodor W. Adorno differentiates between *Erziehung* and *Bildung* as two aspects of education. In this model, the term *Erziehung* refers only to the adaption of the individual to society, whereas *Bildung* describes a dialectical process in which the individual appropriates culture in its own and unique way: *Bildung* is the subjective side of culture. The dialectical process therefore changes both the individual and society. But Adorno also points out that the possibility of *Bildung* becomes doubtful in a society that undermines the individuals capacity to experience the world around it.

A similar criticism of the lack of experience has been provided by Guy Debord and the Situationist International (SI), who identified the "society of spectacle" as a new stage of capitalism. But in contrast to Adorno, the Situationists claim to expand the theoretical criticism of society to a praxis of interventions. The construction of situations and the production of new ("revolutionary") desires are at the core of this theoretical and practical project. Although the SI is most often discussed as a political or an art movement, it also has a strong pedagogical component insofar as both politics and art are confronted with the problem of *Vermittlung* (mediation). Moreover, the creation of situations is essentially understood as a learning process and the methods applied are not only influenced by political and artistic but also by pedagogical practices. In this paper, I will outline some of the pedagogical implications of the situationist theory. It will then be discussed, how the theory of the
Situationist International relates to the Critical Theory of Adorno. Finally, it will be asked, in how far and under which conditions a situationist praxis can contribute to a theoretical critique and a critical praxis of pedagogy today.

**Understanding Post-Situationist Struggles in Education: A Comparative Analysis of the Production of Bio-Political Utopias and Revolutionary Subjectivities Then and Now**  
*Kasper Opstrup*

From the early artistic avant-garde onwards, engaged cultural collectives have been preoccupied with the role of education in the sense of not only awakening, de-schooling and re-programming but also in the sense of an aesthetic Bildung. When Hugo Ball founded the Dada movement’s lauded Cabaret Voltaire, it was with an anarchist free school in mind. When Alex Trocchi dreamed up his Situationist utopia in the Sigma Project, it consisted of new experimental cities centred around a new type of spontaneous, action-university. In the early 1970s, the free university movement peaked only to rapidly disappear before re-appearing in the context of contemporary edu-struggles, free schools and other experiments with learning, a tendency that has exploded after the financial crisis.

This paper will address how this didactic urge transformed itself alongside capitalism during the long 20th century while addressing central themes like the production of subjectivities, meme wars, the desired redistribution of the sensible as well as cultural stealth attacks on semio-capitalism, inside operations aiming to create new commons. It will be about education in the context of art and activism but also about experiments with collectivism and new forms of life as well as the production of an unknown future which makes a radical break with what has gone before it.

**Walter Benjamin and Critical Pedagogy: the Limits of Liberalism and the Refunctioning of Pedagogy**  
*Matthew Charles*

This paper begins from the proposition that the current crisis in higher education must be understood in the context of the contradictions inherent to contemporary “mass education”. These contradictions may be explored in relation to the divisions between and within academic disciplines, the hierarchical divisions between teachers/researchers and students, and the social, economic, and political ones between the academic and “the outside world”. Framing the debate in this way permits a critical movement beyond the limitation of neo-liberal and “classical liberal” ideologies and their conception of the “public”, by focusing attention to the historical and material conditions of pedagogical theory and practice. Drawing on the work of Bill Readings, Jacques Rancière, and Walter Benjamin, it seek to confront and think through the Brechtian possibility that, if the concept of “education” can no longer be applied to that which will emerge once transformed into a commodity, we may have to eliminate this concept with due caution but without fear, lest we liquidate the function of the very thing as well.

**Paulo Freire’s Educational Progressivism and Its Contemporary Significance**  
*Jones Irwin*

Progressivism has always been a contested ideology in educational discourse, but, especially since the 1990s it has been considered to be associated with an overly-romanticised paradigm of child centred education. Here, the figure of John Dewey has come to be particularly maligned as being responsible for the annihilation of the teacher’s authority in the classroom and the overindulgence of student concerns. This is somewhat ironical given Dewey’s unequivocal critique of progressivism in his later work, for example in *Experience and Education*. 
I will argue in this paper that while Dewey overstates his opposition to progressivism, nonetheless a more interesting and consistent example of educational progressivism can be found in the work of the Brazilian philosopher of education, Paulo Freire. Freire’s later work in particular stresses what he terms a ‘postmodern progressivism’, which seeks to offer a pedagogical alternative to the increasing instrumentalisation of education, teaching, schooling and the university. Freire’s text *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1992) is the most eloquent example of Freire’s approach in this regard, but it also bears relation to earlier texts such as *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1968) itself and later, posthumously published texts such as *Pedagogy of Indignation* (2004).

This paper will provide a close reading of key passages concerning progressivism in each of these texts, while also connecting to two other relevant thematics. In the first case, on the basis of these readings, I will draw out Freire’s problematical relation to contemporary emancipatory theory in education, most notably that of Critical Pedagogy (with which he is often associated). Second, I will explore how Freire’s work can shed light on some of the recent conflictual policy issues in educational discourse, in relation both to schooling and the reform of the university sector.

The Practical Politics of ‘Criticality’ in Higher Education
*Sarah Amsler*

In 1938, after a decade of experimental work in the ‘progressive’ educational movement in the United States, John Dewey concluded that the defence of any pedagogical practice must begin from ‘a comprehensive, constructive survey of actual needs, problems and possibilities’ within a society – not from any certainty about the inherently progressive nature of an ‘ism’, or the inherent evils of traditional authority. Today, more a decade deep into the emergence of a multitude of educational struggles against neo-liberalism, the term ‘critical pedagogy’ has assumed a similar ideological aura as a progressive alternative to all forms of education that exist within a broad context of the ‘business-facing’ or corporatised university.

‘Criticality’ is thus widely regarded as an antidote to the intellectual, psychological, emotional and political ills of neo-liberalism. But what does it actually mean to think, teach or ‘be’ critically, in theory and in practice, at all, and today? To answer this question, I examine how the ‘critical attitude’ has been interpreted within different – and at times competing – traditions of educational philosophy and practice in recent years, and how they have been retooled with various consequences in contemporary projects of critical pedagogy. But which are most appropriate for understanding the particular limits and possibilities of human freedom in neo-liberal societies? Which articulations of ‘criticality’ offer critical hope today? After reflecting on these questions, this paper concludes by suggesting that rather than adopt the traditions and terms of ‘critical pedagogy’ as parts of oppositional identity, we may work to articulate more specific critical attitudes, affects and theories which interrogate how particular critical practices actually work to disrupt and open up logics of power in practice.

Critical pedagogy, Public Sociology and Student Activism
*Joyce Canaan*

Many academics and academic activists have been turning to critical pedagogy in recent years in response to growing government pressures to marketise and privatise the university. They have done so because of critical pedagogy’s insights that education can never be neutral and that learning most effectively occurs when students are encouraged to build on, and challenge, their pre-existent understandings. Critical pedagogues have found that students are moved by this pedagogy’s power to enhance their agency, linking the word and the world, as Freire put it, although few have sought its ultimate goal of building a more equal world.
This paper explores why the public sociology students taught in the past two years are, in the current climate of nearly wholesale government privatisation of HE and growing student resistance, beginning to realise critical pedagogy's emancipatory potential more fully than prior students. The paper, based on interviews and recorded, dialogue-based classes with students, examines key factors internal and external to the public sociology programme that contribute to students' changing responses. The paper concludes by considering how insights from an analysis of students' current and growing political awareness might contribute to the more effective use of critical pedagogy in future.
Critical Human Rights
Illan R. Wall

I  Human Rights Beyond Marx
(Friday 9.00 – 11.00 MS G16)

The Proletariat and the right for ‘the common’
Andreja Zevnik

The Modern Foundations of Critical Human Rights
Bob Cannon

On the Human Rights Question
Paul O’Connell

II  Human Rights and the Potential of Law
(Friday 11.30 – 13.00 MS G16)

What is radical in ‘radical international law?’
Bill Bowring

The World Turned Upside Down? Socioeconomic Rights and Counter-hegemony
Joe Wills

Critical human rights and liberal legality
Roger Merino Acuña

III  Thinking Beyond The Human of Rights
(Saturday 10.00 – 11.30 Clore 103)

Liberal Pragmatism, the Marxian Critique of Human Rights and the Political Paradox
Andrew Schaap

Paintballs Against Lynchers – The Israeli media's coverage of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla
Itay Eisinger

A Trojan Horse? The Pirate and the constitution of the in/human at the limits of the international
Roberto Vilchez Yamato

IV  Unworking Disembodied Human Rights
(Saturday 12.00 – 13.00 Clore 103)

Right of resistance and human rights intactivism: The mutilated body of female genital cutting
Elisabetta Bertolino

Narratives of Blood and the Killjoy Sister: Queering Human Rights’ Politics in Contemporary Argentina - Cecilia Sosa
The Proletariat and the right for ‘the common’
Andreja Zevnik

When in his lectures of 1968-69 Lacan developed a theory of four discourses (a discourse of the Master, Hysteric, University and the Analyst) little was he aware of its impact on the future legal and political debates. Forgotten for a couple of decades, the theory of discourses re-emerged in relation to the study and the critique of the world order. Zizek, Zupanic, Declercq, amongst others, wrote about the critiques and alternatives to the political, to subjectivity, law and capitalism at the back of Lacan’s theory of four discourses and the traces of Marxist thought in it. This paper builds on the critiques and alternatives of the aforementioned thinkers in order to create a non-individualist and a non-determinist conception of human rights. Supported by Lacan’s theory of four discourses, the paper starts with the assumption that in a modern capitalist system we are all proletariat with no individual rights or private possessions. A condition we all share – proletariat – opens up a possibility for thinking the category of ‘the common’ rather than the private, public or the individual. After drawing out the status of ‘the common’ and its legal and political place in the world, the paper looks at the rights that both create and are being created by the existence of such a ‘common’. The paper gives focus on the notion of space as a ‘common right’ and explores the potentiality of such right for social movements and political manifestations of various kinds. While the paper of course discusses the Occupy Movement as one particular claim for a common space or a way of turning private/public space into a common space; the paper also looks at the practices that can translate such claims for ‘the common’ in ways that allow for the protection of individuals without abandoning their ‘common’ nature. The paper also examines to what extent can the ‘right of the common’ be enforced and protected outside the court.

The Modern Foundations of Critical Human Rights
Bob Cannon

In this paper, I argue critical theory is made possible by the normative resources of modernity: above all, democracy, equality and human rights. The supreme modern right comprises the right of social agents to democratically determine their own moral rules/laws. Nevertheless, many critical theorists view modern (universal) norms as merely an instrument of (particular) strategic interests. While postmodern/postcolonial theorists view modern norms as constitutively racist, colonial and genocidal (Goldberg 1993), Marxists view them as constitutively bourgeois (Miéville 2006). For both, human rights are little more than an ideological façade for the perpetuation of Western imperialism. These criticisms have much merit, providing valuable insights into the way dominant power relations inform normative-legal ones. However, they risk throwing the baby of normative universalism out with the bathwater of particular (Western and/or bourgeois) interests (Bowring 2008).

Postmodernism/postcolonialism (in its Foucauldian versions) succumbs to Nietzschean nihilism by reducing morality to struggles for power (Foucault 1984). At worst, Marxism exhibits the same reductionist tendencies when it claims to represent the interests of the proletariat. At best, Marxism is covertly parasitic upon norms it overtly dismisses as bourgeois: not least, ethical self-determination (Hegel 1830). Treating modern norms as mere expressions of particular interests is counterproductive. Without them it is impossible to provide a progressive critique of oppression. Spartacus may have led a legendary slave revolt, but he lacked the normative resources to render slavery unjust. The same cannot be said of Toussaint L’Ouverture or those currently struggling for freedom in the Arab world.

On the Human Rights Question
Paul O’Connell
There is a fundamental tension at the heart of Marxist scholarship when it comes to the question of human rights. On the one hand there is the recognition that the law – including the language of rights – is intimately implicated, in a number of ways, in the maintenance of the social, economic and political status quo. However, in spite of this insight, there is also persistent recourse to the language and practice of rights by Marxists in movements and campaigns to oppose, and overcome, the existing order. The origins of this ambiguity can be found in Marx’ own work, and persists to the present day. The object of this paper is to draw out the nature of this contradiction, and to contribute to an on-going dialogue about how Marxists, and fellow travellers, should approach the question of human rights in the contemporary global dispensation.

What is radical in ‘radical international law’
Bill Bowring

In this paper I explore some answers to the question whether there could or ought to be a radical international law, or even, more modestly, a radical approach to international law. My own answer to my investigations is that almost all ‘critical’ or ‘radical’ international law is firmly located in the academy, or the ‘discipline’ or the ‘field’ as it is often called. It is too often marked by eclecticism and the closely related pragmatism which traditionally emanates from the United States, just as British mainstream thinking is often termed ‘empiricism’. I criticise the part of this large corpus of work which I have selected in some detail, on its own terms. But there is a striking, for me, absence in almost all of this work. That is, the ‘radical international law’ pursued by organised engaged political lawyers, especially since World War II in the form of the IADL, on the basis of the organisation of politically active lawyers in a large number of states – for example, the National Lawyers Guild in the USA and the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers in England. In this paper I will explore the reasons why the NAIL (New Approaches to International Law) and even the TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) approaches, and David Kennedy’s curiously unpolitical critique, cannot provide a “radical international law”.

The World Turned Upside Down? Socioeconomic Rights and Counter-hegemony
Joe Wills

There has been much criticism of the neo-liberal development model that lies at the heart of the international trading regime, particularly in relation to its inability to improve the material conditions of the world’s poor. The ideas that underpin neo-liberal doctrine are sharply opposed to the idea of socio-economic rights. Rights, according to neo-liberals, exist to protect negative liberty, meaning freedom from the intentional coercive actions of others. Socioeconomic rights, which contain the promise of the progressive realisation of universal access to certain material entitlements, are not real rights because they imply exercises in command over resources in ways that render them either irrelevantly utopian or the basis for arbitrary governmental interference with the autonomy (and most notably the property) rights of its citizens.

Given the animosity of neo-liberal ideology to the idea of socioeconomic rights, it might seem that such rights constitute a potential superstructural domain upon which to destabilise neo-liberal orthodoxies. However, neo-liberalism is not simply a unified and coherent doctrine imposed on to a passive populace but rather a ‘hegemonic’ process that presumes the absorption of counter-discourses. In light of the materiality of neo-liberal globalisation, Upendra Baxi has argued that the power of human rights discourse has been appropriated by "global capital", resulting in a shift towards a "trade-related market friendly paradigm". Within this emergent paradigm "promotion and protection of some of the most cherished contemporary human rights becomes possible only when the order of human rights for global capital is fully realized". The emergent market friendly human
rights paradigm has emphasised that the success of socioeconomic rights depends crucially on the implementation of neo-liberal macroeconomic programs and policies, most crucially privatisation and deregulation.

Notwithstanding such "market friendly" readings of rights, this paper will argue that socioeconomic rights talk remains a popular discursive strategy among a number of subaltern actors to challenge the hegemony of neo-liberalism. It will be argued, drawing on Gramscian theory, that the key to unlocking the radical and emancipatory potential of socioeconomic rights discourse is to locate its future in the creative praxis of the counter-hegemonic social movements whose human rights have been violated and undermined by the dominant neo-liberal order.

**Critical human rights and liberal legality**
Roger Merino Acuña

Recent critical approaches on human rights have exalted the potentiality of this category for seeking progressive agendas (Santos, 2007) insofar as they are enacted within counter-hegemonic cognitive frames (Rajagopal, 2006) towards the construction of “subaltern human rights” (Onazi, 2009). Others, however, have pointed out that the human rights institutional and political hegemony makes other valuable emancipatory strategies less available, and that this foregrounds problems of participation and procedure at the expense of distribution (Kennedy, 2005). Finally, others have explained how the abstractedness of the category entails a de-politization (Rancière, 2004; Žižek, 2005; Douzinas, 2007) or an emptiness that, of course, can be filled by progressive activism, but whose substance is easily reappropriated by those in power (Miéville, 2005). By engaging with the above-mentioned perspectives, and following the modernity/coloniality approach (Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 2007; Grosfoguel, 2007), I suggest that the category human rights can be decolonized and being used for progressive agendas only after a comprehensive critique of liberal legality (that entails a critique of liberal abstract rationality, political economy and modernity/coloniality) has been performed.

**Paintballs Against Lynchers – The Israeli media’s coverage of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla**
Itay Eisinger

In the early morning of 31 May 2010, Israeli armed forces attacked a humanitarian aid flotilla that was trying to break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. Eight Turkish and one American-Turkish activist were killed, dozens were wounded, and about 700 passengers and sailors were seized in international waters and taken to Israel. These individuals, who were from some 40 nations, were detained in hard conditions, humiliated, interrogated and then deported. During and after the raid, they were brutalized, many beaten, abused or tortured in one of the greatest attacks Israel has ever carried out against a pro-Palestinian but non-Arab group. The Israeli media campaign – the subject of this paper – depicted the flotilla as an imminent Islamic terror attack against Israel and its armed forces. Specifically, it portrayed the event as a barbaric lynching attack on its inefficiently-armed commandos, the carriers of international law, who had no violent intentions. The logic and tactics now deployed by the Israeli army in the West Bank and Gaza was also deployed against the flotilla. The activists, who were signified as Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, Fundamentalists, Islamists, or pro-Palestinians were thus reduced, like the Palestinians, to *homines sacri*.

This paper explores how the Israeli raid on the Turkish-led humanitarian convoy was presented in the *Israeli media* – that is, how the Israeli “propaganda machine” functioned in this specific case. It provides a critical exegesis of the Israeli media while making three (overlapping) claims regarding the workings of Israeli discourse in this case: A) It is argued that the media campaign was the continuation of the armed campaign by other means. Control of information and the shaping of a
narrative were fundamental to the raid’s overall objectives, and the Israeli media discourse should be read in this context. B) The media campaign drew upon a salient element in Israeli culture and identity—self-victimization; by the state, its citizens and soldiers. The media campaign depicted the event in a projected way—presenting the peace-activists as a violent terrorist mob and the soldiers as their victims. C) This representation was based on an Orientalist logic that describes the ‘Eastern’, Arab and Muslim worlds—and the flotilla activists—as inherently inferior, backward and barbaric, while describing Israel as Western and hence as intrinsically superior, civilized and moral. Furthermore, it is argued that Israel is now deploying Orientalist logic against both the "Eastern" and "Western" worlds as it portrays itself as structurally superior to—and the victim of—them both.

A Trojan Horse? The Pirate and the constitution of the in/human at the limits of the international
Roberto Vilchez Yamato

During the 1990’s, a discourse of “the end of history” was accompanied by a certain sense that, finally, human rights were going to be inter/nationally protected, enforced, and thus realized. After the end of the Cold War, a certain discourse would advertise, we were all—as one, as humanity—moving towards the global. The UN International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Pinochet Case, and the Rome Treaty establishing the first permanent International Criminal Court were read, at least by some, as some kind of institutional proof of the realization of a universal, self-fulfilling prophecy, or enlightenment. In such a story, the “new” international criminal law was celebrated as the final, natural next step within the universal progression of human rights towards the global. What’s more, the universal, the global and the international could be understood, or simply confused, as synonyms, and the so-called universal jurisdiction could be celebrated as the enforcement paradigm of humanity’s sovereign law and order. According to the so-called Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, this progression towards humanity’s universal law and enforcement had its origins in the criminalization of the pirate, the first international outlaw, also constructed as the “enemy of human race”. In this paper, I attempt to develop a deconstructionist reading of “international human rights-international criminal law” through a rereading of such an “enemy of human race”, of such an international outlaw, or outsider of the international order. I aim at critically engaging the following provocation: taking into account that liberal story, was/is the pirate a kind of Trojan horse? More seriously, with the pirate, I aim at engaging a double problem: international sovereignty and the constitution of the in/human.

Right of resistance and human rights intactivism: The mutilated body of female genital cutting—
Elisabetta Bertolino

The paper argues that discourses shape the body without taking account of the materiality and singularity of one’s body. One’s body is treated by discourses as an idea and as something general and metaphysical. The term discourse encompasses culture as well as the legal and human rights approach. If culture might want to cut and shape the female genitalia to conform them to a specific idea of sexuality; human rights and legal discourses might just insist in keeping the female genitalia intact. In other words, legal and human rights discourses might require to preserve the body to an idea of “intactivism”, intended as norm and normality to be followed universally. However, the human rights approach proves to be problematic not only in relation to FGC but also when applied to the different types of surgery practised in Western culture, through which the body is either mutilated from its integrity or restored to such an idea of integrity.

Scholars such as Hannah Arendt, Adriana Cavarero and also Bruno Bettelheim can be employed to reflect on the inconsistency of the thinking of those discourses in relation to one’s body. Attention to a body as singular and corporeal and a focus on ambivalence might bring newness within the FGC
impasse. This might offer the possibility for a right of resistance that cannot be recovered from a legal and human rights approach as it is currently ontologically imagined.

Narratives of Blood and the Killjoy Sister: Queering Human Rights’ Politics in Contemporary Argentina
Cecilia Sosa

This paper provides a critique of the biological normativity that has pervaded the human rights’ politics in contemporary Argentina. Following the ‘disappearance’ of 30,000 civilians during the military regime (1976-1983), the post-dictatorship’s unspoken rule was that only those related by blood to the missing were entitled to ask for justice. For more than 30 years biological kinship has been the main motor of political activism. Yet, I demonstrate how the centrality of blood in the post-dictatorship created a paradoxical situation that raises crucial queries around how to conceive a politics of memory for the aftermath of violence. These concerns become especially poignant during the current ‘Kirchnerist’ administrations (from 2003 to date), which have adopted the flags of the victims while transforming the idea of memory into a national duty. In this ‘progressive’ human rights context, the overlap between kinship ties and groups of victims constitutes a subtle from of political backlash that has remained largely unexplored and almost a ‘taboo’ issue among the scholars working in the field of memory. Furthermore, I suggest that this reliance on blood reinforces a biological determinism that could be conceived of as an unforeseen form of ‘racialization of the intimate sphere’ (David Eng, 2010: 11). Engaging with Sara Ahmed’s critique of normative forms of happiness (2010), I examine the case of a ‘killjoy sister’ who was accused of acting against ‘Human Rights’ and expelled from the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo’ organisation after she could not get along with her abducted biological brother. Ultimately, I suggest that only by acknowledging the failure of normative narratives of kinship will it be possible to conceive a creative human rights politics in the wake of violence.
The Eurocentrism of Critical Theory and Modernity as Crisis

For a thinking that stands in the proximity of the history of modern colonialism, Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of modernity is not radical enough. Indeed, the Frankfurt School’s conceptualization of the crisis of modernity needs to be radicalized. Adorno and Horkheimer’s interpretation requires a sweeping modification so that our understanding of the history of atrocity and human rights in modernity can make justice to the victims of colonialism. According to Sabine Broeck the incapacity of Critical Theory to fully decipher modern history stems from framing the clash between the dark and the emancipatory sides of modernity as an inner European conflict, so that the climax of modernity’s self-destruction and the collapse of civilization are found in the Nazi crimes against humanity. The investment placed on this line of interpretation leads Critical Theory to keep modern imperialism out of focus and to “assume modernity innocent of colonialism”. The Frankfurt School does not pay due attention to the role played by colonialism and slavery in the constitution of modernity, and it does not recognize that the vast accumulation of capital, political power and knowledge in modern Europe was made possible in a substantial way by the undertakings of imperialism. The schizophrenia of Europe in the Twentieth century, which evinced expressions of high culture and materialistic progress on the surface but concealed the most depraved savagery in extermination camps, ought now be understood as present centuries ago. Modern reason and slaughter did not coincide only in Auschwitz. As Europe was giving birth to Humanism and culturally efflorescing, it put millions to death in the Americas. Europe’s march of progress from its renaissance emergence has cost an ocean of blood. The first modern genocide had already an extreme anti-moral quality so that, at the very moment of the blossom of the European civilization, it had already negated itself, collapsed and disintegrated. Modernity was born already in crisis. Modernity is crisis.

The blackness of black studies

The past decade has seen a reinvigoration of black studies within the U.S. academy. There have been a series of debates taking place within this field about blackness as a theoretical category and its antagonistic relationship to critical theory. What might seem like a minor debate within a relative
sub-discipline of cultural theory and cultural studies, is actually vital to what we deem to be thought, especially in the service of a common political project. The key figures in this black studies debate are Fred Moten, Nahum Chandler, Frank Wilderson, and Jared Sexton. In this paper I would like to survey this field, in order to point to how debates about blackness are not exterior to or at the periphery of critical thought, but necessary to the project of critical theory. They are necessary in the way that blackness stands as both problem and possibility. Blackness is a problem that critical thought has sought to get over, to be done with. In many ways it thinks has got over it, and it is done with. What this post-Black/post-racial tendency in critical theory has neglected are the possibilities that blackness represents, the general possibility for a general project.

In order to get to this place of possibility it is necessary to make two claims. Firstly there is such a thing as blackness. Secondly it is something people we choose to call black have but do not own. In this respect blackness is a critique of the proper and of property. Or rather it is an improper critique of the proper by those who were deemed to be property. Blackness operates at the breakdown of what is deemed to be interior and exterior to thought. It is it's irruption but also it's ground. This begs the question, what in theory is black? Or is theory black? And what does it mean to make such a claim?

Towards a theoretical foundation for human rights: An analysis from Decolonial thinking
Fernanda Frizzo Bragato

The justification of human rights has been grounded in a hegemonic discourse where the Western view is predominant. According to this discourse the genesis and development of the human rights idea resulted from either English, French and USA political struggles, and from European liberal thought. The main feature of this tradition is the empowerment of individuals through the granting of rights derived from the exercise of unconditional free will. The production of knowledge in the field of human rights echoes a logic that can be called Eurocentric. As a consequence human rights are conventionally claimed as an offspring of the cultural and political effort of the West, which implies that these rights has little or nothing to do with the history and rationality of non-Western peoples. In this scenario Latin America tends to be incorporated into the category of "other Western societies" because of its colonial historical background that links it to Europe, or simply ignored. From the perspective of Decolonial thinking the strict connection between human rights and Western culture only obscures and limits the possibilities of interpreting human rights beyond the purposes of standardizing individualism and classical liberalism. Decolonial studies invites us to think of the idea of human rights as a global achievement, to which more than one society contributed. Above all, other histories and rationalities of human rights remain invisible reinforcing unilateral and narrow views about the origins of human rights. A long humanistic tradition was formed in Latin America since the event of the colonization, when philosophical debates in defense of colonized peoples were raised and political struggles took place. Theories like those of Las Casas and Poma de Ayala, and the Latin American contribution to the consolidation of international human rights law in the second half of the Twentieth century are some exemplars of this tradition. Redeeming forgotten elements of this history aims at challenging the Eurocentric discourse of human rights, as well as at opening new possibilities for interpretation.

Critique of critique: On critical interventions
Elise Derroitte & Alain Loute

The aim of our proposal is to analyse different discourses on theoretical critique. According to lots of theoreticians of critique, modern society has developed new vulnerabilities that are not visible in the mainstream discourse on modernity as universal progress. In this context, these authors consider
that critical theoreticians need to intervene in describing these new forms of vulnerabilities. Either Axel Honneth or Emmanuel Renault see the role of the critique as a “disclosing critique” (Honneth 2007) “unveiling” these forms of social depreciations or as a “spokesman” (Renault 2008) of the suffering beings.

For us, these critical interventions remain unsatisfactory. This conception of critique stays at the level of the description of these vulnerabilities. We would like to enlarge this first level of critique by the analysis of the crisis of the intellectual intervention by confronting it to the critique of the forms of dominations that are not visible in a critique as pure content (description). This second way of theorizing critique is held by the theoreticians of the programme “Modernity/Coloniality-Decoloniality” (Mignolo, Maldonado-Torres, Castro-Gomez, etc.). This movement aims at showing that a rectification of these discourses on vulnerabilities does not solve the problem of transformations and repetitions of forms of epistemic domination (coloniality of knowledge, power and being) as long as the position of intellectual intervention itself is not submitted to a reflexive evaluation, a kind of “epistemic disobedience” (Mignolo 2010).

This second form of critical theory, focused on the form of the colonial “Matrix of Power” (Mignolo 2011), allows understanding the particular position of intellectual interventions but does not really manage to overcome this critique of an universal system of knowledge by a real praxis of emancipation, a “praxis of liberation” (Dussel 1996). According to us, a third level of critique is necessary if theoreticians want to propose a critical theory of the critique. This third level is what we call a “critique of critique”. It aims at analysing the problems of society neither as content only nor as form only but at understanding intellectual intervention as a practice of experimentation. This third level will neither consider the process of critique only as a process directed on an object, nor as the reflexive position of the intellectual but it will analyse the self transformation of the subject (the critique) in her practice of critique (Benjamin).
I. Practices  
(Friday 15.30 – 17.00 MS G16)

Deleuze, Philosophy and the Missing Architecture,  
*Marko Jobst*

What is Deleuze and Guattari’s political theory, if there is any?  
*Charles Barthold*

Who are our nomads today? Deleuze’s Political Ontology and the Revolutionary Problematic  
Craig Lundy

II. Corporeality  
(Saturday 11.00 – 11.30 MS 415)

Humoural Assemblages and the Praxis of Corporeal Confluence  
*Anna Chromik*

Deleuze and Alcoholism  
*Aidan Tynan*

Refractions of Crystallinity  
*Dennis Rothermel*

III. Incorporeality  
(Saturday 14.30 – 16.00 MS 415)

The Theory of Ideas: Kant and Deleuze  
*Daniela Voss*

Tradition as Repetition: A Deleuzian Perspective on Christian Tradition and Practice  
*Kristien Justaert*

Deleuze and Guattari: Creative versus Utopian Thinking  
*Lee Watkins*

Deleuze, Philosophy and the Missing Architecture  
*Marko Jobst*

In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari proclaim architecture to be the first of the arts, the originary frame that holds ‘compounds of sensations.’ They state that art begins with architecture rather than the body and, as Elizabeth Grosz noted in *Chaos, Territory, Art*, it is this act of architectural framing that enables the transformation of chaos into territory, making art itself possible.

If this should not be surprising in the context of a philosophical project engaging the notion of
immanence, what does this proposition offer with regard to architecture’s relationship to philosophy and philosophy’s understanding of architecture? In the past decade the writing on Deleuze and Guattari in the context of the arts has steadily been expanding the scope initially delineated in *What is Philosophy?* and yet the importance assigned architecture in the context of the disciplines has hardly been acknowledged. The brief yet telling proclamation by Deleuze and Guattari regarding architecture’s place remains ignored when addressing the question of ‘theory’ and ‘praxis’ in the context of the Deleuze studies, failing in turn to investigate its potential repercussions. As John Rajchman noted in *Constructions*, architecture’s relation to philosophy is yet to be fully acknowledged.

The status of *thought* in architecture will be identified here as one of particular relevance and discussed it in the context of Simone Brott’s conception of architecture’s ‘impersonal effects,’ with the aim to show that it is impossible to speak of the relationship between theory and praxis in Deleuze and Guattari and not find architecture perpetually reasserting itself at the core of the question.

**Who are our nomads today? Deleuze’s Political Ontology and the Revolutionary Problematic**

*Craig Lundy*

This paper will address the question of the revolution in Deleuze’s political ontology. More specifically, it will explore what kind of person Deleuze believes is capable of bringing about genuine and practical transformation. Contrary to the belief that a Deleuzian program for change centres on the facilitation of absolute deterritorialisation and pure lines of flight, I will demonstrate how Deleuze in fact advocates a more cautious and incremental if not conservative approach – an approach, moreover, that is revolutionary precisely because of its distancing from absolute ruptures. As such, this paper will ask who really is Deleuze’s nomad, his true revolutionary or figure of transformation, and who amongst us are worthy of the name?

**What is Deleuze and Guattari’s political theory, if there is any?**

*Charles Barthold*

Against many Deleuze scholars (Patton 2000; Mengue 2003), this presentation will argue that it is essential to take into consideration the role of Guattari in the elaboration of a Deleuzo-Guattarian thought. From this perspective, the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* – *Anti-Oedipus* (1977) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) – as well as *What Is Philosophy?* (1994) are decisive.

The philosophy developed by Deleuze and Guattari does not manifest itself straightforwardly as a political philosophy discussing notions such as freedom, justice or the good government, but rather as an ontology describing dynamic processes such as stratification and destratification, territorialisation and deterritorialisation, striated and smooth spaces, rhizomatic and arborescent logics or molar and molecular entities. Nonetheless, the ideas of micropolitics and becoming-revolutionary are more directly political.

From the biographical point of view, Deleuze was sympathetic to radical politics, as his involvement in different militancy experiences – most of all after May 68 – such as the Group of Information on Prisons or his defense of the Free Radio movement demonstrated. In contrast, Guattari was more of an ‘authentic’ political activist. Precisely, he was a Trostkyist militant, before supporting the Italian operaist movement (in the 1970s and the 1980s) and finally being active in the French ecological movement (in the 1980s and 1990s).

Consequently, Deleuze and Guattari’s position on politics should be put in perspective with their
actual political praxis. It is clear that the ontology of Deleuze and Guattari favours a rhizomatic praxis of nomadism or deterritorialisation. In other words, an ethics of creation (according to the interpretation that Deleuze and Guattari's ontology corresponds to an ethics in the Spinozist sense (Patton, 2000: 33)).

Nonetheless, it is much more challenging to determine what nomadism or smooth space mean in term of political praxis. Therefore, this presentation will argue (using Deleuze and Guattari's writings and biographies) that it is possible to distinguish – to a certain extent – a Deleuzo-Guattarist political praxis from other spheres of praxis (art, science, spupidity...), using the notion of 'relay' (initially mentione by Deleuze in an interview with Foucault (1972)) between philosophy as creation and political processes.

Humoural Assemblages and the Praxis of Corporeal Confluence
Anna Chromik

The poetics of Deleuze’s refurging of the ontology of subjectivity in terms of temporary linkages, intensities, and flows, as well as his notion of the body as an assembly of organs, discontinuous series of processes, and exchanges of corporeal substances and energies appears to be astonishingly similar to the terminology of the humoural body/self as described by the materialist critique of the early-modern discourse. Both concepts deconstruct the self-contained, self-identical, cohesive self and propose instead a mode of being that is open, fungible, trans-fluxible, permeable, and volatile.

This paper probes the juxtaposition of the Deleuzian concept of the bodily assemblage with the poetics of the pre-Cartesian humoural corporeality in order to speculate how it might affect the redefinition of becoming-subject. The question is whether filtering the concept of the assemblage through the optics of another highly speculative theoretical construct would broaden the nomenclature of coming-together (rather than being), and thus whether it could also render the experience of becomings, temporary arrangements, and cross-infiltrations palpable enough to move it to the realm of praxis.

Bearing in mind that the ‘humoural corporeality’ is a highly processed construct made up of the imagery used in the critique of the ‘contained’ and ‘solid’ modern subject, my argument aims at a more general reflection upon the alleged capability of Deleuze’s theory to transform other theoretical concepts into praxis by bringing out their lateral and dislocating potential.

Deleuze and Alcoholism
Aidan Tynan

In A Thousand Plateaus, a theory of alcoholism is proposed as a model for ‘an economics of everyday life’. What motivates the alcoholic in Deleuze's conception is to get to the ‘last glass’, to exhaust the series of drinks constituting the alcoholic assemblage. What makes alcoholism a pathology, however, is that the last glass is never reached through the alcohol itself. What the alcoholic calls the last drink is last only in relation to the next drink, which enables the series to be repeated under different conditions. Various factors relating to the tolerances of the organism, physical and mental health, money etc., intervene to force the alcoholic to break off drinking and begin again at another time and place. These factors are what allow the assemblage to be repeated, and last drink (which is never reached via the assemblage itself) is what allows desire to be fix within the assemblage's repetition. All 'value' is 'conferred' by the last term (hence the emphasis on economics) and this is how desire is governed in any assemblage. The truly last drink, however, would take the alcoholic beyond the assemblage altogether, and thus beyond the pathology. The example Deleuze and Guattari find for this is Henry Miller in Sexus, who manages to get drunk on a pitcher of pure water.
This literary image expresses the practical emphasis schizoanalysis puts on thought: altered perceptions of drugs should be possible with concepts alone and without the intoxicating substances themselves, which always have the propensity to enslave the user to the unproductive repetitions of addiction. This paper examines the conceptual logic that Deleuze was able to extract from alcoholism and shows how this helps us to understand how a non-philosophical, unthought or purely bodily compulsion or pathology is necessarily involved in the genesis of philosophical abstraction.

Refractions of Crystallinity
Dennis Rothermel

Launching Gilles Deleuze’s explication of the power of the false in cinema is his introduction of the notion of crystallinity, which will serve as the initial rendition of how cinema can deliberately obstruct the connection between image and a believable diegetic reality. The crystalline separation arises blatantly in the violation of ordinary expectations of narrative construction. Mainstream cinema is steeped in the need to present plausibly coherent existence, even if fantastical, and just as much constrained by ordinary behaviour, ordinary emotions, ordinary objects, etc. Crystalline cinema veers away from these expectations.

Deleuze identifies four aspects of the crystalline separation: crystalline descriptions, the virtual as detached from the duality of real and imaginary, the eradication of sensory continuity providing grounding of the narrative, and, finally, the rise of images of time that frames movement, rather than vice versa, and which puts truth into question. The best, clear exemplars are Jean-Luc Godard’s Alphaville (1965) and Alain Resnais’s L’année dernière à Marienbad (1961). The crystalline clarity of the crystalline fissures in the cinematic fabric that defy cognitive attribution is palpable in these two films.

Crystallinity, though, also works especially well in regard to Jacques Tati’s Play Time (1967), but without the emphatic anti-organic tones of Alphaville or L’année dernière à Marienbad. In contrast to these two early films by Resnais and Godard, Play Time retains something of an anchor in the organic, but as stretched to the point of palpable incoherence, which asserts the crystalline separation all the more strongly in hinting at it persistently rather than exploiting it blatantly. In contrast to the burlesque, the comedic, the satiric, the absurd, the surreal, the farcical, and the bathetic, Tati’s flux of refractions stretch the immanent into meanings that dissipate away rather than separate. Thus it is a gumminess that is not exactly crystallinity that holds Play Time together, but yet sustains a separation from the organic as a melting dissolution into disparate but intertwined events rather than crystalline fractals that cleanly separate images and events. The film’s humor doesn’t rest upon a contrast to a presumed norm for the world, but rests instead upon the nature of being as a chaotic flux of harmony and incoherence, a flux without explanation and without surcease.

Crystallinity, though, hasn’t thrived just in French films of the 1960s, and especially if we can see it as refracted through a balanced tenuous anchoring in the organic. So, variant refractions of crystallinity can be detected in, e.g., Juzo Itami’s Tampopo (1985), Chantal Akerman’s Demain on déménage (2004), Joel and Ethan Coen’s A Serious Man (2009), Alain Resnais’s Les herbes folles (2009), Julie Taymor’s The Tempest (2010) and Alberto Fuguet’s Country Music (2011).

Finding these extensions of Deleuze’s discourse best exemplifies Deleuzean thought, specifically always to transition further and never to ossify. It also provides a model for Deleuzean praxis that doesn’t collapse into recapitulation nor venture into alternative theoretical-foundational standpoints – and these have been the dominant trends in scholarship on Deleuze’s cinema books.
The Theory of Ideas: Kant and Deleuze
Daniela Voss

Kant’s doctrine of transcendental ideas in the Critique of Pure Reason is often neglected in favour of attributing to Kant the exclusively hylomorphic view that knowledge is only possible by relating concepts or forms of thought to intuition. But transcendental ideas play a crucial role as necessary conditions for the possibility of systematic empirical knowledge. Without transcendental ideas, it would be impossible to produce a unified system of interconnected cognitions representing a world that is significant to us. Thus Kantian ideas clearly have a transcendental status, and as such they require a transcendental deduction. Kant admits that ideas of reason do not permit any deduction of the same kind as the categories, that is, a demonstration of their objective reality. Nevertheless, they have objective validity and are “by no means merely figments of the brain (Hirngespinsle)” (CpR, A314/B371). According to Deleuze, Kant pointed out a certain objectivity of ideas, put in his words: an Idea “is a perfectly positive, objective structure which acts as a focus or horizon within perception” (DR 169). However, Deleuze rejects the Kantian viewpoint of conditioning and radicalizes Kant’s theory of ideas by granting them a power of genesis. Drawing from the Jewish philosophers Salomon Maimon and Albert Lautman, Deleuze constructs a new theory of Ideas-problems according to which Ideas are to be conceived as immanent differential structures generating actual things, perception and thought.

This paper will analyse the notion of ideas in Kant and Deleuze, and examine their function in Kant’s transcendental idealism and Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism respectively.

Tradition as Repetition: A Deleuzian Perspective on Christian Tradition and Practice
Kristien Justaert

In Christian theology, the practice of tradition, and more particularly the normativity of it, has always been a topic of discussion. The question ‘is there an absolute core of the Christian tradition which needs to be preserved as such through the ages, or does the tradition changes fundamentally over time and is there no absolute truth do hold on to?’ seems to be irresolvable. The goal of my paper is to demonstrate how the concepts of repetition and creativity of Gilles Deleuze provide a way out of this dilemma, by radically directing the discussion on the meaning of tradition towards the future instead of the past. Particular elements, dogmas and practices of the tradition, such as the Eucharist, or the death and the resurrection of Christ, are judged to the degree of intensity and power they generate, allowing the Christian tradition to be a creative praxis again that is truly ‘catholic’ (kata-holos; for everyone, transcending cultural and historical particularities). In order to achieve this goal, I will first trace the meanings of ‘repetition’ and ‘creativity’ in the works of Deleuze, which are closely interconnected. It was Nietzsche (next to Kierkegaard and Péguy) who inspired Deleuze most in his conception of repetition as fundamentally geared towards the future. In a second part of the paper, I will apply Deleuze’s ‘theory’ of repetition to the Christian tradition, by giving a general new definition of tradition, and by re-interpreting concrete elements of this tradition.

Deleuze and Guattari: Creative versus Utopian Thinking
Lee Watkins:

In What is Philosophy?, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari tell us that "utopia is not a good concept". In my paper I explain why this is the case.

Deleuze and Guattari write that utopia "is still subject to [History] and lodged within it as an ideal or motivation". That is to say, utopian thinking looks for an ideal that is implicit in the actual historical
situation and seeks to show how we can develop our society and our subjectivity (i.e. our institutions and our own behaviour, desires etc.) in order that this ideal be realised.

For Deleuze and Guattari, solutions to political problems must be creative rather than utopian. To be creative is to attend to the "deployment" of the subject. While utopianism responds to the actual state of affairs in which one find oneself in order to develop the subject towards its ideal, creative thinking attends to the reality (i.e. "virtuality") of the subject in order to create an actuality adequate to the subject. Creative and utopian approaches can be easily confused, I argue; however, it is vitally important that we distinguish between these approaches.

In my paper I look at two of the historical examples that Deleuze and Guattari refer to in their work (the New Deal in the USA; May '68 in France) in order to explain how these creative approaches attempted to respond to the demands of the real subject rather than to the (illusory) ideal subject found in historical actuality. I argue that it is only by being creative that we can put philosophical concepts into practice, since it is only by being creative that we respond to what is real for the subject, rather than attending to the illusory ideal in the actual.
Formulating Systems of Affect: Developing a methodology for interrogating and responding to the dominant aesthetic

Tina Richardson

This paper provides a methodology for critiquing dominant discourses as they pertain to spatial representation. Institutions and organisations offer up an ideological narrative about themselves that represents how they wish to be portrayed. This discourse often masks other, more subordinate, stories that manifest in a heterogeneity that might be counter to the dominant voice. While there may be a number of techniques available to discover the “not-said” (Foucault), often a practical-performative approach to the concrete space in which an organisation operates is not taken up in critical theory.

I have developed schizocartography as a way to provide both an archival, theoretical and psychogeographical examination of the manifest terrain as it appears in its representation of specific organisations operating under neoliberalism. Developed from Félix Guattari’s term “schizoanalytic cartography”, it enables alternative existential modes for individuals in order to challenge dominant representations and power structures. Providing an opportunity for multiple ways of operating in space and reading the environment, it critiques the conventional ways of viewing, interpreting and mapping space, while at the same time responding to the aesthetic of these spaces.

The work Guattari has carried out in this area relates, in particular, to the psychiatric institution and to his project in Brazil (Molecular Revolution). I have taken these principles and incorporated them into the psychogeographical strategies of the Situationist International in their critique of the aesthetic of the spectacle. It appears to be the case that not until one explores the typography of a given space that it is apparent that their is an excess that is, perhaps intentionally, not taken up into the dominant discourse. This paper discusses schizocartography in the context of the institution of Higher Education and provides a case study of a specific campus in order to demonstrate a method of critiquing the corporatised university.
Over the last decades, the work of Deleuze (and Guattari) has witnessed increasing attention by social scientists. Deleuzian notions pervade the social scientific field in its striving to overcome the historically privileged attention to discourse and signification, in order to be able to better understand the material and affective flows of the social. However, as Brown (2009) points out in critiquing de Landa’s (2006) ‘assemblage theory’ as an overarching framework to a Deleuzian approach to the social, identifying the interests and possibilities of a Deleuzian social science is no easy task. And this is so not only because, in a way, Deleuze’s position as regards such sciences remains relatively unspecified (as compared for instance, to his –and Guattari’s– discussions of philosophy, art, and ‘science’ in their What is Philosophy? (1994)), but also because previous attempts at accomplishing this task seem to invariably put forth a negative depiction of the ‘social scientific’ by placing it at the middle ground between two ‘better’ formalised endeavours (i.e. philosophy and science) or by stripping it from any singularity in an –however welcome– attempt to overcome disciplinary boundaries (see for instance Massumi’s 2002 work on affect). Contrary to previous attempts, thus, Brown (2009) interestingly argues that instead of seeking overarching frameworks, the social sciences must instead find ways of engaging in a ‘one event, one idea’ mode of practice. This I take to be, on the one hand, a call to attempt at constructing a Deleuzian approach as an immanent exercise, that is, by attending, on an event-to-event basis, to particular creations of concepts, practices, entities, values and experiences that might provide social scientists not with any general ground or foundation but with new possibilities for practice and knowledge-production. On the other hand, and insofar as the key of such events is that of becoming interesting, that is, of affecting and transforming the ways in which the social sciences relate to their empirical realities (Stengers, 1997), I read this suggestion as a call to experiment with a form of what we could call ‘political epistemology’, that is, the production of knowledge through a transformation of the interests and values of social science by remaining open and sensitive to the recalcitrant nature of the subjects/objects of study and the excessive and vital character of the processes and experiences at stake in the practice of knowing.

In my paper, thus, I want to begin this political epistemological experiment by thinking with Deleuze’s (& Guattari 1987; Deleuze & Parnett, 1987; see also Stengers 2010) notion of ‘double capture’ which, exemplary illustrated through the reciprocal becoming of the wasp and the orchid, advocates the construction of a relation, a ‘nuptial’ between two distinct reigns that brings a transformation not only of the relation among the relata but also of the relata themselves. It will be my contention that the political epistemological experiment of putting the notion of ‘double capture’ at work in the practice of social scientific research, as a different means of understanding and transforming the interests and passions through which social scientists approach their empirical realities might be a way to begin to think through the productivity of the singular and positive encounter between Deleuze and social science.

**Facing transpolitics – from image to operational formula**

Dan Öberg,

This paper critically interrogates the impact of the face on global politics. A number of recent thinkers have conceptualized the face and its socio-cultural role. For example, as an ethics (Levinas, Agamben) or as a politics (Deleuze & Guattari). This text maps the theoretical framings of the face and argues that a trans-political understanding of global challenges illustrates what the face as an ethico-political image presupposes in today’s world of televisual media. It is well know that Jean Baudrillard argues that what is fascinating about contemporary art is not its being as such, but rather its disappearance into other modes (“in homeopathic doses” as he puts it). In The intelligence of Evil Baudrillard builds on this argument to claim that the mystery about art as an empty form lies in our continued servility towards it as spectators. This argument illustrates well how the tele-visual faces of today (the face of Jessica Lynch as “the victim”, of Osama bin Laden as “the terrorist”, Muhammar Khadaffi as “the tyrant”, Anders Breivik as “the psychopath” etc.) are less interesting because of the
content they convey than because of the way they are visually absorbed as self-evident parts of political events. In short, we crave them as icons despite their emptiness. The argument by Baudrillard illustrates our servility as spectators towards facial images in an era when the digitized images of the face are not so much seen as deciphered, not adored but scanned; not a mark of “humanness” but a cipher (similar to a fingerprint) and where the face is part of an operational formula which links to political, military and economical restructurings of time and space. The obscenely smiling face of advertisement therefore illustrates the absence of a possibility of politics through images in the trans-political world, the disappearance of the face as an ethical or political icon, and the challenges which evolves from these disappearances.

Decolonizing Critical Theory
Julia Roth

Critical Theory has usually been positioned theoretically and epistemically in what is conventionally known as »the West« or »the Occident« and the cradle and location of European Modernity and Enlightenment thought. The privileged locus of enunciation — and of critical thinking respectively — has hence been territorially located in Europe and the US, structurally excluding or subordinating knowledge productions from the Global South: »From Hegel, Marx, and Comte to Weber – including Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, Popper, Levinas, Foucault, Lyotard, and Habermas – Eurocentrism shines unopposed.« ¹ Decolonial critics like Dussel, Mignolo, Quijano, Grosfoguel or Coronil thematize the very processes that have led to this exclusion and the structural colonization of power, knowledge, epistemes, arguing that European modernity is closely entangled with coloniality — the structural subordination of everything non-European starting with expansionist colonialism. That is, the creation of a subordinated colonial ‘Other’ has been the condition of possibility for Eurocentric modernity and domination. Toni Morrison has brilliantly put it this way:

»[W]e should not be surprised that the Enlightenment could accommodate slavery; we should be surprised if it had not. The concept of freedom did not emerge in a vacuum. Nothing highlighted freedom – if it did not in fact create it – like slavery. Black slavery enriched the country’s creative possibilities. For in that construction of blackness and enslavement could be found not only the not-free, but also, with the dramatic polarity created by skin color, the projection of the not-me.« ²

This paper argues that approaches such as decolonial thinking (and Critical Whiteness Studies and Critical Occidentalism) are deeply rooted in and devoted to a Critical Theory perspective in the tradition of the Dialectics of the Enlightenment. Aiming at including hitherto excluded perspectives and locations they such approaches furthermore provide critical re-readings of established thinkers

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such as Hegel, Kant or Marx by pointing at their blind spots. Walther Mignolo hence formulates Decolonial Theory as an expansion of Critical Theory and its adaption to post-colonial contexts: »an attempt to shift the geography, and the geopolitics of knowledge, of critical theory (as introduced by the Frankfurt School in the 1930s) to a new terrain of a critical theory beyond the history of Europe proper and within the colonial history of America (or Asia or Africa; or even from the perspective of immigrants within Europe and the US who have disrupted the homogeneity).

Decoloniality [...] a concept of historio-structural heterogeneity [...] becomes decolonial theory.«

Contrary to such self-positionings, however, decolonial perspectives are largely marginalized as well when produced in/from the South as within Occidental interpretive communities and disciplines. My own experience of working with these concepts in German academy proves this, as well as the fact that the prestigious conference »Marx Revisited« 2011 at Humboldt University included one single contribution of a decolonial critic. – Significantly at the ‘Postcolonial Perspectives’ sub-panel which ran parallel to the ‘Feminist Perspectives’ one, whereas all »significant« contributions got the space of keynote lectures and the auditorium maximum and where further produced by scholars based at the hegemonic centers.

In my paper I will hence take a decolonial and hegemony critical view on critical theory/thinking and discuss in which ways the respective approaches can open dominating critical thinking toward »multichronotopic« (Shohat) perspectives and free dominating structures from their (neo-)colonial legacies and help thinking new forms of global conviviality.

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I  Politics
(Friday 11.30 – 13.00 MS 151)

Marxism and Democracy Today
Marco Vanzulli

Inter-State Relations: Furthering National Interests
Ozgur Yalcin

From Negative Freedom to Recognition: A Change in the Concept of Reification,
Jonathan Lewis

II  Visualizing Capital
(Friday 14.00 – 15.00 MS 538)

Allegory, Commodity, and Death. Reading Capital with Benjamin
Sami Khatib

On the Visual Dimension of Alienation: The Berlin School (Hirdina, Heise, Trebess)
Leena Petersen

III  Dialectics Saturday
(Saturday 10.00 – 11.30 Clore 102)

Max Horkheimer’s Open Marxism Retrieved. A Defence of His Dialectics
Vasillis Grollios

Marx, Hegel and the ‘Realisation of Philosophy’ in the Work of Guy Debord and the Situationist International
Tom Bunyard,

Communism and Consumerism: A New Perspective
Ishay Landa,

IV  Abstraction and Value
(Saturday 12.00 – 13.30 MS 415)

Real Abstraction and the Marxism of Alfred Sohn-Rethel
Simon Choat

Failed Abstraction – A Critique of Uno Kōzō’s reading of Marx’s theory of the value form
Elena Louisa Lange
Marxism and Democracy today
Marco Vanzulli

In the epilogue of La haine de la démocratie [The hatred of democracy], Jacques Rancière characterizes the democracy as the counterforce always singular and alone at work inside the oligarchic governments which we call «representative democracy», and referring to Negri’s and Hart’s Empire and Multitude, he criticizes the idea of a democracy of the multitudes which would find in the most developed aspects of capitalistic society the seeds of a new society: unequal society doesn’t carry in his womb any equal society, he concludes. In an absolute contingency, according to the French philosopher, democracy only exists as a single and precarious act, that every time must be reinvented, devoid as it is of any historical necessity. Democracy has a history yet, the history of the struggles for a fulfilment of the claim for social justice. The welfare system has not only been a way for capitalistic State to maintain consent, but also the effect of the action of anti-systemic forces, though filtered by semi-systemic institutions (as the communist parties in occidental countries). I’ll try to focus attention on the relationship between new forms of democracy and history. Marx’s dialectical perspective put in a line of continuity and negation capitalism and socialism; one cannot deny, for instance, the interrelation between democracy and development of individuality – the latter, though in an ambiguous way, is the result of the capitalistic progress, as Marx points out in the Grundrisse; or, from a more strictly political point of view, one cannot deny the affirmation of the popular sovereignty that the contemporary democracies-regime (borrowing an expression of André Tosel) betray in their proper organization but have to recognize as their leading principle. The new claims for democracy are in the middle between the expression of indignation for the betrayal of a common good never fulfilled (democracy itself) and the announcement of a new way of organizing production and social relationship that non-government forces have not the power to carry out. How a Marxist theory of democracy can explain the historical meaning and the possibilities of democratic movements of today?

Inter-State Relations: Furthering National Interests Submitted to the stream Marx and Marxism Today
Ozgur Yalcin

In the context of debate on the question of imperialism, inter-imperialist rivalry and geopolitical conflicts, Lacher and Teschke (2007) criticize contemporary historical materialist theoretical accounts of global capitalism with respect to the relationship between the inter-state system and capital. They claim that these approaches are inattentive to the historically changing forms of inter-state geopolitical competition, because these conceptions presume the territoriality of the state system as an internal necessary aspect of capitalism, while, in fact, territoriality of the state is a pre-capitalist legacy that still produces and structures the geopolitical dimension of the capitalist world system. Callinicos (2009) attempted to overcome these criticisms by providing an alternative account of geopolitical inter-state competition based on the multiplicity of the state system. He argues that the multiplicity of the state system is a necessary aspect of capitalism grounded in the uneven and combined development of capitals, which is expressed in geopolitical competitions between the states that have distinct interests from the interests of capital.

However, I will argue that despite their claims to produce non-economistic and non-functionalist accounts of inter-state relations, Lacher, Teschke and Callinicos could not go beyond economism and functionalism and they could not reveal the historically specific constitution of the political form of state and the inter-state relations under capitalism.

Through a critical discussion of Lacher, Teschke and Callinicos, I will argue that the value-form critique of capital, as developed by Eldred (1984) and Reuten and Williams (1989), can allow us to provide a non-functionalist/economicistic conceptualization of the state and inter-state relations
under global capital relation. I will claim that the state as the universal social subject that aims the realization of the universal well-being of civil society appears in the context of the multiplicity of the state system as a particular social subject striving for its national interests in competition with other states.

FROM NEGATIVE FREEDOM TO RECOGNITION: CHANGE IN THE CONCEPT OF REIFICATION
Jonathan Lewis

The concept of reification has, arguably, maintained a constant presence in Western Marxist discourse, whether implicitly in the works of Hegel and Marx or explicitly in those of Lukács, Adorno, Habermas and Honneth, for example. Yet, despite being so vital to questions of freedom, the problem with the concept of reification is that, like most concepts, its meaning has not remained fixed throughout history. What had for Lukács been synonymous with objectification and alienation, extending itself outwards from the economic sphere to cover all aspects of social activity as a ‘second nature’, and couched in highly political terms to do with class struggle and the emancipation of the proletariat, was to lose its explicitly political significance when it became a matter of sociological, epistemological and metaphysical concern for Adorno (not to mention aesthetic concern, of course). The idea of reification may today seem out-dated when we read Lukács’ polemic or too metaphysical to be material in the case of Adorno, who saw any hope of overcoming reification as coming from the sphere of negative freedom – the ineffable and transcendental non-identical. This is perhaps why, in his 2005 Berkeley Tanner lectures, Axel Honneth revived the term and developed his own normative account whereby reification is seen as a process where we lose sight of our ‘antecedent recognition’ of other human beings, which is a precondition for understanding other human beings as human beings, as opposed to mere ‘things’. Evidence of such reifying behaviour, for Honneth, includes stereotyping, instrumental treatment of others and bestial dehumanisation characteristic of racism, human trafficking and the sex industry. It is with these three accounts in mind that this paper will briefly chart the tensions between the various accounts and the relationship of reification to political, social and human freedoms over time before suggesting ways in which the previous accounts of the term by Lukács and Adorno may still prove to be extremely valuable for understanding (and potentially overcoming) some of the fundamental problems of modernity where freedom is concerned.

Allegory, Commodity, and Death. Reading Capital with Benjamin
Sami Khatib

Ever since Habermas’s influential essay on Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism (1972), the ‘official’ Frankfurt verdict on Benjamin’s Marxism has been clear: Benjamin failed in his attempt to fuse critical Marxism with contradictory elements – be they of messianic, surrealist, psychoanalytical, or anthropological origin. Already in the 1930s, Adorno harshly criticized Benjamin for his allegedly idealist or vulgar – if not heretical – appropriation of the Marxian theory of commodity fetishism and ideology. Summing up the Frankfurt school’s take on Benjamin’s Marxism, Benjamin’s editor Rolf Tiedemann succinctly stated: “It is not difficult – though also not very productive – to point out Benjamin’s miscomprehensions of Marxist theory” (Tiedemann 1982).

In the last three decades, scholars like Susan Buck-Morss, Irving Wohlfarth, Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner, Michael Löwy, Margaret Cohen, Esther Leslie, and others have challenged this assessment with different arguments and demonstrated how productive and daring such a theoretical enterprise can be. They have either attempted to reconcile the contradictory elements within Benjamin’s Marxism (especially the tension between materialism and theology), or pointed out the productiveness of such polar extremes, giving rise to a Benjamian Marxism sui generis – an “alternative Marxism, neither Frankfurt nor Brechtian nor vulgar” (Cohen 1993).
In light of this debate, my paper concentrates on Benjamin’s reading of Marx’s Capital, especially on his fragments on allegory and commodity form. Taking up his earlier theory of allegory as outlined in his book on Baroque Trauerspiel, in the Arcades Project and the Baudelaire Studies Benjamin conceives of the Marxian commodity as allegory, that is to say, the “commodity has taken the place of the allegorical way of seeing.” The commodity as allegory is not a mere personification but an aesthetico-social mode of signification (valorization), by which contingent and meaningless fragments, signifiers without significant content, can actually form and perform a meaning (value) labelled with a price tag. As an allegory, the commodity is the frozen, congealed crystal – in Benjaminian terms, “mortification” – of a political-economic totality. If all commodities can stand in for each other and each commodity can be expressed by every other commodity, we enter the “sensuous-supra-sensuous” (Marx) sphere of commodity language – an allegorical language in which abstraction acquires a quasi-natural concrete form. By virtue of this inversion, concrete things as commodities express a social relation in an allegorical way: every commodity “says” something different than itself, αλλη-γορεω. Ultimately, this “speaking-differently” is not only about saying, but rather about seeing, perceiving: the commodity is the phantasmagorical image that promises something different than itself.

On the Visual Dimension of Alienation: The Berlin School (Hirdina, Heise, Trebess)
Leena Petersen

As soon as the function of art is transformed in the course of secularisation, its form also changes. During this modern development, the boundaries between art and other areas of knowledge [Wissensgebieten] become porous, and, moreover, art permeates the sphere of the everyday, while everyday objects take on functions of art. Hence any attempt to grasp the reality of modern life is also determined by a transformation in aesthetic contemplation. This displacement towards the everyday and towards other areas of knowledge generates a transitional area in which there is an interchange and an engagement between moments of the most variegated spheres. This transitional area codifies a historic knowledge [Wissen] of art.

In this research-project, then, the methodological thesis is advanced that the knowledge of the historical necessarily entails a detour via an engagement with the medium of art; this thesis is grounded on the one hand on the basis of the elements of illusion [Täuschung], much debated in the critique of epistemology, which cover the empirical/sensuous [Empirische/Sinnliche], in other words the semblance character [Scheincharakter] to which immediately empirically grasped reality and even its critique can be subject. At the same time, a “harmonised, concealed life contradiction” is to be found in the area of art, which always asserts itself “in the emptying out of the artwork”, as Wolfgang Heise once formulated it. Here the historical knowledge of critique, alienation and utopia which is internalised by art is to be investigated, as developed by the (East-)Berlin School around Karin Hirdina, Wolfgang Heise and Werner Trebess.

Max Horkheimer’s Open Marxism Retrieved. A Defence of His Dialectics
Vasilis Grollios

Summary: Contrary to the vast majority of the literature, which holds that Horkheimer’s pessimism stems from his dialectical materialism, I will defend his interpretation of dialectics. Horkheimer follows the Marxian understanding of a dialectic between phenomenon/form and content/essence that has come to the fore in recent times through ‘Open Marxism’ writings. For Horkheimer, materialism is not simply a theory of knowledge that takes place only on the theoretical plane; rather, it is the ad hominem critique, which, as Marx stated in his analysis on Hegel, “grasps the root of the matter. But for man the root is man himself.” Therefore, materialism endeavours to make evident the human content of the form-fetish. The main concepts within Horkheimer’s dialectics are negation, determinate negation, non-identity thinking, and mediation. I will attempt to show how these concepts form a negative dialectic by focusing on Dialectical materialism, in Horkheimer’s words, “is inconvenient, obstinate, and with all that, of no immediate use—in fact it is a source of annoyance. Philosophy lacks criteria and compelling proofs”. Dialectical materialism aims to make man “feel insecure and on dangerous ground”. What Horkheimer means is that if we include opposing class interests in our philosophical thinking and investigate how supposedly innocent philosophical notions stem from them, then negativity comes to the fore. This means that we will come to realise that we do not, and cannot, have all the answers since “the rational is never totally deducible”, and the most important task, therefore, is to open cracks in capitalism here and now, as John Holloway would have us believe.

For Horkheimer, however, we are able to open cracks in it if we perceive “the tension that characterizes all the notions of the critical way of thinking”, a tension that stems from the fact that in capitalism we attempt to satisfy our basic needs through a contradiction, through the obligatory transformation of our doing into abstract labour, that is to say, into money. This is non-identity thinking: to see the internal contradiction-tension in every notion, in every form-fetish, and not as Postone believes to have ideas “hover mysteriously above its object”. Non-identity thinking separates Open Marxism’s understanding of Marx’s dialectics from the majority of the Western Marxism tradition, which focuses its efforts towards capturing the state, and connects it, as Horkheimer underlines in his article on the authoritarian state, with “The roots of the council system that go back to 1871, 1905, and other event’s.

Marx, Hegel and the 'Realisation of Philosophy' in the Work of Guy Debord and the Situationist International
Tom Bunyard

This paper attempts to extract a model of collective political praxis from the theoretical work of Guy Debord and the Situationist International. Debord is often erroneously presented as a media theorist, but the ‘images’ and ‘representations’ described in his theory of ‘spectacle’ should not be taken in a reductively literal sense. Instead, they refer to false, illusory forms of unity that mask society’s atomisation, and which thereby perpetuate the separation of social power from its producers. Ultimately, this is the power to constitute history (understood as pro-active action rather than a retrospective catalogue of events): for the goal of the Situationist project was to allow an effectively existential proletariat to ‘live the historical time that it creates’, and to thus afford the capacity of shaping and directing one’s own experience according to one’s own dictates, as opposed to those of a now sovereign economy. The model of communism that their work implies is consequently not a prescribed mode of production, but rather a condition of perpetual, self-determinate historical process.

In order to develop this interpretation this paper addresses Debord’s debts to Marxism, French Hegelianism and existentialism, and connects the notions of history, subjectivity and agency that one can find in Debord’s work to his much noted (but seldom theorised) interest in strategy. This will afford a means of reconstructing the salient aspects of his Hegelian Marxism. The paper will then
argue that although the theory of spectacle fails as a description of capitalist society, the ideas that support it may nonetheless be of contemporary interest.

In order to substantiate that contention the paper considers Debord’s reading of Hegel, paying particular attention to his ostensible views on the nature of the Hegelian ‘absolute’. Although he was clearly influenced by Kojève’s idiosyncratic ‘end of history’ thesis, Debord seems closer to Hyppolite, who presented the absolute as a condition of perpetual, negative, self-determinate process. The paper contends that Debord can be seen to refigure that process as that of collective historical praxis, and concludes by discussing the implications and possible merits of this approach by comparing it with that of the Hegelian value-form theorists to whom Debord might otherwise seem close.

Communism and Consumerism: A New Perspective
Ishay Landa

In left-wing circles, ‘consumerism’ and ‘the consumer society,’ are widely held in contempt. Both are seen as deplorable epiphenomena of capitalism, where egoism, materialism and shallow hedonism take the place of genuine human bonds and social solidarity. The left-wing project of political transformation, or what is left of it, is thus conceived as emancipation from consumerism. Such an approach, while heavily mediated by the authors and followers of the Frankfurt School, is usually traced back to the writings of Karl Marx himself, especially his critique of commodity fetishism. Since Erich Fromm, at least, Marx is seen as the source of the crucial distinction: ‘to have or to be.’ The aim of this presentation is to scrutinize these prevalent assumptions, and sketch out a different approach to the issue of consumption. Firstly, the Marxist pedigree of anti-consumerism will be challenged, by comparing two of Marx’s posthumously published writings: the 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and Grundrisse (1858). The so-called ‘Paris manuscripts’ have inspired and served to stamp a Marxist seal of approval on a whole brand of literature excoriating consumerism. The Grundrisse, by comparison, has remained a largely neglected text, at least as far as the topic of consumption is concerned. This unbalanced emphasis, in turn, has produced a skewed understanding of Marx’s position, with far reaching consequences for left-wing cultural theory and practical political orientation. In continuation, the usual identification of consumerism with capitalism will be re-considered. It will be argued, that capitalism is in many ways incompatible with consumerism, the latter being the source of numerous problems from a capitalist point of view, of cultural, political, and even economic nature. This explains the existence of a large tradition of anti-consumerist literature coming from the political right. In some cases, indeed, such literature has even identified consumerism with … communism. Similarly, I will call attention to some of the figures which, within the socialist, Marxist and communist camps, have taken a much more dialectical view of consumerism, pointing beyond the current aporia of left-wing cultural pessimism.

Financial Fetishism and the Rise of state Capitalism-Radhouan
Ben Amara

The posterity of great thoughts is versatile. It is largely tributary to what Hegel called Zeitgeist, “the spirit of the times.” After the fall of the Wall of Berlin, this Zeitgeist had almost made us think that Marxist Thought was definitely outdated. Francis Fukuyama prophetised the “end of history,” others announced the “benediction of globalisation.” More than two decades later, and in front of the rise of a world crisis, it is high time we discovered again this Marxist thought, that is usually reduced to some known formulas and slogans. In this paper, I’ll argue that Marx more than ever, has become today a source and a resort: it helps us decipher, or better, decrypt a globalisation that multiplies the destruction of labour, and increases the inequalities between countries, and inside these, between social classes. A globalisation that presents itself as an uninterrupted succession of speculative
bubbles. Today, we can say that the Marxist Theory remains pertinent to all that is strictly related to the localisation of the “engine” of economy, that is to say, exploitation. But the originality of Marx resides elsewhere: Marx does not only provide us with the interpretative keys relative to the dynamics of our society, but his thought remains mainly relevant because it undermines the liberal vision of the homo economicus. The merit of Marx is to have postulated that “global vision” which was at the same time economic, social and political: he is the one who discovered the promethean character of capitalism. As any other thought, Marxism, in spite of its contemporary pertinence, has its limits, especially in relation to the political and historical action. But Marx has never hesitated, for example, to outline the diffuse “general corruption” and the rampant “universal prostitution.” This is what makes Marx very contemporary, in an era where generalised merchandising appears as a major social phenomenon. For him utility is not only a big error, but it is a big lie too; it is the necessary appearance that invests the relationships between people in the capitalistic society. In my talk I’ll also argue that it was Antonio Gramsci who really founded the bases of a political theory in the real sense of the word, through his concept of “cultural hegemony” and his adjacent notion of “historical blockage” (“blocco storico” as Gramsci said) As a matter of fact, Gramsci has brought up to date, historicised anew, and put into perspective Marxism. To give another life to Marxism, we should politicise it again, applying the same principles of Marxist Criticism.

REAL ABSTRACTION AND THE MARXISM OF ALFRED SOHN-RETHEL
Simon Choat and Paul Rekret

This paper offers a critical overview of the contribution of Alfred Sohn-Rethel to Marxist thought, focusing on his book Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology. Although Sohn-Rethel remains a marginal and neglected figure in the history of Marxist philosophy, recent debates around the concept of ‘real abstraction’ have revived interest in his work. Arguing that the abstractions of conceptual thought reflect the real abstractions of commodity exchange, Sohn-Rethel’s basic aim is to provide a historical materialist account of modern science, and in doing so to offer a critique of traditional bourgeois epistemology. Despite his sometimes apparently idiosyncratic interests and language, Sohn-Rethel engages with debates common to the entire Marxist tradition (the relation of base and superstructure, the development of commodity production, the nature of classless society), as well as providing a radical extension of historical materialist thought.

Our paper aims to: introduce Sohn-Rethel’s argument and terminology (real abstraction, social synthesis, second nature, etc.); situate his work within the lineage of Marxist philosophy, drawing critical comparisons with the work of other Marxist writers, in particular Louis Althusser; offer a assessment of his methodology and conclusions. Although there are deep flaws with Sohn-Rethel’s work – among them an often simplistic economic determinism and a decidedly non-Marxist preoccupation with exchange – we argue that Sohn-Rethel’s work deserves wider attention, addressing as it does the nature and status of Marxist thought itself and providing a genuinely novel interpretation and application of historical materialism.

Failed Abstraction – A Critique of Uno Kōzō’s reading of Marx’s theory of the value form
Elena Lange

Uno Kōzō (1897-1977) was Japan’s foremost Marxian economist. His critique of Marx’s method in Capital, especially with regard to the “premature” introduction of value-form analysis in vol. 1, has motivated him to completely rewrite Capital vol. 1 in his book The Principles of Political Economy (Keizai genron, 1964). The impact of this work is probably best reflected in the formation of the Uno School which has gained popularity in US, Canadian and British Marxist thought within the last 30 years and has recently even been acknowledged within the Neue Marx Lektüre (e.g. Helmut Reichelt).
Notwithstanding Uno’s increasing popularity in international Marx research, I want to present a critical paper that looks at a fundamental misunderstanding in Uno’s reading of the value form. In what is one of the most significant discussions of Marxian value form to take place in post-war Japan, Uno argues that ‘value’ and money as its ‘bearer’ cannot be understood in abstraction from personal interaction and human wants in commodity exchange. By drawing on the Japanese original documents and supporting the view of Uno’s lesser known rival Kuruma Samezō (1893-1982), I want to show that it can, and how Marx understood the ‘law of value’ as a non-personal law of social domination. In my view, Uno fails to reproduce the high degree of abstraction that is methodically required at the beginning of Capital and therefore necessarily misunderstands Marx’s fundamental claim – with grave consequences.

By drawing attention to this important debate, I not only want to broaden the scope of knowledge about Marx research in one of the most highly developed capitalist countries in the world, but also try to give impulses for critically re-evaluating “the most important and original Japanese contributor to Marxian political economy” (Robert Albritton).
NEW FOUCAULDIAN APPROACHES

Sam Kirwan

(Friday 11.30 – 13.00 MS 417)

Michel Foucault’s theory of sovereignty in modern political society
Attasit Sittidumrong

Healthcare as a Common Right: Biopolitics and the privatisation of the NHS
Graham Matthews

Who is the subject of human rights practice? Witnessing and its discontents
Michal Givoni

Michel Foucault’s theory of sovereignty in modern political society
Attasit Sittidumrong

As everyone knows, the world today is in the process of transformation by globalization. Among these processes the dissolve of the modern (or nation) state’s sovereignty resulted by the transnational movement of men, capital and information is so interesting and (may be) most important. For the student and scholar of political theory, this is the point that nudges to reconsider the principle of sovereignty in modern political society. As the junior scholar of political theory, I wrote this article for this purpose and used the idea of Michel Foucault to frame the direction of this article. For the content, I divided this article into two sections. The first deals with Foucault’s interpretation of Thomas Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty to project his own view of both modern political society and the principle of sovereignty emphasized on the sovereign’s centralization of the fear making capability. The second deals with the forms and characters of biopower/politics as the sovereign’s mechanic to administer life for distributing his inventive fear toward the entire society.

Healthcare as a Common Right: Biopolitics and the privatisation of the NHS
Graham Matthews

Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Antonio Negri, this paper brings the issue of healthcare reform to the forefront of debates about biopolitics and the commons. I argue that the shift from a ‘welfarist’ to a ‘neoliberal’ system of healthcare would signal a victory for the expansion of economic measure into all noneconomic territories. Consequently, it is crucial to consider the drive to privatize the National Health Service (NHS) as a key site for contending the disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms by which neoliberal governance exerts control and power over the population.

As Allyson Pollock demonstrates in NHS plc, over the past twenty years, ‘a radical marketization of the NHS has taken place, by opening it up to private providers of health care and by making the publically owned institutions of the NHS more like commercial companies’ (67). The impact of this shift has had profound effects. Firstly, the systematic devolution of the not-for-profit NHS into a healthcare market has resulted in a dramatic increase in the bureaucratic, managerial and legal costs involved in negotiating contracts for ancillary and secondary services. Indeed, the privatization of public health services has the effect of redirecting taxes into the pockets of share holders rather than investing in the health and wellbeing of the general population. Secondly, the running of hospitals has seen a shift from a focus on planning services to meet patient needs, to a focus on contract performance and income. This has resulted in a reduction rather than an expansion of choice by the
The increasing marketization of the NHS risks the loss of the core principle that healthcare should be universally available to all. This marks – alongside the shift in perceptions of the sufferer as a ‘patient’ or ‘citizen’ to a ‘client’ or ‘consumer’ – the systematic dissolution of the principles of community and solidarity.

The inception of the NHS brought with it strategic planning bodies responsible for the health of the nation. By contrast, the privatization of healthcare systems brings with it an emphasis on ‘decentralization’ and ‘choice’ which risks negating the ability of specialists to influence unhealthy behaviour and lifestyle choices. Within the complex landscape of welfare politics, it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine between decisions which are made by medical professionals for the benefit of the patient or made by management consultancies for the benefit of the private sector. However, by reading the privatization of healthcare services as a politicization of biology, it is possible to generate resistance to neoliberal governance through an emphasis on social cohesion and community.

Who is the subject of human rights practice? Witnessing and its discontents
Dr. Michal Givoni

Michel Foucault’s discussion of humanitarian sensibility in *Discipline and Punish* and the notion of biopolitics that he developed in the *History of Sexuality* provided the theoretical infrastructure for one of the most influential critiques of human rights ethics in the late 20th century. By unravelling the complicity of the discourse and practice of human rights with technologies of power and sovereignty, studies inspired by Foucault’s insights have rightly questioned their benevolent aspirations, but also promoted an overly generic view of human rights and humanitarian practice and failed to account for what had brought it into being in the first place. In my paper, I will claim that Foucault’s insights on ethical modes of subjectivization make it possible to approach human rights practice from a different critical perspective, one that emphasizes the procedures and techniques that are adopted by individuals as they willfully turn themselves into subjects of human rights activism. I will show that Foucault’s later works on the care of the self in antiquity and his unique understanding of practical ethics open a way for a broader understanding of human rights practice, which brings into account its own critical edge and the knowledge that sustains it.

In an attempt to show how subjects of human rights practice in the 20th century have been formed, I will focus on practices of witnessing and testimony and on their problematizations. I will claim that for individuals and groups who were involved in human rights activism, witnessing provided not just a workable formula for creating publics but also a matrix for crafting their own responsible selves. A wellspring and an overarching rationality of techniques of observation, documentation, writing, and protest, witnessing also formed the focal point of sustained, and often contested, procedures of self-formation that generated and maintained the distinctive subjectivity that could ground and carry it forward. In my paper I will analyze several meta-testimonial discourses that posited witnessing as a vexed and problematic venture and outlined the procedures that individuals had to follow in order to cultivate themselves as moral witnesses. I will discuss Jean Norton Cru’s attempt to scrutinize testimonies of veterans in the wake of the Great War; the theories of traumatic witnessing elaborated by scholars associated with the Fortunoff Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University; and the reflexive practices of witnessing of the humanitarian organization Médecins sans Frontières. I will show that those manifestations of critical witnessing configured the relations between testimony and the political in shifting and varied ways, some attempting to bypass political life and others seeking to exploit new opportunities for meaningful action in its midst.
I. **Attention to the object** (Chair: Matt Mahon)  
(Friday 11.30 – 13.00 MS 538)

**Happening Art: Anthropological approaches to the art object**  
*Sam Barton*

**Alarm Clocks, Awakening, and the Outsourcing of Capitalist Time**  
*Jacob Bard-Rosenberg*

**The Object(s) of Musical Experience: Potentials for Cross-Disciplinary Dialogues**  
*Sam Wilson*

**Fashion, Consumption, History**  
*Calvin Hui*

II. **Roundtable: “Speculative Realism/ Object-Oriented Philosophy and the Criticality of Critical Thought”** (Chair: Matt Mahon)  
(Friday 14.00 – 15.00 MS 416)

*Joseph Noonan-Ganley*  
*Chris Wong*  
*Stanimir Panayotov (via video)*

III. **Temporalities as strategy** (Chair: Sam Wilson)  
(Saturday 14.30 – 16.00 Clore 102)

**Preservation, Restoration and the Politics of the English Constitution in the 19th Century.**  
*Reuben Bard-Rosenberg*

**Notes for an argument about Deleuze: postcolonial thought, temporality, transdisciplinarity**  
*Matt Mahon*

**The Experiential Time of Pre- legality**  
*William E Conklin*

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**Happening Art: Anthropological approaches to the art object**  
*Sam Barton*

**Anthropological approaches to the object can provide a view of artwork as something happening, only as important as they are to their viewers now, and that only have meaning through experience and consensus. As opposed to any idea that objects have signification somehow ‘baked in’.”**

**Art objects are undoubtedly considered as having temporality - but often they are considered to have already happened rather than continuing to happen in any sense.**

**Contemporary movements have challenged this. The Situationists, Relational Aesthetics, some video**
art such as Pipilotti Rist or perhaps Tacita Dean have sought to create or promote art that can be considered as existing specifically in the time that they are seen.

But this type of approach to the object has not always been extended beyond contemporary media to include more traditional or historical art forms.

The main part of this paper is will be an object study of the Naiads in the British Museum, chosen for their status as both historical and art objects, as well as my fondness for them. The aim is to explore the way they may be seen to continue to happen.

An approach inspired by anthropological and material culture approaches to the object will serve to create a reading of these objects that pays attention to what is happening. How do people move around them? How does the space itself change the way the objects appear?

I’m specifically going to draw upon Alfred Gell’s theory of the agency of objects to examine how we might view these objects to continue to act upon their viewers.

My hope is to provide a detailed and ethnographic approach of one set of art objects, drawing on the Anthropology of Art and Material Culture to describe these objects in a way that emphasizes their current and continuing temporality rather than just their history.

Indicative Bibliography:


Gell, Alfred 1996: "Vogel's Net: Traps as Artworks and Artworks as Traps" in Journal of material culture


Munn, Nancy 1973: Walbiri Iconography, Cornell University Press


Clocks, Awakening, and the Outsourcing of Capitalist Time

Jacob Bard-Rosenberg

Alarm Chapter 10 of Marx’s Capital describes the development of the working day in England, through a “concealed civil war between the capitalist class and the working class.” If the working class were to have won the battle, with the institution of the 10-hour and then 8-hour working day, the war was to continue. Its tragic conclusion can perhaps be found in the late work of Adorno: “Free time”, which is guaranteed by the temporal limits of the working day, “is the shadowy continuation of labour.” Within ten years of the publication of Capital the first bedside alarm clock had been patented by the Seth Thomas Clock Company, and by the late-1890s, alarm clocks were so common that Freud included “alarm clock dreams” (Weckerträume) in The Interpretation of Dreams. In 1931, Westclox, having just merged with the Seth Thomas Clock Company, produced the new “2-voice Big Ben” clock. An advert reads: “HERE'S A NEW BIG BEN – with amazing new features that make him almost human! [...] First, there's a series of soft chime calls that wake you gently – without shock or sudden jar to your nerves. But – if you fail to shut off the alarm during this first warning – there's a loud, steady call in reserve that's sure to GET YOU UP! [...] Drop in wherever clocks are sold and see what Big Ben has done to make getting up a happy experience.”

This paper considers how technologies of awakening after Marx impact on notions of time under capital. I argue that the alarm clock is an early example of the outsourcing of industrial machinery in
the form of a consumer durable. With Freud and Marx in the background, I then take the Westclox advert as a starting-point to discuss shock, awakening, and “second nature” in two near-contemporary theoretical works: Benjamin’s “On the Image of Proust” (1929), and Adorno’s “On the Concept of Natural-History” (1932).

**The Object(s) of Musical Experience: Potentials for Cross-Disciplinary Dialogues**
Sam Wilson

Focusing on the relationships between the objects of musical experience, time, and temporality, I argue that in these terms music holds potential for cross-disciplinary dialogues. To this end, I discuss three dialectically entangled objects of musical experience: (1.) the musical work as object, (2.) discursive objects within given musical works (e.g. quotations, moments of allusion), and (3.) the physical objects complicit in shaping musical experiences (e.g. musical instruments). All are experienced in their temporal unfolding and, in addition, performatively mediate experiences of the world (for example, ideas of the natural, of the body, of the self, and so on). As such, this opens music to larger questions of ideology and critique. The relationships of these objects to time is also crucial, with them inherently being inscribed with the historicity of past ways of mediating reality performatively. These legacies I discuss with reference to their confrontation and modification in aspects of late twentieth-century art music (including that of Helmut Lachenmann, Morton Feldman, and others).

**Fashion, Consumption, History**
Calvin Hui

This presentation is part of my project that uses fashion – understood as consumer commodity and artistic production – to provide a critique of Chinese consumer culture. Indeed, fashion has dual meanings. Fashion can mean clothes: the prêt-à-porter (ready-to-wear) is often regarded as consumer commodity whereas the haute couture is often appreciated as high art or avant-garde art. Fashion can also be perceived as a temporal register, as in trend and à la mode. By using the dual meanings of fashion as a point of departure, the project attends to the complex mediations between fashion and consumption, gender and sexuality, class and ideology, and temporality, such as history and memory, within the context of Chinese (post-) socialism. In my presentation, I argue that it is through the representation of fashion consumption that the politics of history is registered and worked out. First, by analyzing the representation of the consumption of a high-quality uniform in Xie Tieli’s socialist film, Never Forget (1964), I argue that fashion consumption reveals the contradictions of Chinese socialism at the dawn of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Second, I examine the representation of the red dress to show how fashion consumption unravels the contradictions of China’s economic reforms and opening up in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to the revisionist narrative, since Chinese women were asked to wear the clothes of the workers, peasants and soldiers in the socialist era, Maoism denied their natural femininity, turning them into masculine or genderless beings. In the post-socialist period, however, Chinese women were encouraged to express their femininity and develop their consciousness as gendered beings through fashion and make-up. I will confront the revisionist argument by showing its limitation. Intersecting with the theme of the panel, my presentation engages with fashion – a temporal object – to contemplate the politics of history. By focusing on fashion, consumption, and (post-) socialist China, it problematizes the existing discussion of the subject and object, time and temporality.

**Roundtable:**
“Speculative Realism/ Object-Oriented Philosophy and the Criticality of Critical Thought”
This roundtable session asks, what is the effect of speculative realism and object-oriented philosophy on the criticality of critical thought? Our interest here is in examining the meaning of criticality, both within SR/OOP and in relation to the ‘critical’ of critical theory. We will explore what it may mean to have a critical relationship to the object, to take objects seriously. How should we link this tendency to the legacies of critical theory in the Frankfurt School? How might we trace a relationship between philosophies which focus on the objects and the criticality that they employ or engender?

Addressing these questions are three practitioners who engage with SR/OOP in their work. Chris Wong (UCL), Stanimir Panayotov (Euro-Balkan Institute, via video) and Joseph Noonan-Ganley (Goldsmiths) will each present a brief position paper on the question, then discuss the topic. The session will be chaired by Matt Mahon.

Preservation, Restoration and the Politics of the English Constitution in the 19th Century
Reuben Bard-Rosenberg

This paper will consider the English Constitution, as an imagined historical object within 19th century political discourse. The idea of the “ancient English Constitution” functioned as a lynchpin of political debate throughout the 19th century. Insofar as it represented a set of unyielding governmental principles, the idea was frequently invoked by Conservatives. Meanwhile Jonathan Parry has shown that the “ancient Constitution” was an important aspect of Whig-Liberal discourse, wherein it was represented as an evolving but nonetheless epoch-traversing element of Britain’s political inheritance. Less systematic attention, however, has been paid to the significance of the "ancient Constitution" within radical discourse. Within radical thought, the Constitution did not exist in the actuality of the present. Rather, the "democratic" English Constitution was imagined to have developed and existed within ancient, pre-Norman, England. As such, it represented a collective birthright which had hitherto been denied - and thus a mandate for political transformation.

This paper will focus upon the importance of chronology and time in delineating radical and conservative conceptions of the Constitution. Whigs and Conservatives emphasized the “restoration” of the Constitution in 1689, and the principles established at this point. Insofar as the object was fully visible, and fully knowable, it could constitute a thing to be preserved, and a bulwark against change. By contrast, a Constitution that was routed in a more ancient and unknowable past could function as a somewhat emptier vessel, into which radicals could load their desires for transforming future. Given such elasticity, can the ancient English constitution be properly analyzed as an "object"? In contrast to a physical object, the famously uncodified Constitution lacked any particular form that preceded its interpretation. Yet even the radical conception of the Constitution - though it was objectively mythical – nonetheless emphasized the Constitution’s real historical existence, and its trans-historical nature - in short its object-like characteristics. This paper, therefore, will consider the necessity (or otherwise) of distinguishing between the literal, the discursively created, object. Starting from Joan Wallach Scott’s statement, that “[w]ithout meaning, there is no experience; without processes of signification, there is no meaning”, it will consider the concept of the object in relation to discourse and materiality.

Notes for an argument about Deleuze: postcolonial thought, temporality, transdisciplinarity
Matt Mahon

The temporality of objects is at stake when they are thought as objects of study – the objects of a particular discipline. But disciplines themselves are entangled in the time of their objects. This is particularly evident when it comes to postcolonial studies. John K Noyes (2010) invokes a Deleuzian ‘geographical materialism of desire’ in order to describe the temporality of postcolonial studies, and to defend postcolonial thought from accusations (such as
those levelled by Spivak) of a decline into apolitical affirmation and indecision. He claims there is a
temporal tension between the historical analysis of the globalisation of capital and the
epistemological analysis of the colonial subject. This split temporality allows us to think the
postcolonial as a transdisciplinary mode of thought, and therefore as inherently radical and
politically.

However, other representations of the postcolonial object of study find its temporality more
problematic. Naoki Sakai (2006, 2011) describes the flow of knowledge from the periphery to the
university as a temporal relationship that orders the object of study historically: The periphery
becomes a site where the objects of study are produced, and in the university those objects are
individuated and framed by concepts. This analysis, contra Noyes, presents certain modes of
postcolonial thought as deeply depoliticised and depoliticising.

Considering the temporality of the subject in the present and capital unfolding in history (what
Noyes' calls 'traditional' objects of the postcolonial), I will examine the temporality and disciplinarity
of postcolonial studies. I will draw conclusions on how we can think disciplinarity in relation to time,
and whether postcolonial thought is viable as a properly transdisciplinary practice.

Indicative bibliography
Bignall, Postcolonial Agency (2011)
Noyes in Patton and Bignall, Deleuze and the Postcolonial (2010)
Sakai, Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference (2006)
Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak? (1988)

The Experiential Time of Pre-legality
William E Conklin

This Paper will examine the intersections of subject and object through experiential time. The take-
off point of the Paper will be HLA Hart’s dichotomy of pre-legal and legality. Although this
distinction is usually projected in terms of the pre-legal as represented by a traditional society (as
Hart held out), I shall argue that the pre-legal is really concerned with the exclusion of experiential
time from legal reasoning. I shall draw from Husserl’s earliest works and from Ricoeur’s recent works
in order to better understand experiential time. I shall also highlight how experiential time transpires
through collective memory and how the latter is excluded from legal reasoning because jurists have
been preoccupied with the identity of an object (called a law) in terms of its institutional textual
source (a statute, or treaty or implied customary norm) rather than as the social-cultural experiential
time. A territorial-like boundary represents the inside and the outside of the object. Experiential time
closes the subject-object relationship by presupposing an object as meant through experiential time
rather than as posited as a conceptual object.

My example of this theory will be fleshed out in the Paper. I shall explain how experiential time,
particularly as collective memory, has been excluded from the international law doctrine of
nationality. Collective memories have especially been excluded as extra-legal or non-legal. This
exclusion has left international law with a paradox: namely, a universality of human rights claimed for
everyone in the international legal order which, at the same moment, leaves it to the state to posit
objects which are emptied of experiential time. I shall draw a subtext from international legal
discourse, however. This sub-text highlights the importance of experiential time. The sub-text
examines how experiential time is important in rendering a de facto nationality to a person who
otherwise lacks a nationality in any state of the globe.
Social Integration Through Recognition: Between Normative Consent and Subjection
Kristina Lepold

This paper proposes a recognition-theoretic understanding of social integration between normative consent and subjection. It seeks to contribute to overcoming the unproductive divide between two influential pictures of social integration that regard either normative consent or subjection to domination as the exclusive mode of social integration, thereby significantly limiting not only our understanding of processes of social integration, but also our possibilities for effective social critique. In the first and the second part of the paper, the conceptions of social integration that can be disclosed in the works of Parsons and Bourdieu and paradigmatically capture the above mentioned divide will be critically reconstructed. While both authors conceive of recognition as a fundamental medium of social integration, they are led to diametrically opposed conclusions regarding the nature and stakes of social integration, Parsons taking the side of normative consent, Bourdieu the side of subjection to domination. By way of contrasting these approaches and their respective limitations, the outlines of a new understanding of social integration through recognition will become visible. The third part of the paper will further work out and fill in these outlines of an understanding of integration between normative consent and subjection by drawing on post-structuralist thought, most notably on the works of the late Foucault and Butler. It will be argued that, while being constituted through recognition as subjects within society and thus necessarily subjected, we also always individually or collectively negotiate, consent to or resist against the dominant norms of recognition governing social integration on the basis of our experiences of the social. This paper will conclude by suggesting that conceptually reconciling normative consent and subjection as modes of integration is indispensable if we want a more nuanced understanding of processes of social integration as well as of the normative stakes involved.

Cultivating Sexuate Difference with Luce Irigaray’s Between East and West
Laura Roberts

A recent criticism of the philosophy of sexuate difference contends that this philosophy is unable to adequately accommodate lived differences between women. I suggest that rather than being indifferent or hostile to differences between women, Luce Irigaray’s philosophy is actually offering a more radical proposal. One of Luce Irigaray’s concerns is that when we speak of differences in terms of ‘race’ we are returning to a past logic that Luce Irigaray is, and always has been, working constantly to overcome. According to her we must understand diversity in women’s daily lives as

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**POST-STRUCTURALISM AND THE POLITICAL SUBJECT**

*(Friday 9.30 – 11.00 MS 540)*

Social Integration Through Recognition: Between Normative Consent and Subjection
Kristina Lepold

Cultivating Sexuate Difference with Luce Irigaray’s *Between East and West*
Laura Roberts

‘We will destroy all logical revolt!’ Revolutionary Failure and the Event: Rethinking Kathy Acker’s Politics
Emilia Borowska
specific. However, to be able to do this, we have to renegotiate the relationship between the
material daily realities of women’s lives and cultural categories of, for example, ‘race’. In *Between
East and West: From Singularity to Community* Luce Irigaray attempts to provide an example of how
to express or experience this relationship by writing about her own personal experiences of yoga and
Eastern philosophy as a woman situated within Western culture/s.

While I do not deny that an analysis of racial or cultural difference is important I think this recent
criticism forgets that when Luce Irigaray speaks of sexual, and more recently of sexuate difference, it
does not equate it to an ideal or impossible couple, or to a biological difference, or to the problem of
sexual oppression. Sexuate difference, for Luce Irigaray, is a mode of being in the world – an
ontological reality – that is outside of our current understanding, beyond any way of being or
thinking that dominates life in contemporary Western societies. And, yet, even though sexuate
difference stays beyond our current understanding, it is always intimately tied to our embodied daily
realities. Importantly, sexuate difference calls for the recognition of a passage between nature and
culture, biology and spirit, an articulation between the sensible and transcendental, that permits two
to enter into relation with one another without either being sacrificed or submitted to the other
differently sexuate subjects.

‘We will destroy all logical revolt!’ Revolutionary Failure and the Event: Rethinking Kathy Acker’s
Politics
Emilia Borowska

American novelists with Leftist sympathies writing in post-1970s America have often been accused of
being complicit in the academic Left’s withdrawal from the political scene. Kathy Acker, for example,
has been largely read as a cult figure of postmodernism - a plagiarist who, equipped with the tools of
poststructuralism, describes the oppressive system that seeks to ‘destroy all logical revolt’ (a phrase
borrowed from Rimbaud), while lacking the vision, inspiration, or hope to change it. Unlike some
critical definitions of her as a ‘dazzling postmodernist’, and in contrast to the prevailing, politically-
bankrupt American fiction produced during the Reagan era, this paper argues that Acker was actively
interested in producing progressive models of democracy. By engaging with the emancipatory
material of the May 1968 revolts and the Paris Commune of 1871, her most politically explicit novels
are looking backwards for hope, seeking to unleash revolutionary potential. I suggest her radical
stance is akin to the affirmative notions of the Event, differently conceived by Gilles Deleuze and
Alain Badiou. Further, I posit that ‘revolution’ is an unstable term in Acker’s writing, because its
meaning shifts from the pre-modern as repetition; the modern as novelty; the postmodern as
failure; and revolution as Event. Finally, I argue that the logic of the Event - theorized by Deleuze as a
‘becoming’ and by Badiou as a ‘rupture’ - offers a way beyond the postmodern binary logic of
failure/success, and opens new approaches to reading Acker’s political engagement through her
works.
The Question of the Animal, The City and the World

Yoriko Otomo

Following Jacques Derrida’s explicit provocation to think the ‘question of the animal’ within the context of a ‘carnophallogocentric’ economy, scholars in the English-speaking world have since the turn of the millennium started developing what can broadly be called posthumanist work. What are the possibilities and limitations of thinking the human/animal distinction in our various disciplines and projects?

I  Consumption and the Question of the Animal
(Friday 9.30 – 11.00 MS 538)

Cannibals and Apes: Revolution in the Republic
Dr. Richard Iveson

Wolf-biters and Over-Groomers: (Self-)Consumption as Ethical Reciprocity
Kamillea Aghtan

Molar Ethics and Aesthetics
Karin Sellberg

II  Animal Life: Beyond Good and Evil
(Friday 14.00 – 15.00 MS 417)

A Marxist Response to ‘The Animal Question’?
Daniel van Strien

Deleuze and an Ethics of Suffering: Toward the Zone of Indiscernibility of Human and Animal
Hyun Sook Oh

A Poetics of the Naughty
Tom Lee

III  Animals in Domestic and Urban Space
(Saturday 10.00 – 11.30 MS 451)

The Panoramic Animal: Authenticity and Living Exhibitions
Aaron Santesso

Art from the Dead: the Moral and Ethical Transformation of the Animal Pet into Cultural Artifact
Angela Bartram

Animal-Life in the London Zoo: Architecture, Consumption and Display
Lucia Vodanovic

Cannibals and Apes: Revolution in the Republic
Richard Iveson
By way of Derrida’s ethical injunction to “eat well,” this paper explores the relation between “eating the beast,” popular revolt, and Plato’s worker-ape. I take as my starting point Plato’s claim that those in whom the rational soul sleeps are unable to control what is both the beast of the body and the body of the beast, thus wallowing shamelessly in incest, bestiality, and cannibalism. For Plato, the “despised” manual worker exemplifies this monstrosity because he cannot rule but only serve his beastly corporeality, thus becoming an “ape.”

In Plato, the figure of the cannibal functions as a technique of control linked via instinct to the jurisdiction of power. Here, the Law of the Father is aristocratic, evidenced by Plato’s fearful hatred of both worker and democracy. There being no food that the worker-ape refuses to eat, the horror of the cannibal thus overlaps with the fear of the starving. Not by chance, this figure of the beast rampaging through the domestic arena follows on directly from Plato’s claim that the “equal freedoms” characteristic of democracy, in being shared also by domestic animals, constitutes both origin and symptom of imminent tyranny.

To prevent the letting loose of cannibalistic animality, for Plato both the worker and the democratic urge or instinct must be controlled by enslaving the unruly mob of apes beneath the “best,” the proper instrument of which is, quite simply, the mouth, described by Plato as that through which the necessary enters and the best exits. The best thus exits but never enters the mouth, is never ingested or digested, but rather, in being installed through other orifices, places within the body an external guardian of the Law to take the place of sleeping reason. The worker-animal, in short, must incorporate the Law as both foreign and determining, “set free” only once the cannibalistic instinct that is revolution is imprisoned within a further crypt.

It is this constellation of eat-speak-interiorise which Derrida puts into question, in the process tearing apart the dominant schema of subjectivity and the order of the political and of right. This paper thus centres upon two questions: first, when to “eat well” means learning to give without grasping the endless procession of partial objects which pass through the orifices by way of interminable mourning, what remains of the cannibalistic worker’s revolution? And second, how might Derrida’s injunction be restaged to incorporate both the transformative cannibalistic “instinct” that is revolution and the offer of infinite hospitality to the “living in general,” including those beings whose physiology has no need of orifices?

**Wolf-biters and Over-Groomers: (Self-)Consumption as Ethical Reciprocity**
Kamillea Aghtan

This paper begins with the confessional act, “I am a wolf-biter”. That is, I am in the habitual practice of picking, biting, tearing, chewing and swallowing the skin which skirts my fingernails, occasionally until the skin discolours and the fingers bleed. This compulsive practice of autodermatophagia is multiply wounding. It is triply-branded as unseemly, a bad habit and/or a mal-practice: firstly, by an aesthetic shame, as one of the most visible parts of the body is prone to be hidden or de-publicised; secondly and consequently, by a modal uselessness both as the fingertips become haptically desensitised to textures and as the hands are placed “out of use” in the space of public interactivity and visibility; and thirdly, by its pet-name (and medicalised insult) of “wolf-biting”, terminology which renders the act of self-consumption into animalistic – and, indeed, amoral – behaviour.

Within this schema of (self-)injury, I argue that it is the quality of self-consumption as an impenetrable, closed economy following a set of valueless and nonrational rules which lends itself to its animal identification. We may contrast this with the distinctly anthropomorphising veterinary diagnosis of similar self-harm practices commonly seen in dogs and cats of over-grooming. Whereas wolf-biting functions within a non-social realm of irrational behaviour amongst humans, over-
grooming is described an anxious, pathetic response by animals to social isolation and abandonment. In the spectrum of social relations, these self-harm techniques are counter-intuitively polarised.

In response to this sliding scale of habit, I wish to engage with the works of Jacques Derrida ("Eating Well"; The Animal) and Giorgio Agamben (The Open) to explore the possibilities – and problematics – of autophagism as a form of simultaneous ethical and animal behaviour. If a Derridean ethics of "eating well" in a carnophallogocentric world obligates one "always to remain responsible to the others with and on whom one dines" (Melville, "A 'Friendship of Taste'"), I ask the central question: what does this imply for the autophagic consumer?

Molar Ethics and Aesthetics
Karin Sellberg

‘The most philosophic organ man possesses are his jaws’, the artist, writer and provocateur Salvador Dalì exclaims in his autobiography The Secret Life of Salvador Dalì: ‘what, indeed, is more philosophic than the moment when you slowly suck the marrow of a bone that is being powerfully crushed in the final destructive embrace of your molar’s’ (Dalì, Secret Life 10). It may seem farfetched to connect Dalì’s moment of molar embrace of animal flesh with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of molarity, since they refer to widely different connotations of the word, but I believe that this may give us an opportunity to consider the connective and possible affirmative aspects of eating, while simultaneously not forgetting the violence of the act.

The moment when Dalì’s meat enters his mouth produces a deeply significant encounter between teeth and animal flesh that allows the artist a type of transportation. He refers to the common expression ‘you are what you eat’, claiming that only through his mouth can he truly connect with the outside world and become increasingly other. This is not dissimilar to De Certeau’s conception of eating as a means of ‘honouring’ and ‘enveloping’ the eaten (Heteralogies 66), but Dalì is not unaware of the fact that this is an ‘imperialist act’ (Secret Life 9) which, as Derrida recognises in his various lectures and essays on cannibalism and eating, finally destroys the other.

In response to this, Dalì develops an ethics and aesthetics of continual and reciprocal chewing – a process of eating and being eaten that is no longer ‘nutritional’, but ‘relational’ (Deleuze & Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 301), and if it is taken to its final end entirely transforms both self and other. This paper will thus argue that Dalì’s eating – and eating in general – can be read in terms of Deleuzo-Guattarian processes of becoming-animal and becoming-imperceptible: a violence of the molars that leads to molar connection.

A Marxist Response to ‘The Animal Question’?
Daniel van Strien

Growing interest in ‘the animal question’, both in the academy and wider society, has resulted in a wide variety of responses and posed an increasing number of additional questions. However for the most part Marxist theory has been notably absent from these debates. There are a number of reasons why this might be the case - Marx’s own dismissal of concern for animals, the distinctions Marx made between the ‘species being’ of humans and animals developed first in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, and later in Capital, and possibly the lack of obvious applications of Marxist theory to ‘the animal question.’

There have, however, been exceptions to the lack of attention played to animals in the Marxist tradition. Of special relevance is the critical theory of the Frankfurt School particularly Adorno and Horkheimer. Marxism has increasingly begun to turn its more general focus to bodies and the bio,
and with the growth of ecological Marxism the possibilities of a serious Marxist response to the animal question seem imminent.

What I plan to do in this paper is present a brief outline of the ways in which Marxism has engaged with the animal question, before moving on to highlight some of the possible areas where Marxism and Marxist theory could provide a contribution. Rather than presenting a single answer, the paper aims to provide multiple possible theoretical conceptions that could initiate an initial Marxist response to the animal question: the relationship between animals and value creation, the reification of animal bodies at the macro and micro levels, primitive accumulation, formal real and total subsumption and a historical materialist approach. While engaging with each of these concepts only briefly, I aim to give examples and explanations of the ways in which these ideas might be developed in order to provide an overall justification for claiming the relevance of Marxism to the animal question, and perhaps provide a preliminary argument on the importance of the animal question to Marxism.

**Deleuze and an Ethics of Suffering: Toward the Zone of Indiscernibility of Human and Animal**

Hyun Sook Oh

This paper attempts to explore Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of “becoming-animal” in terms of the “sensation of suffering”, developing this discussion through a critical comparison with Agamben’s and Derrida’s ethical reflections on animality. Since Aristotle, Western civilization has persistently defined humans as non-animal beings, as possessors of logos (language) or ratio (reason). Yet the traditionally settled difference between humans and animals has, over the last two centuries, been attacked and dismantled by a range of philosophical, political and scientific discourses. Among contemporary philosophers, Deleuze and Guattari articulate the radical idea of “becoming-animal” in order to abrogate the putative differences between humans and animals. It is my contention that this conception of “becoming-animal” is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s ethics of life, being deeply and inextricably associated with the question of how we should live. Agamben and Derrida also criticize the animal-human demarcation for exhibiting a prejudiced “anthropocentricism”, one that has long been central to the West’s conception of the self. This conception of the self establishes a borderline between the human and the animal which has, according to Agamben and Derrida, both caused and justified considerable violence (notably, the mechanized extermination of humans and animals on an industrial scale). These reflections highlight the fact that the question of animality, even when not explicitly acknowledged, has always been at the heart of ethical and political affairs and needs critical re-examination in order to overcome its narrow limitations. Yet, despite their contribution to this re-examination, I shall argue that we must ultimately take direction not from Agamben and Derrida, but from the Deleuze and Guattari: it is the latter who prepare the fullest exploration of animality and its importance for ethics.

The primary question for us now might be thought to be “How do we relate to animals?” But, for Deleuze and Guattari, the question is posed differently “how do we become animal?” This presents us with a possibility which they argue is neither a “dream” nor “phantasy” but “perfectly real”. “Becoming-animal” is also not a simple correspondence between relations: it is not a “resemblance” or an “imitation”, rather it is “the zone of exchange between man and animal in which something of one passes into the other”. The ethos of becoming-animal forces us to reconsider animality as a radical activity of affecting and being affected by animals and is to be sharply contrasted with Agamben and Derrida’s proposal that we develop a “radical passivity” toward the suffering animal. By exploring Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the experience of “meat” and the transformative “sensation of suffering”, this paper aims to reveal how becoming-animal serves to provide a ground for their ethics of life. Such a ground is not to be confused with an anthropocentric morality based on pity, and nor is it merely a superficial vitalistic philosophy: it motivates a wholly new ethical perspective.
A Poetics of the Naughty
Tom Lee

In this paper I elaborate a poetic genealogy of ‘naughtiness’ using literary, anecdotal, etymological and vernacular examples. The origins of the word have numerical connotations, ‘to be naughty’: to have naught. It is a particularly good word for identifying the relatedness of the wicked and the permissive. Naughtiness is also a category of being well suited to narrative exemplification because naughtiness is what something or someone gets up to. Naughty things are instances of things that are seen to be doing their thing, defining their character through the exhibition and incorporation of excess. There seems to be a certain intimacy between the story telling impulse and the desire to test, extend and sometimes establish limits that comes with naughty activity.

What I begin to do in this paper is outline a conceptual field in which the category of naughtiness might be situated. The literary examples I turn to, Franz Kafka, Gertrude Stein and W. G. Sebald, are canonical modernist writers—a fact that I don’t yet wish to make too much of a fuss over. I do suggest, however, that naughtiness is closely linked to ‘creatureliness’, creativity and beings of dubious ontology. In this sense my argument develops or moves aside from Eric Santner’s theory of ‘creatureliness’ outlined in his book On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. Naughtiness is a variety of creatureliness, or more generally of feeling, that tends to get neglected in the rush to discuss things like love and hate, trauma, madness, and theoretical staples such as irony and the uncanny. Naughtiness also usefully eludes some of the more antagonistic ways we conceptualise the activity of characters, it is endearing sin, delight that is permitted but never advised, affective self-justification.

This is paper is not an argument for or against naughtiness, but an indication towards it. Animals, grandparents, children, celebrities, literary characters, numbers and Gods all make cameos in my poetic genealogy.

The Panoramic Animal: Authenticity and Living Exhibitions
Aaron Santesso

People who inhabit these arcades: the signboards with the names have nothing in common with those that hang beside respectable entryways. Rather they resemble the plaques on the railings of cages at the zoo, put there to indicate not so much the dwelling place as the name and origin of the captive animals. (Benjamin, Arcades Project)

Benjamin, like many critics, tends to associate the most contrived and artificial forms of human containment in the modern city with the zoo. My paper would reverse the metaphor, looking at the ways in which the zoo, in Benjamin’s day especially, was feverishly working to “naturalize” the idea of containment and display. During the half century between 1880 and 1930, as architects, planners and exhibitors sought to implement new ways of displaying living beings in urban and artificial environments, they regularly drew on the strategies of “authentic” living display developed by the zoological garden.

Dostoevsky had singled out the Crystal Palace as heralding a new form of urban existence, one “all ready-made and computed with mathematical exactitude.” By the time Benjamin began writing about the Parisian arcades, this vision of life under glass had become urban reality. But nervousness about “ready-made” city life also inspired an opposing desire for elements of the natural, the real and the authentic – a desire explored to greatest effect in the zoo. The German zoo designer and wild animal merchant Carl Hagenbeck pioneered the techniques of “barless cages” (moated...
enclosures) and “natural” environments (concrete mountain peaks, etc.) in his Tierpark zoo in Hamburg -- precisely to counter the image of the zoo as a row of labeled cages alluded to by Benjamin. Hagenbeck also, more notoriously, participated in the development of exotic “living panoramas” and “human zoos”; by the turn of the century, these could be found in urban parks, squares, and fairgrounds. In a series of World’s Fairs, for example, Parisian organizers cooperated with the Jardin Zoologique to set up “negro villages,” a Madagascar panorama stocked with natives, and the like. Hagenbeck’s introduction of naturalistic human displays had a powerful impact on the modern notion of “realistic” natural environments, and how living creatures might be offered up to the spectator’s gaze while still seeming to be free.

Ultimately, my paper would attempt to explain the influence of the zoo on living urban displays and “natural” urban existence by concentrating on the vexed question (posed especially, though in different ways, by the Frankfurt school and certain postmodernists) of what “authenticity” and “freedom” mean in the context of an artificial environment, and on how the living element -- animal, human, or both combined -- increasingly came to be seen as a guarantor of the real and natural, an alleviation of the artificiality of the modern metropolis.

Art from the Dead: the Moral and Ethical Transformation of the Animal Pet into Cultural Artifact
Angela Bartram

The body is an important site for analysis of the physical and the social condition. Whether human or animal, it provides information and experience that communicates what it is to be alive -- even in death. This has made the dead body a source material to be analyzed, scrutinized, dissected, and surveyed in the pursuit of knowledge. However, whilst it is acceptable in certain scientific, anthropological and museological contexts to unpick the workings and functions of the non-human animal body in death, this tends to appear more provocative in art practice. Ethical and moral considerations of the cognitive and sensory animal in life inform how it's cultural representation is received within a gallery context.

A reflection of the animal as living and social is particularly relevant in negotiations of companion species or pets included in art works. The pet is an in-between creature placed between human and animal taxonomies and this makes it a problematic art ‘object.’ Produced by taxidermy, dissection or anatomical display, this type of artwork provokes a confrontation to the memory of the domestic arrangements we make with these animals and our experience of cohabitation. The pet body displayed as skin or dead carcass reminds us of the general presence of the domestic animal in our lives. Frustration is often produced at their use within art in death, and this can seem unfathomable.

This paper will analyse and reflect on artworks that incorporate dead domestic pets to understand the cultural, ethical and moral effect of this practice. Taking Jacques Derrida idea that animals have no ‘consciousness of good or evil’[1] to inform the discussion it will analyse how sentiment informs moral and ethical regard for the incorporation of dead animals in art.

Animal-Life in the London Zoo: Architecture, Consumption and Display
Lucia Vodanovic

Ever since the initial grounds of the London Zoo were laid out in 1828, the institution has been a relevant protagonist of the history of architecture in Britain and holds twelve Grade I and II constructions. In 1933 the Round House, designed by Berthold Lubetkin for the gorillas, was one of the first modernist buildings in the country; the following year the famous art deco Penguin Pool was opened, and now holds Grade I status even though its inmates have been moved to the more comfortable Penguin Beach; the Snowdon Aviary, built in 1964 by Cedric Price, Lord Snowdon and
Frank Newby, made pioneering use of aluminium and tension for support. For the purposes of this paper, the fact that the Zoo is unapologetically postmodern is more important than these design milestones, in the sense of being a space that incorporates its own critique and the very visual manifestation of its failures: the now deserted Penguin Pool at the middle of the Zoo exhibits a small sign acknowledging how unsuitable it was for the animals despite its architectural credentials; the enormous Elephant and Rhino House, designed by Sir Hugh Casson in 1962-5, is currently virtually unused as the elephants have left for the wilds of Whipsnade and the institution stresses its role in conservation and research.

This paper draws on Catherine Ingraham’s (2006) ideas about the “assymetry between life and architecture” to discuss some issues arising from the very notable—yet mostly unexplored in critical terms—architectural history of the London Zoo. “It is only insofar as architecture can suspend its preoccupation with spatial and technical interests that it apprehends the life of the beings who live inside it; overcomes its indifference to ‘needs’”, she writes. And adds: “Thus, the assymetry produce by architecture’s indifference to life, and life self-privilege, on the other, is not one issue among many in architecture. It is, in a sense, the always-there, always-prevailing, issue”[4]. The Zoo Aviary would be of particular importance for the exploration of the shifting assymetries between the life of the animals and their houses: for its architect Cedric Price, buildings should not be aimed at lasting functionally or aesthetically into the future and therefore change has to be included as part of the construction. Externally Price’s projects embrace plasticity and rearrangement (the Aviary, for instance, swings according to the birds’ flight), but this incorporation goes beyond flexibility; architecture is erased into a system of connections with the capacity to generate forms of social interaction, knowledge, or entertainment. This paper would therefore interrogate which forms of knowledge and interaction arise from the construction of buildings that shelter animals to care for them for also for the display, entertainment and consumption of the Zoo visitors.
Discourse or Dialogue? Habermas, the Bakhtin Circle and the Question of Concrete Utterances
John Roberts

The tactical polyvalence of leftism
Mark Kelly

Being Radical: The modernist grounds of radical political rhetoric
Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis

The Politics of Redescription and Democracy: Going beyond Rorty
Giuseppe Ballacci

II Case Studies and Engagements
(Saturday 12.00 – 13.30 Clore 102)

The not reactive rhetoric of emergent social movements
Alicia Dominguez Garnelo and Rommy Morales Olivares

Not Another Twitter Revolution: Social Media and the Radical Politics of Refusal
Zinaida Feldman

The role of ethics for radical political discourse
Anat Matar

This Silence that Is Not One: Silence as a Tactic in Politics
Sofia H. Hadjisavvidou

Discourse or Dialogue? Habermas, the Bakhtin Circle and the Question of Concrete Utterances
John Roberts

This paper argues that the Bakhtin Circle presents a more realistic theory of concrete dialogue than the theory of discourse elaborated by Habermas. The Bakhtin Circle places speech within the “concrete whole utterance” and by this phrase they mean that the study of everyday language should be analysed through the mediations of historical social systems such as capitalism. These mediations are also characterised by a determinate set of contradictions – the capital-labour contradiction in capitalism, for example – which are reproduced in unique ways in more concrete forms of life (the state, education, religion, culture, and so on). Utterances always dialectically refract these processes and as such are internal concrete moments, or concrete social forms, of them. Moreover, new and unrepeatable dialogic events arise in these concrete social forms in order to overcome and understand the constant dialectical flux of social life. But this theory of dialogue is different to that expounded by Habermas who tends to explore speech acts by reproducing a dualism between repeatable and universal “abstract” discursive processes (commonly known as the ideal speech situation) and empirical uses of discourse. These critical points against Habermas are
developed by focusing on six main areas: sentences and utterances; the lifeworld and background language; active versus passive understandings of language; validity claims; obligation and relevance in language; and dialectical universalism.

The tactical polyvalence of leftism
Mark Kelly

This paper will explore the prospects for a Foucauldian reading of far left discourses in the context of their actual operation in relation to power. I will argue that the left continue to ignore Foucault’s insights into the operation of power, paying scant attention to the actual effects of their interventions, discursive and non-discursive. Rather, the focus is on the literal correctness of positions, coupled with a certain sensitivity to the effects of pronouncements on potential allies. Against this, I appeal to Foucault’s notion of the ‘tactical polyvalence of discourses’ to analyse how the statements of left groups operate within our current political situation to bolster rather than challenge the status quo that these groups mean to oppose.

I primarily do this through a concept not much used by Foucault, that of audience: I seek to analyse who consumes the discourse of the left and what it means to them. Here, there is a clear disjuncture between intention and reality. While the left seeks to engage a mass public, its discourse finds a purchase by definition only within its own sphere, while failing to appeal more widely. Paradoxically, it finds its purchase in its sphere in many cases precisely by appearing to have a broader appeal. Socialist Worker is a prime case in point: it is a publication read mostly by the politically savvy, but deliberately intended as a tabloid that appeals to a mass readership to which it does not appeal; its real readership therefore either tolerates its simplicity for tactical reasons, or actively enjoys the apparent tub-thumping populism of the publication. That is, the socialist tabloid does not appeal to tabloid readers, but rather appeals to socialists who want to appeal to tabloid readers.

Thus, left discourse objectively serves the purpose primarily of self-reproduction of the left itself, and tends to seal it off from its outside. At a discursive level it achieves a basic compatibility thereby with the discourses it rejects, via a spatial division.

Being Radical: The modernist grounds of radical political rhetoric
Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis

Deriving from the Latin radix (root), the ‘radical’ etymologically bears the traces of its past. Being radical does not simply or solely mean departing markedly from the usual or the customary; favouring or effecting fundamental or revolutionary changes in current practices, conditions, or institutions. Being radical also and foremost means arising from or even going to the root or the source. The Ancients used the word rhevekeleleftos, meaning the innovator and, literally, the one who opens up a course. Interestingly enough, importing and translating the modernist Western conceptualization of radicalness, the Modern Greek word for the ‘radical’ is rhezospastes, literally meaning the one who breaks with one’s root. Hence the noematic metamorphosis of radicalness: its literal, lexicalised meaning is marked by a certain passage of its central idea from the opening up to the breaking with; from disclosing a future to wholly departing from the past. Modern radicalness still registers the future, but only after and through a divorce with the past. The core rift involved is less an opening from our political present towards an imagined future, than a severe rupture between this future and our present. The paper investigates the limitations and perplexities born from this conceptual impasse. The issue brings forth the extent and limits of the inventiveness of radical rhetorical practices, the relation sustained between radical rhetoric and the dominant discourse it seeks to disrupt, as well as the ‘novelty’ of radical argumentative forms.
The Politics of Redescription and Democracy: Going beyond Rorty
Giuseppe Ballacci

The power of language to configure social reality is something that has always surprised philosophers (for good or for bad), at least since Plato and the sophists quarreled on the meaning of rhetoric and philosophy. In the Twentieth century, the linguistic turn has made common currency the idea that language creates, rather than merely describes, reality, as it constitutes the unavoidable medium through which we get access to it. In political philosophy, the anti-foundationalist implications of this perspective have been celebrated by postmodern thinkers as an opportunity for a proliferation of difference and plurality. This line of thinking has been defended probably in the most compelling way by Richard Rorty, who has proposed a politics of redescription – a politics based on the capacity to create new consensus through attractive and original redescriptions of political ideas – as a way to eschew the dogmatic implications of foundationalist doctrines based on what he calls ‘final vocabularies’. The general aim of this paper, then, is to determine some of the conditions under which this democratic potential of redescription can be actualized. Drawing on a variety of authors such as, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Vico, Nietzsche, Arendt, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Derrida, C. S. Lewis, and Rorty himself, I will argue that: a) the symbolical and rhetorical nature of language, instead that an impediment to communication and comprehension, represents a great opportunity, as it is what allows us to articulate democratic (re)descriptions of our beliefs that, leaving open their ultimate meanings, call for a plurality of interpretations; b) the postmodern intuition about the transformative power of language has to be complemented by the ancient rhetorical understanding of sensus communis and prudence, as a protection against the dissolution of meaning through its endless reproduction, and of education, as a key-factor to develop the necessary communicative skills.

The not reactive rhetoric of emergent social movements
Alicia Dominguez Garnelo and Rommy Morales Olivares

After the occupation of Tahrir square in 2011, different social movements emerged (SM from now on) with particular interests that progressively became movements with a universal perspective, even acquiring the modernity ideals. In this context were born and structured speeches in different rhetoric. The question of how these formats manage to overcome the traditional forms of political action (demonstration, rising, strike) achieving irruption in the public space is what we seek to answer in our work.

The mainstream traditional media, whose act from a Derridian point of view has been historically homo-hegemonic, have established editorial walls whose objective is to prevent the political noise – to which they are used to – to become a political speech, according to Rancière terms. The appearance of new forms of political communication sustained by these SM has allowed cracking such walls, slipping the noise through the cracks, giving birth to speeches although invisible due to the homo-hegemonic media. The performative naturalization of inequality, injustice and unfreedom by the traditional media is no longer effective when the other side of distinction emerges: the speech, also performative of SM and repetitive in temporary terms, that, in opposition, produces a denaturalization process. This process is in itself neither revolutionary nor deliberative. Entering the public space it finds the possibility to legitimize deliberatively.

We have selected three examples of rhetoric that have evolved from noise to political speech: first, the case of the 15M movement in Spain and the use of Twitter as a persuasive tool; second, the case of iconography in the egyptian revolution as an explanatory tool; and third, the use of flashmobs in the case of the Students Spring in Chile as a tool for impact. In the Spanish case, the messages transferred the synthetic rhetoric, characteristic of the tool (Twitter), to the public space. In the egyptian case, the messages created allowed the visualization of the political future, with the
objective of overcoming the breach between digital native and the analogical and digital illiterate. In the chilean case, the flashmobs irrupted, unlike previous cases, in an already institutionalized SM, generating an irruptive impact. In all three cases the rhetoric was not reactive but creative, where humour and irony were both the key to transform the traditional codes of the political speech.

Not Another Twitter Revolution: Social Media and the Radical Politics of Refusal
Zeena Feldman

In the shadow of the Arab Spring, social media’s political agency is frequently framed by a discourse of rebellion. This paper examines how writing can offer a new mode of rebellion and a new framework for dissent. Dubbed ‘the radical politics of refusal’, this textual resistance is presented as an alternative to the violent politics of embodied revolution.

The politics of refusal is here explored through an ethnography of CouchSurfing.org, a popular social network site for travelers. From 2004 to 2011, CouchSurfing operated as a non-commercial platform for hospitality exchange between site members. But following its legal conversion to a for-profit structure in August 2011, the site became a hotbed of anti-capitalist critique. Many felt betrayed by site operators, reading the site’s commercialisation as a theft of member contributions and a capitalist appropriation of resources never intended for commoditisation.

Members of Brainstorm Redefined (BS-R), a subversive discussion forum within CouchSurfing, became leaders of a text-based campaign of refusal launched against the site’s management. This paper explores how BS-R members employed writing as a strategy against capitalist interpellation. Through the work of Maurice Blanchot and Patrick Hanafin, I argue that while writing in this case contributes to a radical politics of refusal, ‘writing… is simultaneously an unwriting or undoing of… political discourse’ (Hanafin 2004: 3). This points to the paradox of a campaign of refusal launched within the very structure whose legitimacy is under attack.

I explore this paradox through three text-based strategies of refusal used by BS-R members: (1) profile hijacking; (2) watchdog disclosure; and (3) reference warfare. These strategies demonstrate how writing can function as an instrument of radical rebellion, but they also highlight the limits of a politics of critique.

The role of ethics for radical political discourse
Anat Matar

What role does ethical rhetoric play in radical political discourse? What role should it play? Contrary to what is usually taken for granted, I argue that the answer to the latter question is "none": far from yielding a stable basis for radical political discourse and action, ethics stands on their way. I justify this claim through two channels: conceptual analysis and examination of empirical facts, which attempt a reply to my first question, about the actual role actually played nowadays by ethical discourse as a hindrance to radical politics.

The conceptual part of my argument is formulated, in the present paper, as a rejoinder to Simon Critchley’s book, *Infinitely Demanding – Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance*. For Critchley, the present experience of political disappointment of liberal democracies provokes the need for ethical and meta-ethical positions which should form a basis on which radical political theory and practice in the 21st century could be formulated and justified. True democracy, for Critchley, is a dissensual practice, based mainly on the idea of an infinite responsibility that arises in relation to a situation of injustice.
Although I share much of Critchley’s *political* vision, I strongly believe that ethics isn’t at all its needed foundation. On the contrary: ethics is a residue of precisely the same liberal-democratic thought that both Critchley and I wish to eventually transcend. Following Marx, Nietzsche and Foucault I maintain that the discourse of responsibility comes out strikingly close to Victorian charity discourse. In my paper I offer a detailed argument for this claim.

A paradigmatic example of the damaging role played by ethical rhetoric in present-day political discourse in Israel clarifies my empirical claim. Both channels of argument, conceptual and empirical, lead me to conclude that the role of ethics in liberal democracies is mainly an instrument of conservative powers, a tool which is, in the best case, hypocrite, and in the worse case oppressive.

**This Silence that Is Not One: Silence as a Tactic in Politics**

Sofia H. Hadjisavvidou

In popular and academic discourse silence is often considered synonymous with apathy and passivity. This view is intensified by the celebration of language and verbal articulation which takes place within social science as part of the ‘linguistic turn’. Political thinkers emphasise voice while condemning silence as a sign of ignorance or and indifference. For theorists of discourse ethics such as Habermas, speech is a prerequisite for political participation, the royal road to empowerment and emancipation; Iris Marion Young relies on speech and specific acts of communication to advance her vision of radical democracy. The purpose of this paper is to problematise what Wendy Brown calls ‘compulsory discursivity’ and to make the case for the political capacity of silence as a radical political tactic. In doing so, the paper argues that silence has many modalities and far from being necessarily the outcome of exclusion or censorship, it can also be a political choice.

I want to argue for the political power of silence, when this is a choice or even when it is perceived as such given the context in which it is encountered. By shifting emphasis from voice to silence, I do not wish to make the case for apathy or passivity, neither do I argue that silence *per se* is political; rather I suggest that it is a form of communication and thus an activity in itself and as such can be politicised. It can be capitalised upon by political activists who seek to explicate an inventive and unpredictable form of critique and even persuasion, not when they are not allowed to speak, but when they affirm words as being inadequate to their case.
The Schmittian Deconstruction of Hobbes’ Leviathan
Georgios Koliás

Walter Benjamin’s Monadology and the Fragmentation of Sovereignty: A Response to Carl Schmitt
Paula Schwebel

Hobbes, Foucault and the Shadow of Sovereignty
Osman Nemli

On the Unconditional Heteronomy of the Sovereign
Mauro Senatore

Securitization through Sovereignty: Anti-Roma Violence in the Nation and Supranation
Erin McElroy

Waning Sovereignty’s New Walls: Contested Mexican American Identity Politics in Ethnic Studies in Arizona
Perveen Ali and Nicolas Blanc

The Schmittian Deconstruction of Hobbes’ Leviathan
Georgios Koliás

The aim of this paper is to read Carl Schmitt’s *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol* as a deconstructive reading of Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. We will try to demonstrate that the approach of Schmitt is deconstructive in the sense of Derrida’s *déconstruction*. This will be achieved through an analysis of Schmitt’s book and through a comparison to the main features of the Derridian deconstruction.

It is remarkable that Schmitt focuses almost exclusively on the symbolic function of *Leviathan*. He even considers the iconography as part of the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty. This must be understood as a clear case of dealing with *parerga* of a major work in a Derridian manner, instead of trying to analyze the explicit argumentation. Ultimately, the results of the reading are such that they remind the Derriadian deconstruction of the basic distinction between inside and outside. Schmitt verbatim refers to this distinction and undermines it as a liberal rationalistic construction.

However the main point is to show how this kind of reading determines the Schmittian approach and in which way the notion of sovereignty is deconstructed, but at the same time thought and posited by Schmitt anew. He shows the limits of political theories based on the natural law. His decisionism (which is a feature of his whole work, even though not explicitly mentioned in this book) grounds exactly on this deconstruction of the metaphysical categories of traditional theories of sovereignty.

His notion of sovereignty based on the state of exception is in a specific sense always deconstructing itself, exactly because it never lets the order be fully in itself and be grounded in itself. On the
contrary, order is always established by an entity (the sovereign), that is, part of the order insofar as it is excluded by it. It is thus sustained by its limit.

**Walter Benjamin’s Monadology and the Fragmentation of Sovereignty: A Response to Carl Schmitt**
Paula L. Schwebel

This essay discusses Walter Benjamin’s engagement with Carl Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty, as it is set out in Schmitt’s *Political Theology*. Benjamin refers to Schmitt three times in his Habilitation thesis, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*. As I argue, Benjamin’s quotations from Schmitt do not evince an uncritical acceptance of the latter’s argument. Rather, Benjamin transforms the meaning of Schmitt’s argument by invoking Leibniz, rather than Hobbes or Descartes, as the clearest exponent of the Baroque concept of sovereignty. I show that the differences between Schmitt’s and Benjamin’s accounts of sovereignty can be traced to these distinct metaphysical commitments. In particular, I highlight the significance of Leibniz’s rejection of Cartesian voluntarism. Schmitt upholds Descartes’ description of God’s unlimited will as the basis for the systematic analogy between the theological concept of miracles, and the political structure of sovereignty. Leibniz rejects Cartesian voluntarism as the tyranny of the will over the understanding. I detail the importance of Leibniz’s rejection of voluntarism for what could be described as a Leibnizian political theology. Moreover, I argue that Benjamin’s embrace of Leibniz as the political theological philosopher par excellence issues in a profound, yet buried, challenge to Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty.

**Hobbes, Foucault and the Shadow of Sovereignty**
Osman Nemli

That a majority of contemporary opinion surrounding Hobbes’ *Leviathan* – a text seen as a defense of authoritarian governments – is arrived at without having read Hobbes, but rather his 20th Century critics, is a situation that demands response. That this judgment is arrived at in the absence of an engaged reading of Hobbes’ work locates it in the position of what Hobbes would call one of the many vain philosophies, the discourses Hobbes attempted to defeat with his philosophical political science. In this paper I will attempt to bring into dialogue Hobbes and one of his 20th century critics, Michel Foucault. I will attempt to show that, if we follow Hobbes’ account for sovereignty, we will find residing in its shadows the very vain philosophies he opposes.

My paper will be composed of two parts. In the first part, I follow Hobbes’ account of the founding and generation of sovereignty, the soul of the “artificial man” Hobbes calls the commonwealth. Taking Hobbes’ definition of philosophy – “the knowledge acquired by reasoning from the manner of generation of anything to the properties, or from the properties to some possible way of generation of the same” – as my point of departure, I will begin by examining the genesis of the sovereign; what is the sovereign, how many different types of sovereignty are there, and how does the sovereign come to be? Following this examination into the conditions for the possibility of the sovereign, I look at the rights conferred by Hobbes on the sovereign. In reconstructing Hobbes’ elaborate account, I hope to focus on the connection between Hobbes’ understanding of true philosophy as a science and the philosophical account of sovereignty he provides.

In the second part I raise some questions concerning Hobbes’ account and stage the state of war that takes place between Hobbes and one of his 20th Century critics, Michel Foucault. I argue that if we take Hobbes’ conception of sovereignty to its limits, following Hobbes genetic account of sovereignty, we will find residing in the shadows of sovereignty the very vain philosophies Hobbes had tried to combat. Vain philosophies are a constitutive part of the genetic structure, and are inevitable effects. These vain philosophies are a structural necessity for the position Hobbes attempts to elaborate.
On the unconditional Heteronomy of the Sovereign
Mauro Senatore

In this paper I aim to retrace Derrida’s deconstruction of the tradition of sovereignty, as it is elaborated in late works like Rogues. Two Essays on Reason (2002) and The Beast and The Sovereign 1-2 (2010-1), back to his early interpretations of Hegel’s process of recognition (‘Violence and Metaphysics’ and ‘From restricted to general Economy’ in Writing and Difference, 1967). My argument is that Derrida attempts to reinscribe the movement of sovereignty into the finite struggle for recognition and, more in general, into the restlessness of the infinite. First, I will account for Derrida’s readings of traditional elaborations of sovereignty according to the paradigm of the forced and unessential recognition of the master. Second, by referring to his readings of Hegel (through Hyppolite and Bataille) I will reckon with Derrida’s proposal of an altogether other concept of sovereignty as the unconditional heteronomy of ipseity or the exposure to the undecidable risk of recognition or death. This paper is part of my postdoctoral research on Derrida’s thought of the oath aiming to enlighten the positional or performative prefix at work in the traditional elaboration of ipseity.

Securitization through Sovereignty: Anti-Roma Violence in the Nation and Supranation
Erin McElroy

Since their medieval emergence into European spaces, Roma have historically been discoursed by proponents of the state as a threat to constructs of its own purity. To defend itself from attenuation via contamination, the sovereign state continually demands that if Roma cannot assimilate into objects recognizable to the state, that they be ghettoized, expelled, or even eliminated. Bataille suggests that the sovereign world is one in which death has no limitations, where the sovereign dictates who can live and who can die. On one hand it inscribes prohibitions against death, and on the other, it transgresses its own prohibitions, invoking both Agamben’s state of exception and Derrida’s autoimmune democracy.

Within the last decade, supranational securitization has surfaced as an emerging site upon which anti-Roma discourse precipitates. Securitization of the post-national Europe is rendered as a political imperative that both discursively and ideologically reifies the ‘immigrant-terrorist-enemy’, a conflation that sanctions violence upon heterogeneous Roma communities across the continent. As Roma increasingly migrate to the West, new enactments of xenophobia transpire, ranging from Western neo-Nazi extremism to forced statist repatriation, both often conducted with impunity to transnational legislation. In this sense, the discursive securitization of the continent, coupled with the juridical failures of the supranation, collectively ensures the autoimmunity of the state. A dialogue thus emerges between the sovereignty of the nation and that of the supranation, one that collectively consolidates violence upon heterogeneous Roma populations. This paper will deconstruct this emerging structuration, questioning if transnational responses to, and provocations of, transnational movement patterns effectively constitute a post-sovereign European constellation of nation-states.

Waning sovereignty’s new walls: Contested Mexican American identity politics in ethnic studies in Arizona
Perveen Ali

Arizona House Bill 2281 denied funding to schools teaching courses promoting the overthrow of the U.S. government, resentment of a particular race or class of people, designed primarily for students of a particular ethnic group, or advocating ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as
individuals. It targeted a Mexican-American studies school curriculum, and a large number of books were removed, including Delgado’s *Critical Race Theory* and Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. In protest, students held teach-ins, and activists and writers formed a caravan transporting the banned books back to Arizona.

This paper considers how this law functioned as a sovereign performative, as the treasonous migrant body, embedded in a politics of communal resistance, became the counterpoint to the production of the citizen, embedded in the ideology of individualism and patriotism. The regulation of migrants in territorial and bodily space through the creation of border walls and harsh immigration laws found new avenues in their elimination in pedagogical space, as the state sought to shore up its waning territorial, communal, and intellectual borders. The proliferation of such measures in every corner of social life naturalised the violence of erasure, containment, and exclusion in the language of eliminating identity politics and hate speech. But the state encountered forms of resistance by the very bodies and minds it sought to regulate, depoliticise, atomise, and silence. In mobilising protests, teach-ins, and book caravans, the violence of identity politics was also productive as they were revived to expose the factitiousness of sovereignty. They pointed to a possibility for a different kind of ethics and political subjectivity enabled by imperfect iterations of norms of governance and re-significations of citizenship. Here, differences and the opportunities for rupture that they entailed un-worked the violence of the mythic melting pot and the hegemonic and racialised self-contained citizen.
S P A T I A L  T E X T / T E X T U T A L  S P A C E
Edwina Attlee & Hannah Gregory

I  text and space
(Friday 9.30 – 11.00 MS 416)

Fire Escape / Washing Line
Edwina Attlee

The Language of Real Estate Boards
Peter SafrOnov

Towards a Spatial Ontology of the Maritime Subject of Modernity
Jonathan Stafford

II  text and space
(Friday 11.30 – 13.00 MS 416)

Baudelaire and the Rhizomatic City
Octavia Bright

Rewriting the City, Reading Harry Beck's Tube Map as a Form of Writing
Andrea Vesentini

III  Spatial Text (text)
(Saturday 12.00 – 13.30 Clore 101)

'To' in Contemporary Poetry
Johanna Hateley

Textual Entrances and Crossed Thresholds
Hannah Gregory

IV  Spatial Text (critical distance)
(Saturday 14.30 – 16.00 Core 101)

Passions and Agonies of Critical Distance; the All too Exemplary Case of Maurice Blanchot
Ivan Callus

Photography, Violence and Sovereign Indifference in Benjamin, Agamben and Barthes
Saul Anton

Critical Distance in the Aesthetics and Politics of Simon Critchley
James Corby

Fire Escape / Washing Line
E. Attlee
“Blessed, beneficent is anything that takes us to the unwilled, into dreamlike disengagement, Rimbaud would say, from our own life.”[1]

Can we trace what Baudrillard terms “the tactile detour of the streets, the tactile detour of ideas” onto certain spaces? Guy Rosolato writes that when we read and daydream, our “reading is thus a sort of impertinent absence[2]”. Taking these impertinent absences and tactile detours as our subject matter this paper will ask where and how they can be found in the everyday experience of city life.

In the day to day reading of the city can we find spaces of irrationality; moments and practices of playful disengagement? Are there spaces which invite daydreams? How can we think about the tactile detour of ideas and streets side by side?

The Language of Real Estate Boards
Peter SafrOnov

In my paper I’d like to talk about the language of real estate billboards in Moscow (Russia), Kiev (Ukraine) and Bucurest (Romania). Billboards are not just visual media or medium as such, they are by far “mixture of sensory, perceptual and semiotic elements” (Mitchell 2005: 258). The effect of multiliteracy should be taken into consideration when we are analyzing particular visual image (Cope & Kalantzis 2000). The urban space while it is presented on a billboard in the capacity of ecologically pure environment of a dwelling house or cottage also re-presents a sign of a certain social position. Functioning as a sign representation of space in poster panels articulates something that could hardly be grasped otherwise. Real estate as it is represented on billboards looks like phantom. Its unreal beauty is even accentuated as the main message of advertising. The place where one could find all these splendid dwellings is presented as nonexistent, as a kind of ecologically designed utopia, ecotopia. Examining billboards one learns a lot about what fits for those people who are supposed to live in advertised dwellings. These billboards incarnate extremely contradictory unity of technology and nature, proximity to facilities of city life and remoteness from the city at the same time. They embody desire to turn natural environment into a boundary between those who are rich and those who are not. Therefore images of ‘green’ environment are used as medium to articulate social inequality based on the premise that when you buy a flat or a cottage like those which are advertised you buy a distance between you and all other inhabitants of the city.

Towards a spatial ontology of the maritime subject of modernity: The nineteenth century steamship as the location of colonial commodity fetishism.
Jonathan Stafford

As a repository for desires and symbolism, the sea-going vessel has few equals. The ship, in occupying the parallel spaces of economic development and the reserve of the imagination, is a cultural object unique in its ability to embody expectations that go to the heart of our understanding of modernity, imperialism and class. In the nineteenth century, shipping underwent a revolution comparable to that of other aspects of western trade and commerce. Increased industrialisation and new mechanisms of spatio-temporal control usurped design principles and traditions that had remained unchanged for centuries. In arguing that the steamship is the overlooked setting for the evolution of certain spatial practices that are specifically modern in character, I hope to challenge the dominance of the city as the special site of meaning in the discourse of space and modernity.

This paper asks to what extent the representation of maritime space in the age of steam provides an opportunity for thinking through issues of imperial identity and colonial desire. From Foucault’s construction of the ship as ‘heterotopia’, to Gilroy’s use of the Bakhtinian concept of the
'chronotope' in *The Black Atlantic*, academic attempts have fallen short of appreciating the unique spatial character of the ship. For Marx, a product’s transformation into a commodity occurs through its journey to market. Conceptualising the emergence of the fetish character of commodities through the space where this process occurs highlights the need to interrogate this contested notion in spatio-temporal terms. In applying the fetish character of commodities to an understanding of the steamship as a floating fragment of modernity I hope to shed light on contemporaneous understandings of civilisation and barbarism. In its oscillation between interior and exterior, traversing and indeed transgressing boundaries, the emergence of steamship travel defines the turbulent terrain of the sea under industrial capitalism in the era of Britain’s colonial century.

**Baudelaire and the rhizomatic city**
Octavia Bright

This paper uses Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the *rhizome* to examine the symbiotic relationship between the poet and the city in Charles Baudelaire’s *Les Fleurs du mal* (1861). It will investigate the ‘becoming-city’ of the poet and the ‘becoming-poetry’ of the city described in this collection. Baudelaire is a poet synonymous with the city; Walter Benjamin argues that the masses are so intrinsic to his existence as a man and his experience as an artist that they have become internalised, a constant presence in his work whether explicitly elucidated or not (1997: 122). As he maps urban experience from amidst the teeming multitude, the poet becomes intoxicated by the city to such an extent that he abandons the detached position he has occupied as a *flâneur*, and crosses the threshold from the streets into the dwellings of the many inhabitants. This paper contemplates the nature of the city as a *rhizome*, and explores Baudelaire’s description of his urban experience as he grapples with his status amid the multitude, trying to discover on which side of the limit his place lies. It explores the act of mapping as a fundamentally *rhizomatic* activity, and discusses the way in which Baudelaire’s poems construct and are constructed by the city.

**Rewriting the City, Reading Harry Beck’s Tube Map as a Form of Writing**
Andrea Vesentini

**REWITING THE CITY:**
**READING HARRY BECK’S TUBE MAP AS A FORM OF WRITING**

An enduring symbol of London and a milestone
of graphic design, the tube map cannot simply be called an emblem of the city, or a very useful source of information for tube travelers. Designed by an Underground engineering draughtsman named Harry C. Beck during a period of layoff in 1931, it has come to be the prototype of virtually any other
map of rapid transit across the world. This essay investigates how Beck's map can be considered a form of rewriting the city, drawing on Jacques Derrida's conception of the word in his science of grammatology. Starting from this analysis, the tube map is read as a proto-hypertext that simplified the geography of London.
in a way that we would now call digital, suggesting that it was thanks to these characteristics that the map proved popular among ordinary Underground users as well as designers all over the world. My analysis starts by focusing on the graphic evolution of the map to then consider how artworks and visual
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‘to’ in Contemporary Poetry
Johanna Hateley

The grammatical particle ‘to’ functions as a linguistic stem cell, pluripotent and plastic, with a flexible
and wide-ranging usage within language: its definitions encompass expressions of ‘spatial or local
relation’, ‘aim, purpose, intention, or design’; indications of ‘that to which something tends or
points’, ‘inclination, desire, or need’, ‘separative force, asunder, apart’ and, notably, ‘motion,
direction’ and ‘contact’ (OED). It is a particle of language upon whose usage syntactic construction
integrally depends but can easily pass unnoticed during casual reading. The relational identity of ‘to’,
shifting between usages and definitions, between words, equips it to embark on an investigation of
the poetic space and to enact a negotiation of the poetic experience. Working from William James’s
recognition of the importance of grammatical particles to philosophical investigation — ‘Philosophy
has always turned on grammatical particles. [...] these words designate types of conjunctive relation
arranged in a roughly ascending order of intimacy and inclusiveness’ — I will examine how ‘to’
functions as a means of negotiating between syntactic ‘conjunctive relation[s]’ of language and the
experiential relations of reality. Language is often considered to be the primary mediator of lived
experience, a way in which we articulate and comprehend sensory experience; a conception of
language can be challenged through an exploration of mediatory particles of language such as ‘to’.

Photography, Violence and Sovereign Indifference in Benjamin, Agamben and Barthes
Saul Anton
Walter Benjamin’s well-known account of photography and his conception of the “dialectical image” famously sought to rescue the work of art from aesthetic politics. Setting itself against the “distance” that he saw as the basic quality of “auratic” art, it implied the event of a pure immediacy in which critical distance is momentarily abolished in lieu of a past that erupts as a crisis (krinein) of history. Benjamin saw this moment as the critical repetition of the foundational violence of origin and its translation into a materialist politics of art no longer guided by aesthetic ideals and historical representations.

Giorgio Agamben has adapted Benjamin’s conception of the “dialectical image” to develop a theory of biopolitics and a “politics of singularity” that, he claims, “cannot form a societas because they do not possess any identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging.” In this paper, I contrast Roland Barthes’ conception of the “absolute contingency” of photography with Agamben’s biopolitics of singularity. I argue that the former’s conception of “sovereign innocence” represents an alternative that does not require the critical repetition of Law’s violent autofoundation. For Barthes, the “sovereign innocence” that photography reveals presumes a historicity with no foundation. A number of questions arise: can Barthes’ “sovereign innocence” be described as the “matter” of a “civil society” that doesn’t reinscribe history as originary violence? More crucially, does photography give rise to or demand a critical reclusiveness or indifference not reducible to a simple apolitical attitude, but is rather a critical distance from the polis, one that can also be described as a being-in-common no longer dependent upon identity and identification? Can photographic reproducibility as Barthes conceives it represent a paradoxical indifference to the order of the law that he calls a “sovereign innocence”? And how might one understand the position or non-position of such a “sovereign innocence”? What kind of criticism does such an indifference imply?

Passions and Agonies of Critical Distance; the All too Exemplary Case of Maurice Blanchot
Ivan Callus

The publication in 2011 of two separate texts by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe on the life and work of Maurice Blanchot, Passion politique and Agonie interminée, agonie interminable respectively, makes it possible to ask what it is that happens when a writer and thinker takes on critical distance all too literally. Blanchot, fastidiously if selectively distant in literary and political life after the War but notoriously involved beforehand, offers an all too exemplary trajectory of the contradictions and conflicts—but also the appeal and rigour—that critical intervention and critical withdrawal, in their contrasting calls and imperatives, precipitate. This paper reads the experience of Blanchot in that regard as a remarkably complete fable on the challenges of critical withdrawal in the late twentieth century. Arguing that the fable is probably not repeatable now, in the early years of the new century, the paper surveys specific works by Blanchot but also Nancy’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s texts with a view to teasing out the peculiar import that lies therein for any reflections on the contemporary prospects for critical distance. In particular, and following the example of Lacoue-Labarthe himself, it analyses the importance of particular ficciones/recits by Borges and Blanchot in allowing literature to stage critical distance through the conceits of posthumous writing.

Critical Distance in the Aesthetics and Politics of Simon Critchley
James Corby

This paper will seek to identify and explore a perceived tension between the aesthetic and ethico-political concerns of the work of Simon Critchley, arguing that any resolution of this tension is conditional upon the recognition and development of the overlooked critical potential of radical indifference in his work.
Forms of indifference feature strongly in Critchley’s writings on aesthetics and on ethics and politics, and though both aesthetic and political indifference have in common the fact that they are invoked to signify distanciation, and though both forms are acknowledged as holding a certain appeal, they are ultimately judged very differently: indifference in the political sphere is rejected, while indifference as a kind of aesthetic detachment is endorsed, albeit with some retrospectively articulated hesitation.

This tension between aesthetic and political indifference is perhaps brought into sharpest relief in Critchley’s 2012 book, The Faith of the Faithless, where “pursuing the pleasures of lyric poetry” is given as a flippant example of the sort of “highly cultivated detachment” that characterises what he calls “passive nihilism.” Passive nihilism is to be rejected because it renounces the utopian impulse, leaving the world unchanged. Yet, in the same book, Critchley suggests that poetry, which elsewhere he valorises for its ability to establish a certain clarifying and calming distance from the world, has an as yet unrealised political potential (he calls it merely a “dim possibility”) based on its ability to disclose “the fictiveness or contingency of the world.” Both views of poetry turn on its perceived ability to distance us from our surroundings, loosening the ties that bind us to our lifeworld, allowing us to see beyond the temptation of a pessimistic epistemological or political realism. What remains unexplored in Critchley’s work, however, is the extent to which this conception of poetry’s critical distance, in endorsing the modalities of indifference, is continuous with the passive nihilism that he rejects. I will argue that the latter is in fact structurally inherent to the former, though in its poetic instantiation it lacks, crucially, what Critchley theorises as a version of ‘original sin’. While arguing that this exploration of critical indifference allows the tension between Critchley’s aesthetics and ethics to be clarified and perhaps even resolved, it also aligns him, I will suggest, with a long tradition of critical aesthetic indifference that today is perhaps most evident in the Schillerian turns of Jacques Ranciere’s thought.
THINKING EGALITARIAN EMANCIPATION
Matthew Cole & Svenja Bromberg

I Thinking Egalitarian Emancipation
(Friday 14.00 – 15.00 MS G16)

Participation, Cooperation, and Common Property: Outlines of a Post-capitalist and Communitarian Idea of (Global) Democracy
Stefano Salvia

Egalitarian Emancipation via Structural Non-domination (or how to recover the structural critique of domination)
Ana Azmanova

II Emancipatory practices
(Saturday 10.00 – 11.30 Clore 101)

Taking Power or Re-Making Power?: New political cultures and strategies of opposition in the Americas and Beyond
John Foran

The failure of the post-1968 consensus
Kevin Gray

Abstract of Catalyzing Dissent: Irreversible Noise and Computational Immanence
Inigo Wilkens & Andrew Osborne

The panel co-ordinators, Matthew Cole and Svenja Bromberg, will be active facilitators as well as give closing remarks.

Participation, Cooperation, and Common Property: Outlines of a Post-capitalist and Communitarian Idea of (Global) Democracy
Stefano Salvia

How to combine some of the most recent experiences of the economic, social, and political laboratory represented by Neo-Bolivarian/Guevarian revolutions (and constitutions) in the ALBA countries of Latin America (mainly Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia) with more general issues coming from contemporary Neo-Marxism and critical theory to rethink and possibly overcome Western liberal democracy and capitalist society? How to do that from a left-winged communitarian perspective without coming back neither to pre-capitalist/mercantilist corporatism nor to definitely surpassed models of (totalitarian) collectivism, which have historically turned out as economically, socially, and politically unsustainable? Aim of my paper is to suggest a (problematic but indispensable) integration among four main issues of contemporary radical thinking in politics and in the social sciences. The first one concerns the need to shift from liberal, representative, and party-based democracy to communitarian, (directly and indirectly) participated, pluralist but post-parliamentary democracy, at all levels of organization: from local communities to central government and back. The second one concerns a necessary reform of our civil and societal right to replace the competitive and stock-based model of capitalist company with a cooperative and jointly liable model of venture (extended also to cooperative credit/banking), overcoming the traditional objection
Egalitarian Emancipation via Structural Non-domination  
(or how to recover the structural critique of domination)  
Albena Azmanova

Critical Theory inherited from Marx and Lukács a critique of power that ran along two dimensions: which I name ‘relational’ and ‘structural’ dimensions of domination. The relational dimension concerns the unequal distribution of power among actors. Injustice, from this perspective, emerges in terms of power asymmetries that allow one group to dominate another, and its remedy would necessitate equalization of power relations. The structural dimension of domination concerns the production of a generalized social harm beyond the unequal distribution of social advantage and disadvantage. Here injustice emerges in terms of the subjection of the majority of human beings to the functional imperatives of the socio-economic system. Among the fallacies of post-structuralist critiques of social injustice is that they have run almost exclusively along the relational dimension of domination: intellectually and politically, the critical enterprise was directed against disparities in social status, political voice and access to resources; it has sought to eliminate status hierarchies, economic inequality, and political subordination. However, this entailed the marginalization of the structural dimension of domination and thus invited remedial power-equalizing techniques rather than a robust critique of the political economy of contemporary capitalism able to target the systemic logic of social reproduction. This paper advances a proposal for discerning the structural sources of contemporary forms of domination in order to bring the critique of political economy back into social theory. This would enable us to think emancipation not simply in terms of equalizing power relations, but also in terms of overhaul of the socio-structural dynamics of contemporary capitalism.

Taking Power or Re-Making Power? New political cultures and strategies of opposition in the Americas and Beyond  
John Foran

This paper examines ongoing movements for radical social change in the Americas through the prism of the concept of “new political cultures of opposition” (Foran 2009). The intent is to compare and
contrast six such movements, three which have “taken power” through elections – the Latin American “Pink Tide,” embodied in Hugo Chávez and his “socialism for the twenty-first century” in Venezuela, the Evo Morales government in Bolivia which claims a similar goal with a stronger environmental platform, and the Rafael Correa regime in Ecuador – and three which follow what John Holloway has called the strategy of “not taking power” – the Zapatistas in Chiapas, the North American Occupy movement, and the global climate justice movement – basing themselves on a direct action and a participatory democracy model.

Looking at their diverse, radical political cultures we can address such issues as: What are the strengths and limitations of following the Pink Tide’s electoral path to “twenty-first century socialism” versus the strengths and weaknesses of the more horizontally organized attempts to radically change the world by the Zapatistas, the Occupy movement, and the emergent global climate justice movement? What are the lessons (positive and negative) of each of these experiments in radical social change? What potential exists for these movements to work together in various ways as parts of a larger, emergent global project, including the Arab Spring and other recent or ongoing movements? Finally, do these diverse phenomena foreshadow new paths to radical social transformation in the future?

I will assess these cases in light of a view of how radical social change – defined as “efforts to deeply transform society in a positive direction by large (or small) groups of people” – is often the result of both electing popular governments (however grand or local in scope), and forging social movements to push them from below and alongside to make good on the vision of their promises.


The Failure of the Post-1968 Consensus
Kevin W. Gray

In this paper, I will draw on the resources of autopoietic systems theory and the New Pragmatic School in French sociology to try to theorize the social dynamics at play in the Occupy Wall Street Movement. In particular, I will use the events as a case study for a version of autopoietic systems theory (modeled on Luhmann and Teubner’s version of systems theory) designed to show how lifeworld values can produce system ideologies and vice versa.

Thus, I attempt to do three things in my paper. First, I will argue, following Boltanski and Chiapello, that there emerged in the 1960s a new spirit of capitalism which stressed the importance of independence and self-realization. Second, I will argue, again following Boltanski and Chiapello, that these changes were largely the result of the autopoietic influence of the 1968 movement, which produced a demand for autonomy and freedom (against Fordist means of production) from inside the lifeworld.

Finally, I will argue that the Occupy Wall Street Movement received much of its intellectual impetus from the precariousization of work that was the result of the changes to the Fordist state brought about by the 1968 challenges to capitalism. While the new spirit of capitalism, as Boltanski and Chiapello argue, stressed flexibility (and ultimately a temporary work force), it also produced great insecurity. The result of this, through the type of system interference predicted by autopoietic systems theory, is the emergence a critique of capitalism in the lifeworld which stress the dangers produced by the growth of wealth and the increase of temporary employment and underemployment. And that, I will argue, is the origin of the 1968 protests.
Abstract of Catalyzing Dissent: Irreversible Noise and Computational Immanence
Inigo Wilkens & Andrew Osborne

This paper examines recent civil unrest in the UK, finding the majority of accounts unsatisfactory in their various descriptions. We both dismiss politico-ideological narratives that assert the ‘mindless’ criminality of the rioters, as well as more complex theories of overdetermination that make claims about the factual irreducibility of such insurrectionary events. The target of our critique is reversible philosophies, which propose a co-constitutive and thus synchretic mixture of oppositional terms, such as cause and effect, or real and ideal. We counter with an irreversible model unilateralized in favour of radical immanence. We propose that, rather being a mindless outburst of inexplicable lawlessness, the riots are a computation immanent to the materiality of the social fabric and claim that such unrest is best understood as the output of a generic matrix composed of ordinary people. For us any system or event, inasmuch as its boundary conditions are axiomatized, is reducible and as such can be modeled by agent-based generative social sciences. Proceeding from the supposition of bounded rationality Joshua M. Epstein demonstrates that through spatial computation, micro-rational agents (rioters) with limited local knowledge are capable of generating macroscopic regularities (events). Agent-based computation allows for the extraction of empirically verifiable ‘stylized’ facts. These abstract truths are determinable-in-the-last-instance and provide a better explanation for the concrete situation of the riots by pointing to high levels of perceived grievance and hardship amongst rioters combined with the low legitimacy of central authority as adequate stimulus conditions. We conclude by proposing an immanent ethics to counter the indifference to justice of the computational matrix, an ethics capable of taking equality as its axiom without reversal to the impossible ideal of equilibrium or to the transcendence of computation.
This one-panel stream covers a spectrum of issues that at investigate the relationship between those discourses that would answer legal questions and those that would illuminate cultural and social logics. The first paper uses critical historiography to describe how processes of self-understanding among 19th-century Indians and other colonial subjects occurred by way of “scholarly protocols bequeathed to them by colonial law”. The second paper offers a re-reading of Fanon vis-a-vis the issue of deep-rooted violence in a ‘post-colonial’ world in need of radical transformation. The third paper discusses the use of colonial tropes in Black German activist mobilisations around legal challenges, highlighting epistemological tensions in knowledge production and narrativisation.

(Saturday 10.00 – 11.30 MS G15)

Colonial Law and the Destruction of Tradition
Siraj Ahmed

Fanon, Violence and the Post-colonials
Saroj Giri

Oury Jalloh and the Colonial Scene: Law as Reminder
Eddie Bruce-Jones

Colonial Law and the Destruction of Tradition
Siraj Ahmed
Dept. of English, Lehman College, City University of New York, USA

Since the nineteenth century, philology has governed critical method in the humanities. According to the scholarly consensus, philology’s authority begins with the research university. My paper argues that its authority derives instead from colonial law, which transformed indigenous life around the world. Philology’s most widely influential principle is that to know a people or a period, one must study its language historically. Disciplinary histories of literary studies (e.g., the work of Michael Warner, Gerald Graff, and John Guillory) overlook the fact that, long before the research university, colonial law instituted a historical approach to native languages and literatures. Because colonial law enforced a Western philological understanding of native traditions, it was responsible, perhaps more than any other single institution, for producing a fundamental rupture in the terms by which societies around the world understand their traditions.

During the final three decades of the eighteenth century, East India Company scholars created an extensive philological apparatus for South Asian languages, including textbooks, literary and linguistic treatises, dictionaries, and grammars. These studies formed the groundwork for the numerous legal and religious texts that Sir William Jones and his colleagues reconstructed from archaic originals. Together, the Company’s philological and legal works transformed Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian—the prestige languages of Brahmanism and Islam—into the vessels of India’s true history.

The British colonial government’s approach to India was, in other words, philological in the modern sense: it made native history a dimension internal to language. Colonial law turned native languages
into markers of human difference, dividing individuals into groups that had previously not existed
and fixing social practices that had been fluid. In fact, it was colonial jurisprudence that first gave
natives an ethnological character: it redefined not merely the property relations, but even the rituals
and beliefs that counted as ‘traditional.’ Because philology identifies tradition with texts alone, it was
able to provide colonial law a traditional lineage from which native experience itself had been exiled.

Jones intended his legal codes to achieve this end in colonial India. In his view, ‘native lawyers and
scholars’ who had the power to adapt religious law to local circumstances could not be trusted.
Jones aspired, as a consequence, to replace the embodied learning of the Brahmin pandits and
Muslim maulavis with the textual and hence scientific knowledge of the colonial state. His explicit
aim was to re-found the Hindu and Islamic legal traditions solely on ‘original texts arranged in a
scientific method’: not on native experience, therefore, but rather on its destruction. His codes
enabled the colonial state to overwrite the ungovernable babble of the newly conquered with ‘the
language of the law.’ Nineteenth-century Indians—and eventually colonial subjects around the world
—would learn to read standardized texts and to understand their histories in terms of the scholarly
protocols bequeathed to them by colonial law.

Fanon, Violence and the Post-colonials
Saroj Giri

What in Fanon do we want to preserve? Fanon’s emphasis on the revolutionary movement, the
armed struggle is one which will inaugurate a new culture, a ‘new national consciousness’. It is not
just about the psychic redemption in the colonized that violence against the colonizer will bring
about. Instead Fanon is emphasizing violence, on the armed struggle as that which will inaugurate a
new world, a new culture, a new way of life. That nothing is given from before, that ‘the struggle is
all’ – a new man will be born out of it. The violence is not an individualized revenge or narrow
psychic redemption but it is about founding a new society without glorifying the ‘indigenous past’. It
is about a revolutionary subjectivity which will now grasp the present as well as come to terms with
the past in order to project a particular future. It is about a subjectivity which knows that the past
cannot simply be erased or mitigated through reconciliation, that the ‘dealing with the past’ (Walter
Benjamin) is a necessary step to bring about a better future. The violence is as much about dealing
with the past as about projecting the future – it is only this way that one can effectively intervene in
the present.

That is, Fanon was not just registering the ‘double inscription’ of the colonial and anti-colonial,
captured in the term postcolonial – a colonialism that apparently persists, does not go away. He was
not emphasizing this persistence per se, as post-colonial theorists like Homi Bhabha make us believe.
Instead, it will be argued, Fanon was emphasizing this deep-rootedness of the colonial encounter
only to posit the necessity for a radical transformation. Violence was not therefore primarily about
psychic cleansing and the like for him but about a through-going transformation of society and its
reified structures of domination and oppression.

Oury Jalloh and the Colonial Scene: Law as Reminder
Eddie Bruce-Jones

My current research describes Black community resistance to racism and legal violence in post-
reunification Germany. This work examines the limits of ‘belonging’, including the ideological
underpinnings of legal policies that determine which bodies ‘belong’ in certain public spaces and the
political narratives that expunge the Black subject from the nation. The present paper draws from
this larger research and focuses on a particular set of contributions that Black activists in Germany
have made to the discussion of belonging that recast important aspects of the idea of citizenship, including the parameters of participation and the conflicts between citizenship and racialisation. In 2005 in Dessau, Oury Jalloh, an asylum applicant from Sierra Leone, was affixed by his hands and feet to a fire-resistant mattress and burned alive while police officers turned off the smoke alarms. All officers were acquitted in 2008, despite a great deal of missing evidence and conflicting testimony. The appeal is ongoing, and as a co-ordinator of an independent investigative commission, I have observed that the most revealing discussions around this case are happening outside of the courtroom. They are happening at the security entrance to the courtroom, at nearby train stations, and in press releases. The case is about the unjust death of one person, and just as immediately, it remains about the ability of Black people to represent themselves as rights-bearing and knowledge-producing subjects before the state.

The paper examines the case of Oury Jalloh and the Black-led activism to find a transparent depiction of how he died. The paper argues that the demand to be heard in this context constitutes resistance to an ideological expulsion from the nation. This demand employs colonial tropes and images order to assert a particular set of historical frames that render this case as continuity rather than a departure, a structural part of the fabric of contemporary German life. The tension between legal framings on one hand, which allow for strict rules but do not consistently account for relations of subordination in their conception and application, and embodied and experiential knowledge on the other reveals a vital level of communication that is virtually invisible if one investigates the legally-framed questions alone.
ŽIŽEK AND THE POLITICAL
Chris McMillan

I  Žižek and Violence
(Friday 15.00 – 17.00 MS 417)

Anonymous Democracy – The Legacy of the French Revolution
Petr Agha

The Mapuche Hunger Strike and The Terrorism Act in Chile: Symptoms of a State and their anti-ethical dimensions
Dasten Julián Vejar

II  Theoretical Interventions
(Saturday 14.30 – 16.00 Clore 103)

The toilet as the Žižekian vase: On the implications of the Lacanian concept of cause to the critique of political economy
Gabriel Tupinambá

Rethinking the political: A genealogy of the “antagonism” in Carl Schmitt through the lens of Laclau-Mouffe-Žižek
Ricardo Camargo

Class Struggle and New Forms of Apartheid: What does sexual difference tell us about urban slums? Chris McMillan

Anonymous Democracy – The Legacy of the French Revolution
Petr Agha

"We are legion, We do not forgive, We do not forget, expect us."

A loose-knit group of hackers who operate under the name ‘Anonymous’ have been responsible for a number of controversial internet campaigns. My reading of their activities is that they foremost bring political questions back into the light, subverting closed and hidden functions and uses of network and meanings.

Žižek never tires of repeating that once we reply to the antagonist on their terms, the debate is effectively over already (Žižek, 2008a: 189). This brings us to the brink of Žižek’s deployment of the notion of revolt as “Event” as an epochal rupture that precedes and goes deeper than any mere revolution in political power. What matters is not the brutal violence and terror, but the enthusiasm generated by this spectacle. To be clear: Žižek does not seem to be celebrating the horrors that ensued from these revolutionary beginnings, but rather the pure potential of revolt as such, this moment of absolute rupture in the causal chain of events where freedom has the opportunity to make real something radically new. Žižek emphasizes, with Foucault, that what is so important about uprising and revolt is the enthusiasm for the “spark of life” that ignites in a community bound up in such an event. The point is thus not the shift in relations of power and domination between actual sociopolitical agents, but the very fact of transcending or, rather, momentarily canceling — this very domain in which all differences are obliterated, rendered irrelevant. Furthermore, recall that Žižek wants to deconstruct the distinction between “observer” and “direct participant” in revolutionary
events. Like Chesterton using the tale told by Father Brown, Žižek wants to extend the possibility of redemption to us, his readers, so that we can all participate in the liberating enthusiasm of the moment, breaking through the deflating distance that fictional narrative, historical separation, or geographic remoteness would otherwise impose on the potential to be inspired by an event.

I will read the activities of Anonymous against the backdrop of Žižek’s analysis of the French Revolution. Together with Žižek I will focus on the potential of rupture and spread of revolutionary enthusiasm and explore how the dichotomy between “observer” and “direct participant” fares in the interconnected world of the internet. Inspired by some of the statements of Robespierre[1] and Žižek’s reading of it I will examine the potential of the reference to freedom of speech/right to information as the idea that could support a novel societal movement that could rupture the existing hegemonic structures transforming the existing societal diagrams into new shapes, not solved by domination, but rather by combination. The activities of Anonymous performed in the cyber world close the gap between “observer” and “direct participant” as they allow the diagrams to merge and assemble into new, hybrid forms, becoming less of a monologue and more of a conversation.

[1] Particularly his speech in which he demanded the execution of Louis XVI

The Mapuche Hunger Strike and The Terrorism Act in Chile: Symptoms of a State and their anti-ethical dimensions
Dasten Julián Vejar

34 Mapuches, imprisoned in different jails of Chile, held a hunger strike from July to October 2010. These had been adjudged and classified by the state as ‘terrorists’ being processed with the application of anti-terrorism law, formulated in the regime of the (last) military dictatorship in Chile (1973-1989). The following is an analysis that addresses the main fissures of a political exercise of violence, its direction, intent and severity to the Mapuche people, as a paradox of the practice and discursive construction of a “democratic scenario,” which we explain as part of the social symptom of the state, in the form of a subversion with/in its own existence, power and ideological claim and failure of legitimacy and universality.

It is in this dimension that they articulate a series of questions that are needed for exploring the problematic characteristics of hunger strike as a protest:

What does the conflict actors carry perform in a protest that exposes the limit of life by placing the body / existence as the last public visibility space in an asymmetrical relationship of political power? From where comes the structural strength of this negation of “being” and that makes it be understood as a negation and an affirmation of life? What is the peculiarity of the anti-terrorism law, as applied, to articulate subjectivities which trigger processes that involve a contradiction between the Mapuche and the Chilean state? Is it the hunger strike a practical reaffirmation of life, culture, rights, etc., of / in a closed down political space and contradictory in its closure and /or a point of tension that makes visible the fractured space from the constitution of the liberal ideology of the “democratic state”? and what is the internal conflict that presents the state from this practice of denial of life and cynical assertion of “democracy” and “democratic” for / in their ideological base?

The toilet as the Žižekian vase: On the implications of the Lacanian concept of cause to the critique of political economy
Gabriel Tupinambá

This paper departs from the following question: what constitutes the specificity of a properly Žižekian problem - that is, of a problem born out of the inclusion of Žižek, who is himself a Lacanian, into the Lacanian field?
Our wager is that a brief comparison of the more “orthodox” Lacanian position with Žižek’s own stance promptly reveals how two interrelated points have a decisive status in this distinction: the different interpretations of the destiny of Lacan’s conceptual and institutional innovations from the late 60’s and the (consequently) different conceptions of the political and philosophical limits of psychoanalysis. Using Žižek’s infamous ideological analysis of toilets as a privileged example of his usually overlooked contributions to the Lacanian conceptual framework, we will attempt to demonstrate how the problematics circumscribed by his work is profoundly determined by the complexities of a certain irreducible dimension of sociality, which cannot be accounted for in terms of an imaginary/symbolic substitute for the real impasses of sexuation - an otherwise common conception of the social space amongst Lacanians.

Finally, we will suggest that there is a crucial conceptual link between Žižek’s recent claim that “in the social field the ‘as if’ is the Thing itself” (Living in the End Times, p.285) and Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s Marxist study of “real abstraction” in Intellectual and Manual Labour. The paper concludes with an overview of how this correlation can produce interesting consequences for the re-assessment of the place and function of the critique of political economy in our contemporary neo-liberal milieu - for example, allowing us to distinguish between the practical and the rather clinical dimensions of political struggle in terms of the difference between effective and material causes.

Rethinking the political: A genealogy of the “antagonism” in Carl Schmitt through the lens of Laclau-Mouffe-Žižek
Ricardo Camargo

In this paper, I will argue that a re-analysis of the notion of antagonism within political theory, particularly in the works of Carl Schmitt, would be key to understand how Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Slavoj Žižek ascribe in a singular way to the particular political distinction that Schmitt proposes in his classic text The Concept of the Political. This, in turn, would broaden the current frontiers of the political. In this regard, this paper will propose an updated genealogy of the notion of the political in Schmitt, focusing on the Concept of the Political (1932) and the Theory of the Partisan (1963). This genealogical analysis would be done with the explicit intention of going back to the theoretical endeavor that Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek formulate on the notion of antagonism. If we observed this endeavour through the lens of such as updated notion of antagonism in Schmitt work, it would result, we will argue, a notion of the political that combine ‘time of deliberation’ with ‘time of confrontation’, or if you prefer, in a Gramscian language: war of positions and war of maneuvers.

Class Struggle and New Forms of Apartheid: What does sexual difference tell us about urban slums ?
Chris McMillan

Slavoj Žižek is often celebrated for his brilliant theoretical endeavours, but derided for his apparently limited political demands. This position is strongly exemplified by Žižek’s conception of class struggle in which he attempts to rehabilitate a discrete Marxian point of resistance to capitalism by reference to the Lacanian Real: the point around which nothing can be said. Whilst Žižek’s conception of class struggle as the impossible point around which political economy is founded is a brilliant insight intervention into a difficult theoretical debate, it is difficult to know what to do with this insight.
Conversely, Žižek's work has been increasingly informed by a reference to concrete antagonisms within global capitalism, in particular what he labels ‘new forms of apartheid’, those excesses of labour existing in the slums of the ‘developing’ world and increasingly divided from the expanding wealth of these areas. Žižek suggests that these excluded populations constitute a ‘part-with-no-part’ within capitalism – constitutive of capitalism yet excluded from its ideological borders – and, as a consequence, its point of universality. By interpreting this understanding of universality as a modality of the Real, an opportunity exists to return to the Marxist orientation of class struggle as a modality of the Real, one that has both a concrete existence and a produces a troubling anxiety. Arguing that Žižek's work should be fundamentally considered as a response to global capitalism, in this paper I suggest that the political value of Žižek's theoretical constructions lies here at the intersection of his conception of class struggle and surplus labour, universality and the Real.
### Friday 29th June

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<tr>
<th>Time/Room</th>
<th>MS 416</th>
<th>MS 417</th>
<th>MS G16</th>
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<td>Critical Art I</td>
<td>Human Rights I</td>
<td>Common Life I</td>
<td>Post-structural Subject</td>
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<td>The Animal II</td>
<td>Emancipation I</td>
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<td>Žižek I</td>
<td>Deleuzian Theory I</td>
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<td>Critical Art III</td>
<td>Rhetoric I</td>
<td>Cosmopolitanism I</td>
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**Edinburgh University Press Book Launch and Reception**
18.00 – 21.00 Foyer of B01 Clore

**History and Becoming**, with author Craig Lundy

**Žižek and Communist Strategy**, with author Chris McMillan

### Saturday 30th June

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<td>The Object III</td>
<td>Žižek II</td>
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**Routledge Book Launch and Reception**
18.00 – 21.00 Foyer of B01 Clore

**New Critical Legal Thinking**
with
Matthew Stone, Illan Wall, and Costas Douzinas (eds.)
The Conference will be taking place in the Birkbeck Main Building (on Torrington Square) and the Clore Management Building. Throughout the programme the Clore management building will be referred to as 'Clore' and the main building as 'Malet Street', or 'MS'.

Registration, information and publishers books stands can be found in 152/153 MS on Friday, and G01 Clore on Saturday.

Online versions of BBK maps can be found here: [http://www.bbk.ac.uk/maps](http://www.bbk.ac.uk/maps)
EDINBURGH University Press

Visit our stand to take advantage of our conference discounts:
50% off hardbacks • 30% off paperbacks

And we look forward to welcoming you to our wine reception on Friday at 6pm in the Foyer outside of B01, Core Management Building to celebrate the launches of

*History and Becoming* by Craig Lundy and
*Žižek and Communist Strategy* by Chris McMillan

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